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ABSTRACT
This historical dissertation discusses the relationship between cigarette advertising and
student publications at colleges and universities across the United States. This study uses The
Orange and White at the University of Tennessee as a case study. Cigarette advertisements
were printed in student publications from the 1920-1921 academic year to the 1963-1964
academic year and provided a needed source of revenue for student newspapers. This
research examines the tactics and strategies that the tobacco industry used to target youth in
the absence of federal legislation. This dissertation is divided into five chapters, which
explain in detail the relationship between student publications, the tobacco industry, and
federal legislators such as the FTC. The chapters also look at the pervasiveness of cigarette
advertising in student newspapers on campus.
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When Thorwald Dockstader – sophomore, epicure, and sportsman – first took up smoking, he did not simply choose
the first brand of cigarettes that came to hand. He did what any sophomore, epicure, and sportsman would do: he
sampled many brands until he found the very best – a mild, rich, flavorful smoke – an endless source of comfort and
satisfaction – a smoke that never palled, never failed to please – a smoke that age could not whither nor custom stale –
a filter cigarette with an unfiltered taste – Marlboro of course! Text from a Marlboro Advertisement, The
Orange and White, 1963.

Chapter One: Introduction
Recent studies suggest that the ultimate goal of cigarette advertising past and present
has been to target college students. A young audience is the natural target for tobacco
companies because the majority of smokers start when they are in high school or college.1 In
spite of the industry’s public arguments that its advertising efforts were aimed exclusively at
brand loyalty and brand switching, their own internal documents contradict these claims.2
This research demonstrates that cigarette manufacturers carefully studied and knowingly
implemented marketing campaigns to attract young smokers at colleges and universities
from the 1920s-1960s. Support for this research is found in industry documents that show
the need and desirability of attaining a large share of the college student market and cigarette
advertisements and promotions placed in student newspapers at colleges and universities
across the nation, and more specifically The Orange and White at the University of Tennessee.
Before government entities such as the Federal Trade Commission, Food and Drug

K M Cummings, C P Morley, J K Horan, C Steger and N-R Leavell “Marketing to America's youth: evidence
from Corporate Documents” Tobacco Control, 11 (2002) pp. 5-17
Cheryl L. Perry, “The Tobacco Industry and Underage Youth Smoking: Tobacco Industry Documents From
the Minnesota Litigation” Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 153 (1999) pp. 935-941.
John P. Pierce, Won S. Choi, Elizabeth A. Gilpin, Arthur J. Farkas, and Charles C. Berry “Tobacco Industry
Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking” Journal of the American Medical Association, 279 (1998) pp.
511-515.
C. Everett Koop, David C. Kessler, and George D. Lundberg “Reinventing American Tobacco Policy:
Sounding the Medical Community's Voice” Journal of the American Medical Association, 279 (1998) pp. 550-552.
Richard W. Pollay; S. Siddarth; Michael Siegel; Anne Haddix; Robert K. Merritt; Gary A. Giovino; Michael P.
Eriksen “The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market Shares among Youths and Adults, 19791993” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 1-16.
2 K M Cummings, C P Morley, J K Horan, C Steger and N-R Leavell “Marketing to America's youth: evidence
from Corporate Documents” Tobacco Control, 11 (2002) pp. 5-17
Cheryl L. Perry, “The Tobacco Industry and Underage Youth Smoking: Tobacco Industry Documents From
the Minnesota Litigation” Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 153 (1999) pp. 935-941.
1
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Administration, and the U.S. Surgeon General began to take an interest in cigarette
advertising, the tobacco industry was able to market its product as much as it pleased.
Because a young market, that included college students, was the industry’s primary target, it
used publications that targeted teenagers and young adults to promote cigarette smoking.
The tobacco industry had the complete liberty to market its product without warnings or
restraints.
One of the primary vehicles that the tobacco industry used to target students was the
college newspaper. Financially strapped and desperate for advertising revenue, student
newspapers were eager to accept advertising dollars from the tobacco industry. The campus
newspapers’ national sales representatives sold large amounts of advertising space in student
publications across the nation to cigarette companies that were eager to attract new collegeaged smokers. Both the national advertising representatives and the tobacco industry made
handsome profits from the arrangement while some struggling student papers barely earned
enough revenue from the advertising sales to print the extra pages that the tobacco industry
required for their large advertisements.3
The issue of cigarette marketing is of public concern because cigarette smoking is a
major preventable cause of serious chronic disease. Medical research has clearly
demonstrated that nicotine is an addictive drug, arguably in the same category as morphine,
amphetamines, and cocaine. Although a variety of factors can influence a person’s decision
to smoke (e.g., parents who smoke, having friends who smoke, low self-esteem), researchers
are beginning to recognize the role that print advertising plays. Studies have recently

3

James C. Crimmins Successful Publishing on the Campus (New York: New York: Newsweek Inc., 1968) p. 71.
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concluded that frequent exposure to cigarette advertising significantly increases the
likelihood of starting a smoking habit.4
Very few references in the scholarly literature are made to cigarette advertising and
promotion on college campuses. However, from the large number of advertisements found
in college newspapers and internal industry documents, it appears that these publications
were an important marketing venue for the cigarette industry. Therefore, this research will
fill lacunae in the current scholarship on cigarette marketing and promotion.
In addition to filling gaps in the research, the history of tobacco marketing on
campus is an important piece of mass communication history. First, this history shows how
a powerful advertising force, such as the tobacco industry, can influence a relatively weak
collegiate press and undermine its goal of serving the student body’s best interest. Secondly,
it serves as a clear demonstration of the tobacco industry’s goal to target young adults.
Lastly, the advertisements demonstrate the tobacco industry’s high level of sophistication in
creating persuasive messages that appealed to young people and spoke to their needs and
concerns.
Therefore, primary focus of the research will be examining the role that cigarette
advertisements placed in student newspapers on college campuses played in persuading
millions of college students across the nation to start smoking. The advertisements in the
campus newspapers are of particular interest because they are a blatant example of how the
tobacco industry in the United States was trying to persuade generations of young Americans
to start smoking. In addition to being an obvious example of the industry’s interest in the
young adult market, the advertisements show the persuasive tactics and strategies that the
industry used in the absence of any significant government interference. In addition, this
Katherine Hawkins and Audrey Curtis Hane “Adolescents’ Perceptions of Print Cigarette Advertising: A Case
for Counteradvertising” Journal of Health Communication 5 (2000): pp.83-84.
4
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research will explore the political maneuverings that the tobacco industry engaged in to
prevent the FTC from removing or regulating the advertisements and the enactment of an
agreement that led to their removal from the student press in 1963.
Purpose of the Study:
The topic of cigarette advertising has been a popular subject of research in many
fields of study including mass communication, business, political science, and public health.
A basic concern has been the role of cigarette advertising in stimulating demand. Cigarette
smoking reached the height of its popularity between the 1950s and the 1970s. Given that
reaching a youth and young adult market was the industry’s goal, it seems useful to examine
the print advertisements that helped to persuade a generation of Americans to smoke.
This research reveals how cigarette companies’ promotional campaigns targeted
college students. College and university newspapers were the primary media vehicles for this
market. From the 1920s to the early 1960s cigarette companies were lucrative advertising
sponsors. Their advertising comprised approximately 40 percent of the national advertising
in most campus newspapers. Advertisements played an important role in creating and
reinforcing a culture in which smoking was seen as being glamorous and sophisticated,
enjoyable and pleasant, rugged and masculine (or chic and feminine), and symbolic of
independent thinking or coming of age.5 This research also demonstrates how cigarette
advertisers refined their product’s image to appeal to college students.
In order to examine this problem, the research will use The Orange and White, the
student newspaper at The University of Tennessee, as a case study. Although there are a
variety of factors that make The Orange and White unique, the advertisements found in the
newspaper are the same as would be found in any major college or university. Tobacco
Steve Craig and Terry Moellinger “‘So Rich, Mild, and Fresh’: A Critical Look at TV Cigarette Commercials,
1948-1971.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 25 (January 2001): p.55.
5
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industry media placement records show that the same advertisements were placed in nearly
every college and university newspaper in the nation.6 Tobacco companies were major
advertisers in campus student newspapers from the 1920s until 1963 when the FTC forced
the tobacco industry to discontinue its tobacco advertising in student publications.
In addition to providing a general introduction to the dissertation, the remainder of
this chapter will provide a review of the current research on advertising and tobacco, an
overview of the study of history in the field of mass communication, a review of textual
analysis methods, and a description of the documents and other texts used for this research.
Current Research on Advertising and Tobacco:
The topic of young adults and/or youth and smoking is a popular area of research
among marketing, advertising, and mass communication scholars. Smoking is an area of
interest because of the public health issues related to tobacco use, the age restrictions, and
the limitations placed on tobacco marketing. In addition, cigarettes are among the most
heavily advertised products in the United States.7 Some of the subject areas that have
received a significant amount of scholarly attention include: where advertising placement
such as magazines, billboards, the retail environment, or product placement in movies;
cigarette marketing strategies and branding; the psychology of youth and young adult
smoking; smoking regulation; and anti-smoking campaigns. However, very little research
takes a historical approach to studying cigarette advertising that targets young people.
Many researchers look at tobacco related advertising in magazines. For instance, a
variety of studies examine the frequency of youth exposure to cigarette advertising in
"Lucky Strike, Luckies Taste Better, Favorite Checker Contest, Tune-in, Light Up A Smoke Light Up A
Lucky, the Best Tasting Cigarette You Ever Smoked, Get the Honest Taste of A Lucky Strike, Tobacco and
Taste Too Fine to Filter, 1956 - 1959". 1956. Bates: ATX01 0147220-ATX01 0147734.
http://tobaccodocuments.org/atc/60233809.html
7 “US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Current trends in cigarette advertising—United States,
1988.” MMWR (1990) 39: pp. 261–5.
6
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magazines.8 Similar studies investigate whether cigarette brands popular among adolescent
smokers are more likely than adult brands to place advertisements in youth-oriented
magazines or magazines with high adolescent readerships. Another study examines how
adolescents attend to the product warnings found in cigarette advertisements that often run
in youth or young adult oriented magazines. In addition, magazine advertising research
studies specific kinds of cigarette advertising such as promotional advertising featuring
information relating to premiums, retail value added promotions, or coupons. Other studies
examine the specific persuasive appeals and images that are used to sell cigarettes in
magazine advertisements.9
Although the magazine is the most popular medium for scholarly research related to
cigarette advertising, scholars have also examined other media. For instance, many
advertising researchers look at the impact of billboards. Like magazine advertising, some
scholars examine the types of social cues that were used on billboards in an attempt to
persuade young people to start smoking. Other research looks at the demographics of the

Dean M. Krugman, Margaret A. Morrison, & Yongjun Sung “Cigarette Advertising in Popular Youth and
Adult Magazines: A Ten-Year Perspective” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 25 (2006) pp. 197-211.
Linda G. Pucci and Michael Siegel “Exposure to Brand-Specific Cigarette Advertising in Magazines and Its
Impact on Youth Smoking” Preventive Medicine 29, (1999) pp. 313–320.
Linda G Pucci and Michael Siegel “Features of sales promotion in cigarette magazine advertisements, 19801993: an analysis of youth” Tobacco Control 8 (1999) pp. 29-36.
9 Dean M. Krugman, Margaret A. Morrison, & Yongjun Sung “Cigarette Advertising in Popular Youth and
Adult Magazines: A Ten-Year Perspective” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 25 (2006) pp. 197-211.
Dean M. Krugman and Karen Whitehill King “Teenage Exposure to Cigarette Advertising in Popular
Consumer Magazines” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 19 (2000) pp. 183-188.
Charles King III; Michael Siegel; Carolyn Celebucki; Gregory N. Connolly “Adolescent Exposure to Cigarette
Advertising in Magazines: An Evaluation of Brand-Specific Advertising in Relation to Youth Readership”
Journal of the American Medical Association 279 (1998) pp. 516-520.
Linda G. Pucci and Michael Siegel “Exposure to Brand-Specific Cigarette Advertising in Magazines and Its
Impact on Youth Smoking” Preventive Medicine 29, (1999) pp. 313–320.
J. P. Pierce, E. Gilpin, D. M. Burns, E. Whalen, B. Rosbrook, D. Shopland and M. Johnson “Does tobacco
advertising target young people to start smoking? Evidence from California” Journal of the American Medical
Association (1991) p. 266.
Linda G Pucci and Michael Siegel “Features of sales promotion in cigarette magazine advertisements, 19801993: an analysis of youth” Tobacco Control 8 (1999) pp. 29-36.
David G. Altman et al. “How an Unhealthy Product Is Sold: Cigarette Advertising in Magazines, 1960-1985.”
Journal of Communication, 37 (1987) pp.95-106.
8
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neighborhoods targeted by billboards that advertise cigarettes. For instance, cigarette
billboards often target minority and poor neighborhoods.10 Because the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) prohibits tobacco advertising on billboards, cigarette
companies have begun using the environment outside of retail locations to promote their
product. For this reason, researchers are now studying the influence of cigarette advertising
that is visible from the outside of retail locations and how it has changed due to the MSA.11
In addition to studying advertisements outside retail establishments, tobacco scholars
also study promotional efforts that target customers inside the retail environment. Cigarette
manufacturers now spend more money on the retail outlet than any other venue. Therefore,
tobacco and cigarette research now focuses its attention on point-of-sale items, shelf
placement, and other retail strategies that tobacco companies employ. For instance,
according to the MSA tobacco items should be placed at least three feet from the floor,
should not be found next to candy, and should not feature cartoons. Therefore, researchers
study whether current cigarette merchandising complies with the MSA, the relationship
between point-of-purchase items and brand preference among underage smokers, and how
the cigarette industry targets youth and young adults with the retail locations it selects for the
majority of its merchandising efforts.12

Caroline Schooler, Michael D. Basil, & David G. Altman, “Alcohol and Cigarette Advertising on Billboards:
Targeting with Social Cues” Health Communication 8 (1996) pp.109-129.
David G. Altman, Caroline Schooler & Michael D. Basil “Alcohol and cigarette advertising on billboards”
Health Education Research, 6 (1991) pp. 487-490.
Diana P. Hackbarth, Barbara Silvestri, & William Cosper “Tobacco and Alcohol Billboards in 50 Chicago
Neighborhoods: Market Segmentation to Sell Dangerous Products to the Poor” Journal of Public Health Policy 16
(1995), pp. 213-230.
11 Carolyn C. Celebucki & K. Diskin “A longitudinal study of externally visible cigarette advertising on retail
storefronts in Massachusetts before and after the Master Settlement Agreement” Tobacco Control 11 (2002) pp.
ii47–ii53.
12 Ellen C Feighery, Kurt M Ribisl, Nina Schleicher, Rebecca E Lee and Sonia Halvorson “Cigarette advertising
and promotional strategies in retail outlets: results of a statewide survey in California” Tobacco Control 10 (2001)
pp. 184-188.
Melanie A. Wakefield, Erin E. Ruel, Frank J. Chaloupka, Sandy J. Slater, and Nancy J. Kaufman “Association
of Point-of-Purchase Tobacco Advertising and Promotions with Choice of Usual Brand among Teenage
10

7

Another promotional practice that is popular with cigarette brands is product
placement in films. Although the industry claims that it has not made placements since the
1980s the prevalence of smoking in the movies has steadily increased. For instance, several
studies have described how smoking is portrayed in movies, others have examined whether
product placement in movies influences adolescent smoking behavior, and the research has
looked at the gender issues related to smoking in films.13
Because of the high rate of smoking initiation among adolescents and young adults
and the hazardous health consequences of smoking, discouraging young people from
beginning to use tobacco is essential. Therefore, some scholarly research has reviewed
interventions and policies aimed at reducing youth and young adult cigarette smoking in the
United States such as antismoking campaigns. Other studies have been more specific in their
approach. For instance, some researchers have examined how non-profit organizations and
government agencies use social marketing to devise advertising that prevents children and
youth from initiating smoking.14 On the other hand, scholars have also explored the

Smokers” Journal of Health Communication 7 (2002) pp. 113-121.
L. Henriksen, E. C. Feighery, N. C. Schleicher, H. H. Haladjian, S. P. Fortmann “Reaching youth at the point
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(2004) pp. 315–318.
13 S. A. Everett, R. L. Schnuth, J. L. Tribble “Tobacco and alcohol use in top grossing American films.” Journal
of Community Health 23 (1998) pp.317–24.
A. R. Hazan, H. L. Lipton, & S. A. Glantz “Popular films do not reflect current tobacco use.” American Journal
of Public Health 84 (1994) pp. 998–1000.
Madeline A Dalton, James D Sargent, Michael L Beach, Linda Titus-Ernstoff, Jennifer J Gibson, M Bridget
Ahrens, Jennifer J Tickle, & Todd F Heatherton “Effect of viewing smoking in movies on adolescent smoking
initiation: a cohort study” Lancet 2003; 362: pp. 281–85.
James D. Sargent, Michael L. Beach, Anna M. Adachi-Mejia, Jennifer J. Gibson, Linda T. Titus-Ernstoff,
Charles P. Carusi, Susan D. Swain, Todd F. Heatherton, & Madeline A. Dalton “Exposure to Movie Smoking:
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Gina Escamilla, Angie L Cradock, & Ichiro Kawachi “Women and Smoking in Hollywood Movies: A Content
Analysis” American Journal of Public Health 90 2000 pp. 412-414
14 Laura A. Peracchio and David Luna “The Development of an Advertising Campaign to Discourage Smoking
Initiation among Children and Youth” Journal of Advertising 37 (1998) pp. 49-56.
Alan Andreasen "A Social Marketing Research Agenda for Consumer Behavior Researchers," in Advances in
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Research, Vol. 20, (1993), pp. 1-5.
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increasing problems with youth and tobacco in developing nations.15
In addition to exploring the various media used to help persuade youth and young
adults about tobacco use, some research examines the psychology of smoking. For instance,
some research explores the relationship between having peers who smoke and becoming a
smoker. Other research explores concepts related to adolescent development to explain why
youth begin smoking. Some research identifies specific socio-demographic, environmental,
behavioral, and personal variables that predispose individuals to start smoking.16
History and Mass Communication
The quest for excellent historical research in the field of mass communication is not
new. Nearly half a century ago, Allan Nevins, a journalist turned historian, called attention
to many of the problems that account for the thin and uneven quality of writing in this
branch of history.17 Historical research involves both documents and a critical method for
their evaluation. Nevins once said that “history was not born – it could not be born – until
both these elements came into existence.”18 Writing communication history involves
knowledge of the media at some point in the past but also a general understanding of the life

Adolescents Perceptions of Peers Who Smoke," Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (1994), pp. 236-251.
Paula M Lantz, Peter D Jacobson, Kenneth E Warner, Jeffrey Wasserman, Harold A. Pollack, Julie Berson,
Alexis Ahlstrom “Investing in youth tobacco control: a review of smoking prevention and control strategies”
Tobacco Control 2000; 9: pp. 47-63.
15 Charles W. Warren, Leanne Riley, Samira Asma, Michael P. Eriksen, Lawrence Green, Curtis Blanton, Cliff
Loo, Scott Batchelor, & Derek Yach “Tobacco use by youth: a surveillance report from the Global Youth
Tobacco Survey project” Bulletin of the World Health Organization vol.78 no.7 Genebra July 2000
16 Gilbert J. Botvin, Catherine J. Goldbery, Elizabeth M. Botvin, Linda Dusenbury “Smoking Behavior of
Adolescents Exposed to Cigarette Advertising” Public Health Reports 108 (1993) pp. 217-224
Kaplan, H.: Patterns of juvenile delinquency: social origins, continuities, and consequences. Sage Publications, Newbury
Park, CA, 1984.
Dean M. Krugman, William H. Quinn, Yongjun Sung & Margaret Morrison “Understanding the Role of
Cigarette Promotion and Youth Smoking in a Changing Marketing Environment” Journal of Health
Communication 10 (2005) pp. 261–278.
Suzanne L Tyas and Linda L Pederson “Psychosocial factors related to adolescent smoking: a critical review of
the literature” Tobacco Control 7 (1998) pp. 409-420.
17 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989) p.113.
18 Allan Nevins, The Gateway to History, new rev ed. (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Company Inc.,
1962).
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and thought of that time. The sources used to conduct communication history should reflect
these two concerns.19
Mass communication historians today profess a new interest in many things about
the past such as advertising, newspaper readership, public opinion, the media and violence,
and sensationalism. They are also interested in how people behave in groups and society in
general. To proceed in investigating such topics in communication history without
investigating what sociologists have said about them would be unwise. The same, of course,
can be said of sociologists that explore the same questions, for there is a definite historical
component to any sociological explanation. This is not to suggest that sociology should
become history or history sociology. Simply, the point is that two disciplines can overlap in
terms of subject, and at those points it is logical to expect intellectual interaction to occur.20
Advertising and History
Much of the history written about advertising has supported one side or another in
the dispute over advertising’s effects on consumers. Whereas much of the early historical
work of advertising was produced as a kind of defense of advertising, much of the later work
has been active in its opposition to advertising. Those who wrote as insiders tended to
commend the process; on the other hand, those on the outside tended to attack advertising
as a societal blight.21
In the field of advertising history, the compositional structure shows considerable
diversity. Early advertising history tended to be broadly descriptive and anecdotal. The
majority of advertising’s history was created in bits and pieces by writers and scholars
James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989) p.49.
20 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989) p.50.
21 Donald R. Avery “Advertising, 1900-Present: Capitalist Tool or Economic Necessity?” In Perspectives on Mass
Communication History, Wm. David Sloan editor. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991) p. 243.
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interested in the history of advertising only peripherally. The later work has been cultural and
social and focuses on American culture and social mores instead of advertising itself.22
Like mass communication research, advertising scholarship falls into several
historical schools. The Developmental approach is usually descriptive and seeks answers
through an incremental accounting of ever advancing advertising techniques. The Business
and Economic historical approach held a similarly favorable view of advertising but was
concerned primarily with the dynamics of the advertising industry and the positive part it
played in the American economic system. On the other hand, the Cultural school was almost
always disparaging. It viewed advertising as being a mirror of society, either being influenced
by its surroundings or having an influence on them. Alternatively, Ideological historians
viewed advertising in a narrower context. They viewed advertising in the context of sociopolitical issues. Ideological historians comprise two groups, Progressive historians and
Marxist historians. The Progressive school explained advertising as it related to democratic
principles and to the clash between the masses and the wealthy class. Lastly, the Marxist
school denounces all approaches but its own. Marxists interpreted advertising history as a
classic class struggle and efforts aimed at reforming advertising as an exercise in futility.23
The Cultural School:
As far as historical approaches in adverting history are concerned, this research fits
best within the Cultural school. Using this approach, scholars view the media in general and
advertising in particular as mirrors of society. Advertising influences culture and society and
is influenced and shaped by those same societal factors.24
Donald R. Avery “Advertising, 1900-Present: Capitalist Tool or Economic Necessity?” In Perspectives on Mass
Communication History, Wm. David Sloan editor. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991) p. 243.
23 Donald R. Avery “Advertising, 1900-Present: Capitalist Tool or Economic Necessity?” In Perspectives on Mass
Communication History, Wm. David Sloan editor. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991) p. 243.
24 Donald R. Avery “Advertising, 1900-Present: Capitalist Tool or Economic Necessity?” In Perspectives on Mass
Communication History, Wm. David Sloan editor. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991) p. 247.
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The inspiring force of the Cultural interpretation can be traced back to the work of
Robert E. Park, one of the faculty members at the University of Chicago who studied urban
sociology. Park argued that the evolution of American journalism resulted from its
interaction with the surrounding culture in “The Natural History of the Newspaper,”
published in 1925. The press, he asserted, was
…the outcome of a historic process in which many individuals participated without
foreseeing what the ultimate product of their labors would be. The newspaper, like
the modern city, is not wholly a rational product. No one sought to make it what it
is. In spite of all of the efforts of individual men and generations of men to control
it and make it something after their own heart, it has continued to grow and change
in its own incalculable ways. 25
The primary factors in determining the nature of the newspaper, Park stated, were the
conditions of the society and the system in which the press operated. 26
While some historians in other schools had attempted to explain the media as
institutions somewhat separate from society, cultural historians considered the media as part
of society and therefore influenced by various factors outside of the media themselves.
While most historians had assumed that the media had a major influence on society, cultural
historians began to study the opposite effect: the impact of society on the media. This
perspective accounted for a major change in historical outlook.27
The study of cultural history in mass communication expands beyond journalism to
advertising and economics. In People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character,
David Potter expands on advertising’s influence on the development of materialistic values
in the United States. He argued that the most distinctive characteristic of American culture

Robert E. Park “The Natural History of the Newspaper” in Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Robert D.
McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925) p. 88.
26 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989) p.36.
27 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan Historical Methods in Mass Communication (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1989) p.36.
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was materialism that resulted from affluence and an abundance of goods produced by its
economic system. In such a system, the role of advertising was central.28
According to Potter, the role of advertising was to stimulate consumers to purchase
goods. In achieving this goal, it had been extremely successful. Potter wrote,
Advertising is not badly needed in an economy of scarcity, because total demand is
unusually equal to or in excess of total supply, and every producer can normally
sell as much as he produces. It is when potential supply outstrips demand – that is
when abundance prevails – that advertising begins to fulfill a really essential
economic function.29
Therefore, in the early 1900s, as the American economy began producing more goods than
necessary for the people’s needs, producers used advertising to encourage the public to shift
its thinking from needs to desires so that the emphasis was on consumption. That change
revised the culture in the United States.30
Like Potter, Michael Schudson also studied the relationship between advertising and
consumption. Schudson argued that advertising helped to shape society in the United States
in detrimental ways. Though more interested in modern analysis of advertising than in
history, his interpretation of the cultural role of advertising exemplified the approach of
historians who emphasized “symbolic meaning” as the essence of mass communication.
Schudson wrote that no one has been so crude as to believe advertising created the
‘consumer culture’ alone, but few critics of advertising have looked at what else besides
advertising could have created the consumerism that exists today.31

David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1954) pp.166-167.
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31 Michael Shudson, Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984) p.13.
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Text Analysis and Methodology:
There is growing interest in the social sciences in the systematic analysis of text. This
growing interest is a result of the large amount of human thought and behavior that is
recorded in one type of text or another. Two broad traditions in textual analysis exist: the
linguistic tradition and the sociological tradition. The linguistic tradition treats the text itself as the
object of analysis. On the other hand, the sociological tradition treats text as a window to
human experience. Because of the sociological underpinnings of this research, the text
analysis will be derived from the sociological tradition.
Those in the sociological tradition view texts as elements of social events that are
said to have causal effects because they bring about changes. For instance, texts can bring
about immediate changes in our level or knowledge because we can learn from them, our
values, our attitudes, and our beliefs. Texts can also have more long-term effects. For
instance, one could argue that prolonged experience of advertising and other commercial
texts contributes to shaping people’s identities as consumers or even their gender identities.
Therefore, texts have causal effects upon, and contribute to, changes in people, social
relations, and the material world.32
However, texts do not create a simple mechanical causality. For example, one
cannot claim that particular features of texts automatically bring about specific changes in an
individual’s knowledge or behavior or specific social or political effects. Likewise, there may
be no regular cause or effect pattern that is associated with a particular type of text or
particular features of text. However, this lack of regular cause does not mean that there are
no causal effects. Texts can have causal effects without their being regular effects because

32

Norman Fairclough Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (New York: Routledge, 2003) p. 8.

14

many other factors in the context determine whether particular texts actually have such
effects and can lead to a particular text having a variety of effects.33
Many theories of social constructivism emphasize the role of texts in the
construction of the social world. Although individuals may textually represent the social
world in particular ways, whether our representations have the effect of changing the social
construction depends on contextual factors. These factors include the way social reality
already is and who is interpreting it. Therefore, sociologists can accept a moderate version
of the claim that the social world is textually constructed but not an extreme version.34
Grounded Theory and Textual Analysis:
Grounded theory is one the methods of textual analysis that is frequently used by
scholars in the sociological tradition. Grounded theory is a set of techniques that can be
used to provide a rigorous and detailed method for identifying categories and concepts that
emerge from the text and it helps the researcher to link concepts into substantive and formal
theories.35 Although grounded theory is often used for analyzing interviews, it seems that it
could also be used to identify themes that emerge in advertising messages.
The mechanics of grounded theory are deceptively simple: review a sample of text,
identify themes that arise, and as analytic categories emerge, identify examples from the
categories and compare them considering not only which text belongs in each emerging
category but also how the categories are linked together. The relationships among the
categories are then used to build theoretical models. These models are constantly being
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checked against the data. Grounded theory is an iterative process by which the analyst
becomes increasingly grounded in the data and develops an increasingly rich concept or
model of how the phenomenon being studied really works.36
Texts Used for this Research:
Newspapers as Historical Texts:
The old proverb “familiarity breeds contempt” can aptly be applied to the
newspaper. Its availability becomes, in the eyes of the public, the best reason for disregarding
it. Unconsciously, this same idea has been the basis of the procedure of the historian.
Historians often give more credence to material that is more difficult to find.37
Historian Lucy Maynard Salmon believes that important historical records are kept in
newspaper advertisements. Salmon said that the student of history finds in studying the
advertiser an important record of changes in the business management of the press. If the
advertiser has unduly influenced the press to suppress news undesirable for special business
interests, it has been the press itself that has set the danger signal. If the advertiser has been
unfair in its dealings with the public, it has been the press that has led the campaign for
honest advertising and that has found its greatest allies among the advertisers themselves.38
The historian uses the newspaper in an effort to reconstruct the past. And, the
historian may therefore find both the authoritative and the unauthoritative parts to be
valuable. The authoritative parts are necessary in giving an accurate account of past events.
The unauthoritative parts may be of value in determining ideals and standards. The historian
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is not concerned simply with the accounts of material events but also the interpretation of
the spirit of a time or locality.39
The historian thus finds in the very processes of newspaper advertising valuable
records of the changing business standards of the press. The historian finds in all
commercial advertising a perfect record of the conditions out of which it has grown.
Advertising presents a record of corporate extravagance and wastefulness, of shortsighted
business policy that accepts questionable advertisements, and philanthropic calls for help
made through an advertising appeal. The “ad-less newspaper” so often urged as a remedy
for all of the evils laid at the door of the press would not only prove as a panacea, but it
would deprive society of the most flawless mirror of itself and the historian of the most
unimpeachable evidence at his or her command.40
Therefore, newspaper advertisement serves the historian in every part of his effort to
reconstruct the past. If the advertisement is true, the facts it states are of value. If the
advertisement is not true, that in and of itself is a record of the low moral standards that
were tolerated but not acknowledged by the press and the public. Moreover, the
advertisement, true or false, is an invaluable record of the normal life in the past. The record
is essential because advertisements made a record of the material, intellectual and moral
conditions in the past.41
Master Settlement Agreement and Tobacco Documents:
The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) is an agreement that was signed in
November 1998 by the tobacco industry and the attorneys general in 46 states and five U.S.
territories. The agreement resolved lawsuits filed by the attorneys general against the tobacco
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industry and provided funds to the states to compensate them for taxpayer money that was
spent on patients and family members with tobacco-related diseases. Among the many other
provisions, the agreement required that tobacco billboard advertising be removed and that
tobacco companies stop using cartoon characters to sell cigarettes. The tobacco companies
also agreed not to target youth in the advertising, marketing and promotion of their
products. The MSA also called for the creation of a foundation -- the American Legacy
Foundation -- to counteract tobacco use.42
In addition to agreeing to limitations on advertising, that tobacco companies also
agreed to make many of their internal documents available to the public. The major vehicle
that the tobacco companies use to make their documents available is the Internet. For
instance, the MSA states:
The Original Participating Manufacturers will maintain at their expense their Internet
document websites accessible through "TobaccoResolution.com" or a similar
website until June 30, 2010. The Original Participating Manufacturers will maintain
the documents that currently appear on their respective websites and will add
additional documents to their websites…43
The individual tobacco companies must continue to update the documents until 2010. The
MSA continues by stating:
Unless copies of such documents are already on its website, each Original
Participating Manufacturer and Tobacco-Related Organization will place on its
website copies of documents produced in any production of documents that takes
place on or after the date 30 days before the MSA Execution Date in any federal or
state court civil action concerning smoking and health. Copies of any documents
required to be placed on a website pursuant to this subsection will be placed on such
website within the later of 45 days after the MSA Execution Date or within 45 days
after the production of such documents in any federal or state court action
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concerning smoking and health. This obligation will continue until June 30, 2010.44
However, there are certain documents that the MSA does not require the tobacco industry
to post. The MSA states:
(1) it continues to claim to be privileged, a trade secret, confidential or proprietary
business information, or that contain other information not appropriate for public
disclosure because of personal privacy interests or contractual rights of third parties;
or
(2) continue to be subject to any protective order, sealing order or other order or
ruling that prevents or limits a litigant from disclosing such documents.45
Internet-Based Tobacco Databases:
As part of the Master Settlement Agreement between the States and the tobacco
companies, the industry was required to make the documents used during the various
tobacco trials available. The companies posted the documents on their websites, but
searching required going to a variety of sites, each with a different interface.
In 1988, Tobacco.org began with Gene Borio's news-posting service on
Compuserve, where Borio was a forum leader, Prodigy, and later AOL. An electronic
bulletin board service started in 1993, and the website began in 1996. Since 2000, the website
has been run by Gene Borio and Michael Tacelosky. Tobacco.org is a free resource center
focusing on tobacco and smoking issues. It features tobacco news, information, help for
smokers trying to quit, alerts on tobacco control issues, and open consideration of all aspects
of the spectrum of issues concerning tobacco, nicotine, cigarettes and cigars.46
The MSA required the industry to submit a snapshot of their sites as of July 1999.
Tobacco Documents Online (TDO) spent more than a year creating standard document
“Master Settlement Agreement” Office of the Attorney General: State of California Department of Justice
http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/1msa.pdf?PHPSESSID=c0699bff2494cc2a9b77e884b43e7412 p.23 (Retrieved
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descriptions to allow uniform searching, and through the American Legacy Foundation, it
obtained tapes of the document images. TDO provides powerful searching across all the
companies, access to high-quality images, as well as the ability to collect and annotate
documents. These tools were built for document researchers, and are available to anyone
with a web browser.47
The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (LTDL) contains seven million documents
related to advertising, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and scientific research of tobacco
products. Visitors can search, view, and download these documents from this website.48
The LTDL includes documents posted on tobacco industry web sites as of July 1999
in accordance with the Master Settlement Agreement, additional documents added to those
sites since that date, and the Brown & Williamson document collections from the Tobacco
Control Archives maintained by the University of California, San Francisco. New documents
are added monthly as they are collected from industry websites.49
Internal tobacco industry documents comprise the bulk of the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library. The documents were made available through litigation brought by the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) that resulted in the Master Settlement
Agreement (1998). As a result of the MSA, the collection will continue to be updated as
documents become available until June 30th, 2010.50
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Organization of this Study:
Although scholarly research has examined the history of cigarette advertising, it has
not specifically addressed the role of cigarette advertising and promotion on college and
university campuses. This study will provide some of the first insights into this important
piece of advertising and tobacco industry history. The purpose of this study is to help
provide answers to two overriding questions.
R1: How did cigarette advertising and promotion on campus endeavor to persuade
students to start smoking from 1920-1963?
R2: What stopped advertisers from promoting cigarettes in campus newspapers in
1963?
This first chapter of the dissertation relates the purpose of the study and the research
questions. The chapter discusses the historical perspective used for this research, the
methodology that will be used, and the research materials that will be compiled to comprise
the majority of the data for the study.
The second chapter of the study comprises a historical review of the topic. In
addition to serving as a review of the current histories on tobacco, the chapter will also relate
a general history of the tobacco industry, tobacco advertising, and anti-tobacco movements
in the United States. The goal of this chapter will be to create a general historical and cultural
context for the cigarette promotion that became common on college and university
campuses across the United States.
The third chapter in this dissertation discusses the relationship between the tobacco
industry and American universities. The history and purpose of the student newspaper on
college and university campuses is of particular importance to this research. This chapter
also discusses campus newspapers in general and references specific student newspapers that

21

set important precedents. The chapter also explains the role of the student newspaper on
campus and ethical and legal issues related to the campus or student press. In addition, the
chapter provides a brief history of The Orange and White, the student newspaper at the
University of Tennessee. The issue of generating funds from campus activity fees and
advertising will be of particular interest as will be national advertising sales agencies such as
College Newspaper Business Advertising Managers, Inc. (CBAM) and the National
Educational Advertising Service (NEAS). In addition, the chapter will discuss the
university’s role in conducting research relating to tobacco cultivation. The goal of this
chapter is to provide background information relating to student newspapers and the
presence of the tobacco industry on university campuses. The chapter also shows how the
tobacco industry targeted colleges and universities to reach a young audience. Chapter three
also discusses how the national advertising sales agents used student newspapers to make a
handsome profit from selling advertising space in student publications to cigarette
manufacturers.
The fourth chapter discusses the Federal Trade Commission’s involvement in the
issue of tobacco and youth. In addition to addressing the FTC, the chapter will also look at
the Tobacco Institute’s efforts to protect the interests of the tobacco industry and its youth
market. Much of the information for this chapter comes from internal documents released
from the Master Settlement Agreement. This chapter demonstrates the power of the
Tobacco Institute and the difficulties that the FTC faced when trying to regulate tobacco
advertising before the Surgeon General’s Report. The chapter ends by discussing the FTC’s
role in stopping cigarette manufacturers from printing advertisements in youth publications,
which include student newspapers.
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The fifth chapter examines the actual newspaper advertisements placed in The Orange
and White. Cigarette manufactures became important advertisers in campus newspapers
during the 1920s as cigarette smoking became socially acceptable. During the 1920s, as the
habit gained acceptance among a female market, cigarette advertisements began to feature
women. In addition, an increasing number of brands began to use student publications to
promote their cigarettes. After the 1920s, cigarette manufacturers became major advertisers
in campus papers and began to use more sophisticated advertising strategies. In addition,
cigarette manufacturers began using an integrated promotional strategy that combined print
and broadcast media to advertise their brands. During World War II, advertising took on a
patriotic tone. The number of advertisements also was greatly reduced during the war years
as the young adult population that comprised the college market moved from the college
and university campus to the war fronts in Europe and the Pacific. The 1950s marked the
start of the regulation of cigarette advertising. In spite of the regulation, the advertisements
increased in size and frequency. However, the regulations were not strictly enforced and
largely ignored by the cigarette manufacturers. Cigarette advertising remained in the student
newspapers until 1963 when the industry removed the advertising because of pressure from
the FTC. This chapter’s goal is to study the frequency of cigarette advertising and the
strategies and tactics used to attract new smokers.
The sixth chapter discusses the findings of the study and draws meaningful
conclusions from the research and demonstrates how the findings apply to the larger fields
of advertising and tobacco research. The chapter also identifies specific themes frequently
found in cigarette advertisements published in The Orange and White and relates these themes
to popular marketing strategies and tactics identified in chapter five. The chapter concludes
with ideas for further study.
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Summary:
The relationship between cigarette addiction and tobacco youth and young adult
marketing is an important facet of the smoking and public health issues that faced our
society in the 20th century and continue to be a concern in the 21st century. The goal of this
research is to explore key issues related to the marketing of tobacco on college campuses
from the 1920s-1963. Internal documents made available by the MSA will be used to help
explain why the tobacco industry decided to stop advertising in campus publications.
Advertisements from a college newspaper will be used to study how the cigarette advertisers
targeted the youth and young adult market.
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Chapter 2: An Overview of Smoking and Tobacco Use and Promotion
Smoking must be one of the strangest habits among humans – the only creature that
takes smoke into the body for pleasure. Purposefully inhaling smoke into the lungs would
seem unnatural and contrary to the organs’ purpose. However, the practice is as old as
civilization. Ancient Greeks, Indians, and Arabians all practiced the inhalation of various
herbs and other substances for medical and ceremonial purposes.51 Although smoking is not
new, at the turn of the 20th century cigar smoking was common, cigarette smoking was seen
as somewhat decadent and slightly subversive habit. Smoking was considered a male custom
associated with “rough-and-ready boys, dandies, and improper women.”52 However, by the
1950s more than one third of U.S. women smoked.53 Some estimates state that by the 1950s
the total population of smokers had reached nearly 70 million.54 This startling shift leads one
to question how this habit that was once obscure could have attained such popularity.
Many factors contributed to the prevalence of cigarette smoking. In addition to the
addictive nature of tobacco, industrialization and mechanization were key factors. The
commercial production of cigarettes had been a cottage industry until 1881 when James A.
Bonsack invented a cigarette-making machine. Then, in 1883 James Buchanan Duke, who
had inherited his father’s tobacco business in Durham, North Carolina, purchased two
cigarette machines. In five years time, Duke’s company was selling nearly a billion cigarettes
annually, far more than any other producer.55 Other manufacturers soon followed in Duke’s
footsteps. The cigarette industry was rapidly becoming a major force in the U.S. economy.
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In addition to mass production, marketing played a key role in the spread of the
habit. Until World War I, cigarette production in the United States remained relatively stable.
Once the United States entered the conflict in 1917, the National Cigarette Service
Committee distributed millions of free cigarettes to the troops in France. The cigarettes
became such a morale booster that General Pershing demanded priority for their shipment
to the front. The war solidified the habit among the American people. Between 1910 and
1919 cigarette production increased by 633 percent, from less than ten billion annually to
nearly 70 billion annually.56
Marketing was essential to the success of the cigarette. Young people were the
natural target because virtually all smokers begin smoking when they are teenagers or young
adults.57 After World War I, tobacco manufacturing had completed its long transition from a
laid-back country craft to an aggressive commercial war on a national battlefield. In this
fight, advertising was the primary weapon. At the dawn of the 1920s, advertising was
repetitious, grating, and emotional. Color advertisements showing movie stars appealing to
the audience to try their particular brand promised social approval to youth and young
adults. Advertising that made cigarette smoking seem sensible, even healthful, stimulated
more sales as medical doctors, athletes, and celebrities gladly signed testimonials. The
millions spent on advertising were directed at capturing new smokers, fostering brand
loyalty, and increasing brand consciousness. Effectively reaching a young audience was vital
to fostering the national smoking habit.58
Early History of the Cigarette Industry in the U.S. and the Tobacco Opposition:
Early History
The cigarette did not start out as a popular way to consume tobacco. Traditionalists
and old-fashioned men smoked pipes. On the other hand, rural men and those who wanted
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to be thought of as “tough guys” chewed from the plug. Americans who wanted to imitate
the style of European aristocrats used dry snuff. Successful businessmen smoked Cuban
cigars while poor workingmen enjoyed penny stogies. Very few American women smoked,
or at least admitted to using tobacco. To be seen with a cigar or any other form of tobacco
marked a woman as being eccentric, rustic, fast, loose, or advanced. Few women sought
these labels a century and a quarter ago.59
American men enjoyed tobacco. The initial chew, the first homemade pipe, and the
cheap cigar lit behind the barn were each considered important rites of passage. Some
parents might warn that smoking stunted growth and that it fouled the breath, but few
outside of dedicated anti-smoking circles made any significant effort to prevent young men
and boys from taking up the habit. The only question that remained was what type of
tobacco should be used.60
Fine artisans still fashioned snuff boxes, but the business was declining along with
the use of that product. However, the chewing tobacco market was expanding. The cigar
was deemed the cleanest form of leaf because its sole byproduct was ash. Elegant cigar
smokers owned silver cutters, pocket cases fashioned of precious metals and leather, and
humidors. Further, the ability to enjoy, judge, and collect cigars was considered as much of a
social grace as the knowledge of fine wines and their proper maintenance.61
However, the decade’s biggest tobacco news was the emergence of the cigarette as
something more than a novelty but less than a socially acceptable habit in most parts of the
nation. There is no way of knowing how many were consumed before the Civil War, since
the government did not keep such statistics at the time. In 1880 half a billion cigarettes were
sold in the United States, and this figure is for manufactured products alone – the roll-yourowns added approximately one billion to the total.
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During the 1860s, when Phillip Morris started rolling its first cigarettes, cigarettes
started to become a widely recognized form of tobacco consumption. Tobacco played an
important role in the Civil War. Tobacco was supported in the South by tobacco revenues
and in the North by a tax. The Civil War was also the first time a government, the
Confederacy, issued tobacco rations to its army. The mingling of soldiers from the North
and South aided the spread of the cigarette in the U.S. For instance, Confederate soldiers
would often trade their cigarettes to Union soldiers for food and supplies.62
By the 1880s the cigarette had a constituency of sorts. In the 1880s, it appeared to be
small and marginal. For most of the 19th Century, tobacco users stuck to chewing tobacco or
smoking cigars or pipes. The skill needed to produce cigarettes limited the growth of the
industry.63 However, those who did smoke cigarettes were mostly the poor, new immigrants,
or dandies in the large eastern cities. Cigarette smoking was not acceptable among middle
class men. However, some sophisticated upper-class women in large eastern cities
occasionally smoked. They primarily smoked Turkish and Russian brands in somewhat the
same spirit as middle-aged Americans today might make a deal for a few joints of marijuana.
The purchase produced a feeling of guilt and excitement. These women smoked within the
privacy of their bedrooms or parlors, often in secrecy.64
After the Civil War, a former Confederate solider named Washington Duke
converted his family farm and turned it into a family pipe-tobacco business. However,
competition from other brands, specifically the Bull Durham brands, created the need to
search for a new niche. Washington Duke’s oldest son “Buck” Duke saw potential in the
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cigarette. Though the cigarette market was tiny, the habit was gaining popularity in urban
areas in England and New York.65
In 1881 Duke returned to Durham to begin the conversion to cigarettes. He did not
relish the change because, like most middle class Southerners, he considered cigarettes to be
effeminate and alien. Although they were gaining popularity in the Northeast, tobacco users
in the South still preferred cigars and chewing tobacco, or plug.66
Duke believed that there were four facets of the cigarette business: (1) the growing,
purchasing, and blending of tobacco, (2) the manufacture and packaging of cigarettes, (3)
distribution, and (4) advertising. Duke’s primary contribution to the cigarette industry was
revolutionizing how cigarettes were produced and how the product was positioned in the
market. Duke had a view of cigarettes that was different from most people in the industry.
Most producers thought of cigarettes as small cigars and tried to make them through a cigarmaking process. Unlike the other producers, Duke considered cigarettes to be “cheap
smoke” that could capture cigar smokers on the basis of price and advertising. Duke
believed that cigarettes were an entirely new product, and not simply a paper cigar. Duke
used the cigarette producing machine or “Emery machine” created by James Bonsack of
Virginia. The machine could produce more than 200 cigarettes a minute. This was more
than 40 times the number of cigarettes that the best skilled workers could roll by hand.67
The mechanized cigarette producing process increased the volume and decreased the price
of producing the product.68 When Duke turned exclusively to machine production in 1885,
he quickly saturated the market in the United States because of the sharp increase in the
number of cigarettes he could manufacture. Because production was no longer an issue, the
primary task was selling the large amount of cigarettes he could produce to the public.69
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In addition to revolutionizing the cigarette, Duke showed his understanding of the
cigarette market. Duke understood that Americans were upwardly mobile. And, it would be
the same with smoking tobacco. Men might begin smoking tobacco with American
cigarettes but if they did well they would graduate up to foreign brands and cigars.
Therefore, the cheap cigarette had a limited future. The cigarette was destined for the role of
the initiator of the young into smoking. And, Duke would keep them as customers as long as
they were not wealthy enough to afford cigars.70
Duke’s ultimate goal was to dominate the entire tobacco business. First, he planned
to engulf the other cigarette firms and take over all forms of tobacco production. Duke
started the process by intensifying his advertising and lowering prices. Eventually, retailers
earned 50 percent more profit by selling W. Duke Sons than any other competitor’s brand.
Duke bought out the competition and formed the American Tobacco Company on January
31, 1890. However, the tobacco trust was short lived. The first antitrust action was brought
against American Tobacco in April of 1890 and the litigation lasted until the Supreme Court
dissolved the trust in May of 1911.71
Cigarette smoking grew in popularity from 1880 onward. By 1890, the use of
cigarette tobacco ran even with snuff. The sales of cigarettes grew into the 1890s. However,
cigarette use fell from 1900-1905 and only equaled snuff sales again in 1911. Cigarettes did
not reach the same level as any other tobacco form until the start of the 1920s when it
surpassed cigars, pipe tobaccos, and chewing tobacco or plug. Cigarettes comprised more
than half of all tobacco use by 1935.72
Early Opposition to Smoking and Tobacco use:
To many, the Surgeon General’s Report in 1964 represents the beginnings of the
tobacco and health controversy. However, issues relating to the side effects of tobacco have
virtually always followed the industry. King James I of England actively voiced his concerns
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about the first tobacco crops being grown in Virginia73. He stated that tobacco was
“loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain” and “dangerous to the
lungs.”74 One of tobacco’s earliest detractors was published in Britain in 1604, A Counterblast
to Tobacco. Although originally it was anonymous, the tract now receives considerable
attention because historians believe that it was created by James I, who instituted heavy taxes
on tobacco as part of a campaign against the product. In 1601, the Calendar of State Papers
(Domestic) published one of the first records of pathology linked to tobacco use. According to
this paper, surgeons attributed the death of a patient to smoking tobacco.75
The first anti-tobacco tract was published in the U.S. in 1798 by Dr. Benjamin Rush,
a signer of the Declaration of Independence. In Rush’s Observations upon the influence of the
Habitual use of Tobacco upon Health, Morals, and Property, he objects to the use of tobacco on
grounds that it had disastrous effects on the stomach, the nerves, and the oral cavity. Many
tobacco users including John Quincy Adams, a connoisseur who had made the cigar
respectable, announced that they had shaken the habit with consequent improvement in
health. 76
During the pre-Civil War period, a group of doctors, educators, clergymen and the
great P.T. Barnum formed an alliance to fight the tobacco habit. Some antismoking literature
also addressed itself to young people. The Reverend George Trask of Boston published a
popular tract in 1852 entitled Thoughts and Stories for American Lads; or Uncle Toby’s Anti-Tobacco
Advice to his Nephew Billy Bruce. Likewise, the Lancet a British medical journal in 1856-57
featured an article entitled “The Great Tobacco Question” in which fifty doctors expressed

Susan Wagner Cigarette Country: Tobacco in American History and Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) p.
26.
74 Jane L. McGrew “History of Tobacco Regulation” based on a paper prepared for the National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. DrugLibrary.org
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/nc/nc2b.htm [July 19, 2005].
75 Jane L. McGrew “History of Tobacco Regulation” based on a paper prepared for the National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. DrugLibrary.org
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/Library/studies/nc/nc2b.htm [July 19, 2005].
76 Susan Wagner Cigarette Country: Tobacco in American History and Politics. (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers,
1971) p. 26.
73

31

their opinions on the topic. Doctors described nervous paralysis, loss of intellectual capacity,
and vision impairment.77
The Civil War increased American cigarette consumption and attracted new smokers
in the Midwest and Northeast. In response to the increase in smoking, Midwestern tobacco
opponents demanded regulation. Because no major manufacturer of cigarettes existed, and
because the government needed money to finance the war, Congress complied by taxing
cigarettes arriving from Russia and Turkey. 78
As cigarettes gained popularity at the turn of the 20th century, the anti-tobacco
sentiments reignited. In 1880, cigarettes constituted one percent of tobacco intake, yet they
drew regular criticism that increased in intensity as sales grew. The opposition to cigarette
smoking took a variety of forms from verbal criticisms in the form of “epithets associated
with death or immortality,” such as “coffin nails,” “gaspers,” and devil’s toothpicks” to more
coordinated activities such as attacks from schools, pulpits, and the press.79
One of the most outspoken early tobacco opponents was Lucy Page Gaston. Born in
1860 to parents who were active in reform movements, especially abolition and temperance,
Gaston could aptly discuss the evils of alcohol and the rewards of clean living as a child.
While working as a teacher, Gaston would see young boys sneaking around to the back of
the schoolhouse to puff on cigarettes. Invariably, these were her worst students. Gaston
organized her Chicago-based campaign modeled on previous anti-alcohol crusades. Children
wore pins and sang songs, carried banners, and paraded. Eventually Gaston formally
organized her cause in 1903 forming the National Anti-Cigarette League. Clergymen,
educators, and many businessmen applauded her efforts.80
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Gaston’s zeal was rewarded. Her campaign was effective and, as one could have
predicted, it did best in the Midwest. Thanks to her hard work most large cities had clinics
that smokers could go to for help if they wanted to quit. Likewise, many new products were
being marketed to help tobacco users quit. For instance, the National Anti-Cigarette League
introduced a mouthwash that was supposed to reduce tobacco cravings.81
In addition to Gaston, many other public figures opposed smoking. Boxing
champion John L. Sullivan denounced cigarettes as unmanly. Henry Ford and Thomas
Edison refused to hire cigarette smokers. A nation-wide “Committee to Study the Tobacco
Problem” was established and attracted distinguished men in every field. Anticigarette
physicians including Surgeon General Rupert Blue condemned cigarettes. In addition, the
New England Life Insurance Company found that after investigating the records of policyholders during a certain period of time that 57 out of 100 nonusers of tobacco died; during
the same period, 95 out of 100 cigarette smokers died. By 1909, twelve states and numerous
towns created laws restricting tobacco use and/or sale. However, many of these statutes
were never enforced.82
There were some within the tobacco industry that made light of the anti-tobacco
efforts. However, tobacco sales dropped significantly during the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century. Buck Duke was said to have mixed feelings about the tobacco
controversy. For a while, Lucy Gaston’s crusade might have harmed American Tobacco but
it almost completely eliminated its competitors. At the turn of the century, nine out of every
ten packs sold carried the Duke label.
Cigarette Promotion and Advertising 1920s and 1930s:
As soldiers returned victorious from the battlefields in Europe, R. J. Reynolds, a
former member of the American Tobacco trust, was creating its first nationally marketed
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cigarette, Camel Cigarettes. Just before the war, the cigarette industry developed a slightly
acid blend of burley and Turkish tobaccos. This new blend allowed practiced cigarette
smokers to inhale without coughing.83 The brand rapidly attained market dominance with an
upscale smoke that delivered a new tobacco taste. In no time, George Washington Hill’s
American Tobacco Company created a richer sweeter product, Lucky Strike cigarettes. Hill
hired hard-sell expert Albert Lasker of the Lord & Thomas Agency to do whatever was
necessary to win the cigarette war. As a result, Lucky Strike broke all previous records. Hill,
urged by Lasker, jumped at the chance to reach an untapped audience – women. The Lucky
Strike campaign involved several advertising innovations. Hill was concerned that women
disliked the green packaging because it clashed with their clothes. To remedy the problem he
hired public relations expert, Edward Bernays who promoted the color green at the season’s
fashion show. Hill also used Bernays to help with the necessary social engineering that was
needed to attempt to persuade women to smoke. They first set out to increase the
acceptability of women smoking in public. To this end, Bernays convinced a group of ten
debutantes to smoke cigarettes while strolling with their escorts in Fifth Avenue's Easter
parade. The stunt was billed by Bernays as women lighting a "torch of freedom" . . . "to
combat the silly prejudice that the cigarette . . . is never seen on the sidewalk."84 Hill also
used celebrities from the entertainment world to promote the cigarettes. The new slogan,
“Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet” resonated with the weight conscious female
audience.85
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Although the new Lucky slogan resonated with women, it did not fare as well with
the candy industry. The tobacco-candy fight was a rough one. As a result, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) became deeply entrenched in the conflict. American Tobacco
appropriated $12.3 million for the battle. To accommodate the candy industry, Lucky Strike
modified the slogan to “Reach for a Lucky Instead,” and ran a “future-shadow” series of
advertisements featuring double-chinned and heavy-belted silhouettes behind trim figures. In
spite of American Tobacco’s efforts, by 1932 the FTC banned Americans from marketing
cigarettes as a weight-reducing device, even by suggestion.86 By establishing a connection
between smoking and a slender figure, George Washington Hill and Albert Lasker, of the
Lord & Thomas agency, were able to erase some of the negative stigma from cigarette
smoking. In fact, they convinced many women that smoking was good for their image.
American Tobacco Company spent more money advertising Lucky Strikes than anyone had
ever spent to advertise a single product. Lord & Thomas used this single account to make a
place among the major agencies.87
As a result of the marketing campaigns targeting women, women became substantial
tobacco consumers for the very first time. The new product intersected with women’s
liberation. In 1919, Printer’s Ink, ever on guard for advertising offenses, warned of an
insidious campaign to create female smokers. Murad and Helmar cigarette advertisements
showed Western-looking women in Turkish harem costumes introducing a daring new idea
by introducing a daring new exotic setting.88
In spite of the success of cigarette marketing to women, the issue of women smokers
remained a controversial issue. Women also found themselves unable to smoke on ships, in
railroad diners, and in train station smoking rooms. However, by the mid-1920s some
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colleges had established smoking rooms, while railroads and shipping lines relaxed their
regulations.89 Advertising further fueled this cultural revolution. In 1926, the NewellEmmett agency daringly presented a poster showing a woman perched beside a man in a
romantic moonlit seaside scene saying, “Blow some my way.” These four words were
shocking to many people. Yet Chesterfield persistently continued the campaign, paving the
way to the immense women’s market.90 From 1920 to 1928, while the production of pipe
tobacco fell by 9 percent and that of cigars by 20 percent, cigarette production increased 123
percent to 106 billion units per year.91
During the 1930s, Lucky Strike led cigarette sales and alternated with Camel for the
number one spot. During the Depression years, two new players effectively entered the
market. Even though hundreds of companies were trying to enter the domestic cigarette
market, only Philip Morris, a small independent producer, and Brown & Williamson, a
subsidiary of British-American Tobacco Company, were successful.92 The tobacco industry
was able to maintain profits through the Depression by voluntary health claims and
endorsements.
Health claims during the late 1920s and 1930s varied from claims that a particular
brand caused less throat irritation and coughing, to aiding digestion and improving
concentration and disposition or even as a remedy for the cold and flu.93 This time period is
unique because of the positive health claims that the cigarette industry made regarding
health. This uniqueness is partially due to the competitive nature of the cigarette industry at
the time94 and the lack of regulation. For instance, No one had ever heard of a “coughless”
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cigarette before Old Gold appeared…No rasping…No coughing…with “not a cough in the
carload” and Lucky Strike’s appealed to taste and health with their slogan “It’s Toasted – No
Throat Irritation.”95 These health-related appeals were ultimately recognized as being far
more detrimental to the industry than appeals to taste, texture and mildness because they
reminded smokers about their own fears about smoking.96
Opposition to Smoking in the 1920s and 1930s:
Because of the popularity of cigarettes spurred by World War I and the tax revenue
that cigarette sales were earning, much of the opposition died down in the 1920s and
1930s.97 In fact, throughout the first half of the 20th century doctors largely ignored any
negative news about smoking. This is largely because anti-tobacco claims makers usually
presented their findings in moral rather than medical terms.98
Lucy Gaston remained active in the anti-tobacco cause until her death in 1924. Her
goal was to completely abolish cigarette smoking by 1925. However, the thrust of her
antismoking campaigns during the early 1920s centered on preventing women from
smoking. Her anti-tobacco campaign slogan was “Save the Girl.” Part of the reason for her
change in focus was that she conceded that men would be smokers. The best that she felt
that she could do was to help prevent women from taking up the habit.99
The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) actively opposed the use of
cigarettes among women and children. Their 1921 annual report indicated that Iowa’s anticigarette law had been weakened and North Dakota’s had been strengthened. The WCTU
lobbied for laws prohibiting smoking at establishments where food was sold. Oregon
instituted a law against smoking where food was sold and Minnesota was considering a

Richard W. Pollay Filters, Flavors…Flim-Flam, Too! On “Health Information” and Policy Implications in
Cigarette Advertising. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. 8, (1989): 30-39.
96 Calfee, John E. & Ringold, Debra J. What can we learn from the informational content of cigarette
advertising? A reply and further analysis. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. 9, (1990): 30-42.
97 John A. Meyer “Cigarette Country” American Heritage 43 (1992): 72.
98 Karen S. Miller, “Smoking Up A Storm: Public Relations and Advertising in the Construction of the
Cigarette Problem 1953-1954” Journalism Monographs, 36 (December 1992) p. 5.
99 Robert Sobel They Satisfy: The Cigarette in American Life (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Press, 1978) p. 63.
95

37

similar law. By 1927, twenty-one states had laws that prevented smoking where food was
being sold. But some legislation was going the other way. In 1927 Kansas repealed a 21-yearold statute by legalizing cigarette sales.100
The Anti-Narcotics Department, a federal agency that continues to fight narcotics,
also took a stand against tobacco. By 1927, the Anti-Narcotics Department reported that its
chapters sponsored 6,699 anti-smoking programs, distributed 580,223 pages of anti-smoking
literature, and nineteen state poster contests. In essay contests, over 27,000 anti-smoking
essays were submitted. 101
When advertising smoking to women became more prominent, there was a backlash.
For instance, beginning in 1928, American Tobacco Company advertised smoking Luckies
as an alternative to eating candy. Chocolate manufacturers feared that women were following
American Tobacco’s advice and the complaints of the confectioners made news. Both the
Cleveland Boy Scouts and the Sioux Falls, SD City Commission objected to billboards that
depicted women smoking. Bills to restrict cigarette advertising were introduced in the states
of Illinois, Michigan, and Idaho.102
In spite of the growing acceptance of the habit, the consequences of cigarette
smoking became evident in the 1920s and 1930s when physicians began to notice cases of a
very rare form of cancer, lung cancer, were accumulating at an alarming rate. Dr. John
Harvey Kellogg, who gained much of his fame from breakfast cereal, published Tobaccoism,
Or How Tobacco Kills in 1923. In this publication Kellogg claimed that nine out of ten
smokers suffered from mouth and throat cancers. Another physician named Dr. Alton
Ochsner stated in 1936, “All of the afflicted patients were men who smoked heavily and had
smoked since World War I…I had the temerity, at that time, to postulate that the probable
cause of this new epidemic was cigarette use.” 103 A 1932 paper in the American Journal of
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Cancer accurately blamed the tars in cigarettes for the formation of cancer. This was the first
major study to make the connection.104 In 1936 study, Drs. Aaron Arkin and David Wagner
found lung cancer in 90% of their patients that were chronic smokers.105
In January 1930, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) passed some of its first
cigarette advertising regulations. These regulations related to testimonials that Lucky Strike
created that included testimonials from celebrities who did not smoke. The FTC ruled that
American Tobacco Company must stop running advertising that featured the testimonies of
endorsers who had never used their product. Further, American Tobacco Company was
forced to identify paid testimonials. And, American Tobacco Company should no longer
claim that smoking cigarettes aids in weight control.106
Cigarette Advertising and Promotion WWII - 1963:
Like World War I, World War II gave cigarette smoking an enormous boost.
Cigarettes were sold at military-post exchanges and ship’s stores tax-free and virtually at cost.
They also were distributed free in the forward areas and were packaged in K rations.107
Tobacco producers got as much free publicity as they could want during the war. Both
Winston Churchill with his cigar and Franklin D. Roosevelt smoking his cigarette helped to
advertise tobacco.108 Prior to World War II, it had been socially unacceptable for women to
smoke heavily. After the war it became much more widely accepted.109
Of any industry, the cigarette business was probably the most eager to invest in
television commercials. Tobacco was sponsoring prime time programming such as “Arthur
Godfrey and His Friends,” “The Chesterfield Supper Club,” “Stop the Music,” and “Your
Lucky Strike Theatre.” Rosser Reeves, the chairman of the Ted Bates agency, which was
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responsible for the hardest of the hard sell in cigarette advertising on television during the
1950s, said that selling cigarettes was “just like wiring the slot machine to keep paying out a
perpetual jackpot. My boy, it was just like printing money.”110
Although cigarette smoking was a popular habit, evidence was rapidly accumulating
regarding the potential heath risks of smoking during the 1950s. The press reported on
various epidemiological studies providing statistical links between smoking and cancer.
While some physicians remained among the doubters, medical opinion began to swing
toward the opinion it holds today.111 The sharp decline in sales that resulted panicked the
industry. The number of health claims in cigarette advertisements peaked in the 1950s
reaching their greatest level of intensity from 1950-55.112 The negative health claims used to
help persuade the public often reinforced consumer fears. While these health claims might
benefit the brand, they tended to harm competitors and injure the cigarette industry in
general because the “less harmful than…” claim suggests that other brands are more
harmful.113 Therefore, health claims are used primarily by upstart or struggling cigarette
brands to gain a market edge on the more prominent brands. Health claims quickly declined
after the 1955 FTC guidelines and, later, the 1960 FTC ban on tar and nicotine claims.114
The cigarette industry responded to the health claims of the 1950s with the
introduction of filtered cigarettes. Since Lorillard introduced its filter, competition in filtering
power became a key marketing strategy.115 The advertisements for Kent’s Micronite filters
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claimed, “Kent offers the greatest health protection in cigarette history.”116 Micronite was
described as “pure, dust-free, completely harmless material that is so safe, so effective, that it
is actually used to help filter the air in hospital operating rooms.” However, the Kent
advertisements did not mention the fact that Micronite is made from asbestos. The
campaign was launched just after researchers had linked asbestos to a host of respiratory
ailments.117
Filters appealed to smokers because they appeared to offer a more healthful
alternative. The new brands presented their advertising firms with a formidable challenge.
Consequently, cigarette advertising embarked on what has become known as the “filter
wars.”118 Rosser Reeves called this rivalry “one of the most vicious running advertising dog
fights in our advertising history.”119 In response to the challenge, the industry used several
approaches to sell filtered cigarettes. One is to discuss tar and nicotine yield and other
explicit health matters. Filters are also advertised for what they do not do. For instance they
do not impede taste. Finally, one can talk up filter quality without saying exactly what the
filter achieves. For example, “Twice as many filters in the Viceroy Tip…”120 The
advertisements never mentioned reducing carcinogens because the filters could not
effectively eliminate them. Another problem was that was when the filters were most
effective; they removed a large portion of the nicotine in the smoke. As nicotine is the
addictive ingredient in cigarettes, smokers were unsatisfied and left craving more. Other
strategies included using stronger tobaccos and loosening the materials inside the filter tip
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making it less effective. However, as a result of their successful marketing, filters made up
20 percent of the market by 1955.121
Meanwhile, the non-filtered brands struggled to stop their loss of customers to
filters. Their biggest selling point was that by not having filters they continued to deliver
“full taste” to their customers. The unfiltered Camels were one of the best selling brands in
the pre-filtered days. To avoid losing its prominence, Camel launched a campaign around
the question, “Are you smoking more now, but enjoying it less?” But for most other
unfiltered brands, including unfiltered Camels, it was a losing battle. Eventually the
unfiltered brands had to develop filtered versions.122
In addition to health related appeals, many cigarette advertisements used sex appeals.
Women’s objections to sex-based advertisements and narrow social roles went largely
unrecognized during the 1950s. The advertising image of women as happy homemakers had
always worked, and traditionally few women had voiced the aspiration for more from life
than this role could offer.123 Many cigarette advertisements reinforced views of women that
seem extremely traditional or even sexist to the 21st century reader. Cigarette advertisements
also used celebrities to promote their brand of cigarettes. One early advertisement featured
Broadway star Patricia Morison introduced as “one whose beauty and talent carried her to
stardom.” Morrison, smoking a cigarette, says “There is nothing quite like Camels. They
taste so good and they are so mild.”124
Opposition to Smoking WWII – 1963:
Although a few doctors and scientists continued their research, the issue of smoking
and health largely disappeared during World War II. The lack of research was a result of a
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lack of funding and a feeling that anti-tobaccoism was unpatriotic. However, the research did
not end completely. But, it often centered on ways that smokers could continue their habit.
For instance, an optimistic study in 1948 found that patients with inactive forms of heart
disease could continue to smoke in moderation.125 In spite of the warnings, Americans were
full of enthusiasm and confidence in their smoking habits during the early 1950s.126
By the early 1950s, however, medical studies began to demonstrate close links
between smoking and ill health. Four retrospective studies were published on the smoking
habits of lung cancer patients. Research connecting lung cancer with smoking was done by
Ernest Wynder and Evart Graham in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
1950, by Richard Doll and Bradford Hill in the British Medical Journal in 1950 and 1952, by
Wynder and Graham with Adele Croninger in Cancer Research in 1953, and Alton Ochsner
in 1952, 1953, and 1954.127 In 1953 investigators at what is now the Sloan-Kettering
Institute announced that they had induced cancer in mice by painting their backs with “tars”
from cigarette smoke.128 This research demonstrated that smoking clearly caused cancer.
This incriminating research was a cause for serious concern for the tobacco industry.129
At first, the heath research relating tobacco with an increased cancer risk remained in
scientific publications. The few articles that did appear in the popular press reassured
smokers. For instance, U.S. News and World Report ran a two-page spread when Dr. Egon
Lorenz of the National Cancer Institute demonstrated that smoking mice lived a normal life
span. The article concluded that smoking in moderation would not cause serious health
problems.130 By July 1954, when an article in Reader’s Digest connected general exposure to
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the smoking with health concerns, the general public had been made aware of the smokingand-health issue.131
Initially, the industry responded to the health concerns with denial and buck-passing.
In 1952, entertainer and broadcaster Arthur Godfrey reassured his audience by saying, “You
hear things all the time that cigarettes are harmful to you… Chesterfields won’t harm your
nose, throat or accessory organs.”132 A responsible consulting organization had vouched for
it. However, industry leaders like American Tobacco Company executive Paul Hahn realized
that the every-brand-for-itself campaign was doomed to failure. It would only serve to
increase the public awareness of the cancer issues.133
In light of all of the negative publicity, it seems that it would have been difficult for
cigarette manufacturers to promote their profitable product. However, because of its
virtually unlimited funds, the industry was able to purchase the best publicity that money
could buy. And, by doing so, entice millions of Americans to begin or continue smoking.
The tobacco industry, assisted by its public relations consultants, won the first battle
of the cancer wars. The doubt raising countered, if not deferred, the health anxieties about
cigarette smoking. And, the introduction of filtered cigarettes helped to convince the public
that there was a healthful alternative to quitting. The tobacco industry’s efforts matched
their needs perfectly. However, the evidence was beginning to mount and the industry could
only argue with the research for so long. In the wake of the landmark reports by the Royal
College of Physicians in 1962 and the Surgeon General’s Report in 1964, legislation to limit
or ban advertising began to take effect. Likewise, counter advertising, public service
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announcements, and campaigns by anti-smoking groups began to diminish the consumer
base. By the mid-1970s the number of smokers began to plummet.134
The Tobacco Industry and Advertising Regulation:
The Industry and Regulations in the 1950s:
When it became clear that the anti-smoking crusade was making progress with the
public, the cigarette makers used the media to distribute a message of their own. The
tobacco industry needed a united front. In December 1953 Hahn and other industry
executives met in New York’s Plaza Hotel to create the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee (TIRC). The purpose of TIRC was to promote the idea that the case against
smoking had not been proven.135
The TIRC was endowed by a self-imposed one cent per 4,000 cigarette tax, plus
additional funding as needed. The TIRC hired Hill and Knowlton, a leading public relations
firm with headquarters in the Empire State Building, to direct daily operations. It ran fullpage advertisements that denied the harms of smoking and made its own statements about
tobacco and health to cast doubt upon the harms of smoking.136 Business Week called Hill and
Knowlton’s work “one of PR’s best finger-in-the-dike jobs” ever.137
Both health professionals and the tobacco industry depended on the news media to
provide information and opinions about cigarette smoking. The information on cigarettes
consisted of two basic messages, “smoking is a health hazard” and “there is conflicting
scientific evidence about smoking.” However, the tobacco industry had an advantage in the
battle for media coverage because of their expert advertising and public relations
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practitioners. Although the tobacco industry could not prevent the media coverage of the
medical reports about the harms of smoking, they could insist that there were two sides to
the story. By insisting that two sides of the tobacco story needed public attention, Hill &
Knowlton convinced journalists to include their side of the story in their coverage of
tobacco related issues.138
The tobacco industry’s perspectives and interests were also nurtured and protected
by the Tobacco Institute, a nonprofit organization created by the tobacco industry and Hill
and Knowlton in 1958. Its membership consisted of the major U.S. manufacturers of
cigarettes, smoking and chewing tobacco, and snuff: The Bloch Brothers Tobacco Company,
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Conwood Corporation, G.A. Georgopulo &
Company, Helme Products, Larus & Brother Company, Liggett & Myers, Lorillard, Phillip
Morris Incorporated, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Scotten-Dillion Company, and United States
Tobacco Company. The Institute received financial support from the contributions from the
large tobacco firms according to their share of the market. The Institute promoted protobacco medical research, attempted to discredit anti-smoking publicity, published
information on the historical role of tobacco, its place in the national economy, the industry
itself, and the public’s use of tobacco products.139
In 1955, two years after the Sloan-Kettering report linking smoking to cancer, the
FTC imposed the first advertising guidelines140. In mid-September 1954, the FTC
announced its intention to issue a set of Cigarette Advertising Guides and circulated a set of
those guides for industry comment. After about one year of comment with the tobacco
industry, the FTC formally announced the guides on September 22, 1955. These guides
signified the FTC’s intention to seek injunctions against any advertising that:
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1. made references to “either the presence or absence of any physical effect of
smoking”;
2. represented that a cigarette brand “contained less nicotine, tars, acids, resins, or
other substances” than other brands unless the claim and its significance could
be supported by reputable scientific proof;
3. made references to smoking on the “(a) nose, throat, larynx, or other parts of the
respiratory tract, (b) digestive system, (c) nerves, (d) any other part of the body,
or (e) energy”; or
4. represented “medical approval of cigarette smoking.”141
The Public Health Service’s Surgeon General Leroy F. Barney M.D. issued his first
statement on the subject of tobacco in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
November of 1959.142 Then, in June of 1961, the American Heart Association, the
American Cancer Society, and the National Tuberculosis and Respiratory Disease
Association requested that a commission be created “to consider the responsibilities of
government, of business and voluntary agencies relative to the health hazards of cigarette
smoking and to recommend a solution to this health problem that would protect the public
and would interfere least with the happiness of individuals.”143
The 1960s and the Surgeon General’s Report:
On June 7, 1962, U.S. Surgeon General Luther Terry announced the creation of an
Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health.144 With the approval of President John F.
Kennedy, the Surgeon General established an “expert committee to undertake a
comprehensive review of all data on smoking and health.” The members of the committee
were respected scientists who had no previous opinions on the subject of cigarette smoking
and health. Each of the members was approved for the appointment by the tobacco
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industry, the American Medical Association, and several other national health agencies.
Cigarette smokers comprised half of the committee members.145
Also during June of 1962, the Tobacco Institute released a statement announcing
that the tobacco industry had always taken the stance that “smoking is a custom for adults.”
Following that position, a number of companies decided to cease advertising in college
publications and engaging in other campus endorsements.146 The cigarette industry had
become the biggest single source of revenue for many college newspapers. For years, most
companies had been conducting campaigns to convince university students to smoke their
specific brands, both by purchasing advertising in college publications and through the
activities of paid “campus representatives” who gave away sample packs.147
The Institute’s declaration that cigarette smoking was “a custom for adults” and,
consequently, not one for non-adults, did have one result that applied on a broader basis
than just the college level. In the fall of 1963, the American Tobacco Company began an
extensive campaign for Lucky Strike cigarettes that contained the statement that “smoking is
a pleasure that is meant for adults.” However, the statement was followed by the sentence,
“Lucky Strike Separates the Men from the Boys…but not from the Girls.” Advertising
creatives, apparently setting out to illustrate the theme that cigarettes are not for boys,
achieved the opposite by illustrating that smoking Lucky Strike turns boys into men.148
Then on January 11, 1964, after 15 months of intensive study, the Advisory
Committee to the Surgeon General released its monumental statement that changed the
tobacco industry forever. Its two most important findings were that cigarette smoking was a
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health hazard of great enough importance to merit immediate action and that cigarette
smoking is causally related to lung cancer.149 According to the American Cancer Society,
“The report produced shock waves, there was an immediate public reaction, and a sharp,
albeit short-lived, drop in cigarette sales.”150
The Surgeon General’s Report and the Advertising Industry:
After the Surgeon General’s Report was issued, the New Yorker and other
magazines banned cigarette advertising. Advertising executive David Ogilvy, whose brother
died of lung cancer after a lifetime of heavy cigarette smoking, and William Bernbach
announced that their agencies would no longer accept cigarette accounts. Emerson Foote
resigned as chairman of McCann-Erickson in protest against its continued handling of
cigarettes. Foote had been active in the American Cancer Society since 1945. CBS told its
producers to minimize smoking in network shows, and Frank Stanton, the president of CBS,
urged the network to prohibit cigarette commercials.
Because of the public pressure, the tobacco industry made a few concessions. It
adopted an advertising code in 1964 that stopped pitches aimed at young people and
outlawed claims that smoking would improve health, ease tensions, or enhance sexual
success. Simultaneously, the tobacco industry, the third largest advertiser on network
television, continued to increase its television advertising budgets, to a total of over $200
million.151
In addition to the large television budgets, the tobacco industry was dispensing
millions of dollars for research designed to show the harmlessness of smoking. Tobacco
lobbyists and congressmen tried to defeat or cripple any extension of federal regulation.
However, the cigarette industry was more skepticism from the advertising industry. In

Thomas Whiteside, Selling Death: Cigarette Advertising and Public Health. (New York, NY: Liveright, 1970) pp.
28-29.
150 Thomas Whiteside, Selling Death: Cigarette Advertising and Public Health. (New York, NY: Liveright, 1970) pp.
41-42.
151 Stephen Fox The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertisers & Its Creators. (Chicago, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1997) p. 304.
149

49

addition to refusing to take cigarette accounts, many creatives were moonlighting for the
American Society and producing anti-smoking materials. However, a few holdouts remained.
Mary Wells Lawrence believed that if a product can be legally sold, the company should have
the right to advertise it. Her creative work for the Benson & Hedges cigarettes’ advertising
campaigns sent her agency flying. She opposed the idea of a broadcasting ban, protesting
that it would be un-American.152
The historic findings of the Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee also served as a
catalyst for numerous industry guidelines. In 1965, for example, the Trade Regulation Rules
on Cigarette Labeling and Advertising became effective, in 1967 the Federal
Communications Commission (FTC) entered the smoking-and-health controversy through
the application of the “Fairness Doctrine” in broadcasting and radio, and in 1970 the Federal
Trade Commission persuaded Congress to pass the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
that banned cigarette advertising from radio and television and required unequivocal warning
labels on cigarette packages. As a result of the 1970 legislation, the tobacco industry
volunteered to publish nicotine, tar levels, and health warnings in all advertisements.153
Although it is difficult to measure the influence of advertising and public relations on
the public’s beliefs and behaviors related to cigarette smoking directly, many studies suggest
a correlation. In 1957, the tobacco industry’s research showed that two thirds of audience
believed that the U.S. government had not done a sufficient job of warning the public about
the harms of smoking. And, they believed that cigarette manufacturers were not to blame.
Among adults, the belief that smoking caused lung cancer rose from 41 percent in 1954 to
50 percent in 1957. However, the numbers decreased to 44 percent by 1958. The year
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following the Surgeon General’s Report, the total leaped to 66 percent. Since that time, the
number of smokers has generally declined. 154
Summary:
Cigarette producers have long claimed that their marketing and advertising efforts
endeavor only to convince smokers to switch brands. However, advertising has proven to be
an effective method for replenishing the ranks of smokers. For instance, estimates from the
World Health Organization state that nearly 3.5 million people die each year as a result of
smoking. In spite of the industry’s claims to the contrary, the cigarette industry’s primary
goal was winning new smokers years ago.155 In fact, Duke set his sights on winning a young
from the very beginning. According to a 1950s article in the U.S. Tobacco Journal, “A
massive potential exists among women and young adults, cigarette industry leaders agreed,
acknowledging that recruitment of these millions of prospective smokers comprises the
major objective for the immediate future and on a long term basis as well.”156
Although the tobacco industry is a very heavily researched industry and a great deal
of research relates to tobacco marketing and promotion, no history exists that focuses on the
most blatant targeting of youth and young adults in American history. Using college
publications to target students is evidence that supports the argument that the tobacco
industry considered its product to be a product that appealed to the student market.
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Chapter Three: The Tobacco Industry and the American University
Tobacco and University Life:
Tobacco has had a long relationship with the university and intellectualism in
general. Both pipes and cigarettes have been associated with the intellectual elite. However,
what is less well known is the influence the tobacco industry had on university campuses
through the employment of campus representatives, contests, and advertising in student
newspapers. In addition to its marketing efforts on campus, university professors and
researchers were improving the tobacco crop through the establishment of tobacco research
stations. Therefore, the tobacco industry and the university had what some might call a
symbiotic relationship. And, the most visible manifestation of this relationship is seen in the
prevalence of tobacco advertising on university campuses.
Opposition to Smoking on College and University Campuses:
Smoking on college and university campuses was becoming increasingly prevalent
starting in the late 1920s. The idea that men smoked in higher education had been accepted
for years. Pipes, specifically, were associated with intellectualism. And, the fact that a
growing number of women were smoking was attracting national attention. From the turn
of the century to the early 1920s, it was taboo for women to smoke in public places.
Smoking on college campuses was an especially hot topic because the majority of women
attending college were being trained in the field of education. The public strongly
disapproved of the prospect of elementary school teachers who smoked. Therefore, many
colleges and universities forbade female students to smoke. However, by the 1930s, the issue
had been settled in the minds of most people. Like it or not, women smoked in the
institutions of higher learning.157
In 1919 Vassar College, in Poughkeepsie, New York, went on record as being
opposed to women smoking. The Students' Association voted: "No Vassar student shall
Kerry Segrave Women and Smoking in America, 1880-1950. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Publishers,
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smoke while under the jurisdiction of the college, this rule to be enforced under the honor
system." However, the rule was changed in 1925 "to lay responsibility on the individual
permitting her to smoke inconspicuously."158 Smoking was prohibited in dormitories and
other college buildings. Burgess Johnson, a professor in the English department and director
of publicity, stated, “[The college] voted against the proposition; I am told. I have not heard
of the students smoking and the students have never asked permission to smoke.”159
In December of 1921 the University of Chicago president Harry Pratt Judson
banned smoking in women’s dormitories. Accustomed to making their own rules, the
dormitory women suddenly were confronted with a notice from the housemothers against
the cigarette. No explanation was officially offered, but rumor had it that the dean of women
and others on campus protested against what was thought to be excessive smoking by
female students.160
The New York Times also reported on smoking policies at Radcliffe and Smith.161 It
was front-page news that M.I.T. allowed young women to smoke at dances. Goucher
College prohibited students from smoking both on campus and at public places in
Baltimore. A study at Bryn Mar showed that less than half of its female students smoked.
Bryn Mar’s self-government association petitioned the college president for a smoking room
and the president consented and repealed the previous smoking ban.162 The New York Times
editorially endorsed the Bryn Mar decision in condescending tones. The Times said that by
allowing cigarettes in certain places, “what once was a feat of defiance becomes rather a
bore…”163
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By 1925, one third of the women at The Ohio State University said that they smoked
at least on occasion. And, in 1924, a student leader at Rhode Island State claimed,
“practically all girls smoke.” The student newspaper at the University of Illinois covered the
issue of women smoking often in 1924 and made it clear that progressive students felt that it
was perfectly acceptable for students to smoke.164
Late in 1929, George W. Stephens, the Dean at Washington University, St. Louis,
Missouri, reiterated a long-standing faculty decision that smoking by female students was not
permitted at Washington University. This ruling included all university related social
functions. In 1930, a report from Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, stated that 44 out of the 400
women attending Bucknell University were prevented from walking on campus and having
dates for the next six months as a result of their admissions that they smoked in their rooms.
A self-governing student organization assigned the penalty. Likewise, Charles McKenny,
president of Michigan State Normal College in Ypsilanti, told a group of women in 1931 that
no woman known to smoke in public places would be allowed to graduate. The reasoning
behind McKenny’s statement was that he believed that the people of Michigan would not be
likely to hire a schoolteacher who smoked.
However, some schools denied any smoking problems among their female students.
James M. Kierman, the president of New York City’s Hunter College, maintained that,
“Smoking hasn’t much of a grip on our girls yet.” He also continued by mentioning that the
school paper was accepting money from tobacco but he didn’t expect that it would influence
the female students’ smoking habits. However, the college eventually set up a smoking room
for its female students. Many other campuses followed by restricting smoking on campus
based on gender.165
As late as November of 1933, certain schools prohibited cigarette advertising that
featured women. For instance, in a letter to the R.J. Reynolds advertising department, the
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Arkansas State Teacher’s College Echo, San Jose State Teacher’s College College Times, Drake
University Times-Delphic, Holy Cross Tomahawk, and the Tennessee Polytechnic Institute Tech
Oracle were listed as schools that could not accept cigarette advertising featuring women.166
Although women were gradually gaining permission to smoke on campus, many
were agitated by the idea of women smoking outside. As late as 1937 a market research firm
found that 95 percent of male smokers smoked in the street but only 28 percent thought that
it was right for women to do likewise. Because women felt conspicuous smoking outside,
they started smoking inside in places where men had never smoked. For instance, they
smoked inside of railroad diners, retail stores, and art galleries. Because of the taboo, colleges
and universities established smoking rooms in dormitories. For instance, Smith College
announced that smoking was restricted to two fireproof rooms.167
By 1937, bans on smoking on campus were the exception rather than the rule. More
and more women smoked in public in the United States in general during this period of
time. Between 1918 and 1928, American tobacco sales increased fourfold. In 1900 cigarette
consumption, as part of the tobacco industry as a whole, was just two percent. By 1930
cigarettes accounted for 40 percent of tobacco consumption. Much of that increase was due
to the dramatic change in the image of the cigarette as more men switched to cigarette
smoking from other forms of tobacco use and more women began to smoke.168
Opposition to smoking on college campuses disappeared during the 1940s. One
reason for this is the fact that the tobacco industry shifted the front lines of its marketing
campaign to the armed forces due to the war effort. A second reason is that as an American
product, cigarette smoking was considered to be a patriotic habit.
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Cigarette Promotion on Campus 1950-1963:
Unlike the 1920s and 1930s, during the 1950s and 1960s cigarettes attained the full
acceptance of the college and university community. Young college men and women were
both given as much liberty as possible to smoke on campus. And, the tobacco industry was
given complete freedom to promote its product.
For instance, among New York State’s many colleges and universities, Cortland State
Teachers College was distinguished for its training program for physical education teachers.
In 1961 the Cortland Alpha Delta Delta sorority won first-place in a contest sponsored by
Phillip Morris. For engineering the consumption of 1,520,000 Phillip Morris cigarettes and
redeeming the empty packages, the young women of Alpha Delta Delta were awarded a
magnificent high-fidelity phonograph.169
Although winning the Phillip Morris prize was an accomplishment, the personal
price for the women of Alpha Delta was high. As the deadline for cigarette package
collection drew near, the sorority house was immersed with a crisis psychology. The
continued smoking of Phillip Morris brands at a breathless pace became a badge of loyalty.
One sorority member was compelled to abandon her relatively mild filtered cigarette for the
non-filtered Phillip Morris. The reluctant sorority sister who dared to venture into the open
without smoking a Phillip Morris cigarette risked displeasure or even ostracism.170
But, the Alpha Delta Delta sorority won its new hi-fidelity phonograph. And, Phillip
Morris won the loyalty and gratitude of future physical education teachers whose enthusiasm
for teaching the hazards of cigarette smoking might be significantly reduced.171
Similarly, a Columbia University student was constructing a replica of the United
Nations headquarters from six thousand Marlboro and Parliament boxes. For the collegiate
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poets, Liggett and Myers held out the lure of eight British Sprite sports cars to be awarded to
the best limerick, plus the bottom panels from five Chesterfield, L&M or Oasis packages.
And, to the sports-minded students, Brown and Williamson presented cash prizes to those
who successfully predicted the outcome of selected football games. The cash prizes ranged
from ten to 100 dollars.172
The prevalence of college contests was a mere symptom of the umbrella spread by
the cigarette companies over every conceivable variety of campus activity. Campus
newspapers abounded with cigarette advertisements tailored to their collegiate audience.
Tobacco companies typically contributed a staggering 40 percent of all national advertising
placed in college newspapers. The collegian that developed a taste for the irreverent humor
of Max Shulman could find him selling the virtues of Marlboros in nearly every college
publication. Meanwhile, American Tobacco Companies copywriters assured undergraduates
that the “Important things in college life stay the same. Parties. Girls. Luckies.” Some
advertisements were even more obvious in their approach. Some typical slogans included,
“Luckies - the cigarette to start with” and “More college students smoke Luckies – than any
other regular cigarette.”173
Brown and Williamson had at least seventeen salesmen engaging their energies as
Viceroy, Kool and Raleigh Santa Clauses at various colleges. Likewise, Phillip Morris selected
worthy students on 166 college campuses as “campus representatives,” paying each $50 a
month to spread the good cheer and complimentary Marlboros. No fraternity party, political
rally, or tea for international students escaped the presence of the Phillip Morris
representatives.174
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It is possible that after the contests were won, the samples consumed, and the
advertising messages burned into the memory of the nation’s undergraduates, one or another
uncooperative student still declined to smoke. But, the imaginative R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company established a program with the collegiate-sounding name “The Line-Backer”
system. Reynolds recruited college public information officers to ensure that Camels and
other company brands advertised in the football programs at many colleges and universities
could be seen, admired and purchased in every possible location at the college. By promoting
the Camel brand, the public information officials earned the right to participate in their own
contests with foreign cars being the reward for soliciting students.175
Student Publications:
The Development of the Campus Press in the United States:
Student publications are a long-established feature of college and university life.
Established early, likely because of their close relationship with an academic subject, they
have persisted in somewhat changing form until the present. Of all student publications, the
school newspaper is the most responsive to students needs and expresses their opinions the
most clearly. Although the newspaper is more transitory than the yearbook or the handbook,
it normally deals with more important issues. Student newspapers are vital because they
contribute to students’ personal development and enhance school life.
In 1799 the first student newspaper was established at Dartmouth College.176 The
Dartmouth was a weekly paper.177 Established January 28, 1878, the Yale Daily News is the
nation's first college daily newspaper. (Usually, a daily student paper is distributed Monday
through Friday during the academic year, with no publications during exam or vacation
175
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weeks). And, it is still a flourishing paper. The News is circulated during the academic year and
serves Yale University community in New Haven, CT.178 Ten years later, in 1883, the
Harvard Crimson, originally founded in 1856 as a weekly paper named The Magenta, also
became a daily paper.179 Dozens of college newspapers existed by the turn of century in a
movement that popularized the college press. These publications filled their four to six pages
with “news concerning undergraduates and alumni, furnishing persuasive editorials on local
affairs, and giving a truthful bulletin of the day’s doings sensibly and in small space.”180
By the late 19th Century the majority of American universities and colleges had at
least a weekly newspaper, and many already had dailies. By 1912 there were 400 campus
periodicals listed in advertisers annuals.181 However, the majority of schools did not begin to
publish newspapers until after World War I. Thirty-one colleges and universities in the
United States published daily newspapers in 1923. And, by 1926, newspapers alone
numbered 400 and circulations ranged from 500 to 5,000. The Daily Illini was an example of
the latter. The newspaper served a community of 30,000 people as the only morning daily.
The paper was printed at a university-owned plant valued at $100,000.182 In 1929, McNeil
stated that there were at least four hundred student papers being published at least twice a
week. Of this number, 32 were college dailies ranging in size from four to 32 pages.183 School
and Society in 1929 summarized the collegiate press as follows:
Today there are thirty-two college daily newspapers in the country, about half of
which use the telegraph service of some nationally known news-gathering
organization…They range in size from four to thirty-two pages…
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As was to be expected, the college newspaper has taken the daily newspaper at its
model and has written its news stories, its headlines, its editorial, and has adapted its
makeup to that of the regular dailies
In an endeavor to find out to what extent staff members receive compensation, a
survey was made and answers received from 230 papers. Academic credit for work
on the staff is the exception rather than the rule, according to the reports received
for only six dailies, eight semi-weeklies, and forty-eight weeklies reported staff
members receiving classroom credit.
When it comes to the question of receiving actual money for work on the staff,
either business or editorial, it appears to be the rule that at least the editor-in-chief,
while seven divide profits among members of the entire board…The amounts vary
from $100 to $800 a year for editors of dailies.184
The first intercollegiate newspaper was created in 1933 among four institutions, Mt.
Holyoke, Amherst, Smith, and Massachusetts State College.185 The first edition included four
pages of news and sold for five cents per copy. News was carried in a light style, which was
reflected in its headlines, “Smith Has Become Sandwich Conscious” and “Sprinkler System
Startles Holyoke.”186 In 1940, The Minnesota Daily also achieved a first in the realm of the
collegiate press. The Minnesota Daily experimented with tabloid journalism much to the
dismay of many who complained of the smaller page size. However, the student body voted
to keep the unique tabloid format.187
As the popularity of higher education grew in the United States during the 20th
century so did the number, size, and frequency of issue of campus newspapers. By 1970,
there were more than 1200 college and university newspapers, and many of them were
published daily.188
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Campus newspapers are a big business. By 1970 more than six million copies were
printed every week. Student newspapers are usually partially supported by student-activity
fees and distributed to all students. The Intercollegiate Press Association, founded in 1886,
was the sole nation-wide trade association for student newspapers until 1963 when U.S.
Student Press Association was created. In addition to constituting a large number of
newspapers, the campus press also represents an important advertising medium. National
advertisers wanting to reach a student audience relied heavily on student newspapers.189
The first college and university newspapers usually were independent publications
that depended on advertising and circulation for revenue. These early papers were small, had
small staffs, and as a result did not need much money to survive. As public institutions of
higher learning were founded and grew into large enterprises, the funding of student
newspapers began to change. The campus publications began to rely more and more on
college and university funds and student fees.
Because of the use of university and student funds, colleges and universities created
publications boards to oversee the campus papers. Publications boards generally were
comprised of both faculty and students. Usually, the student members were drawn from the
publication editors. However, faculty and staff held most of the seats on the publication
boards. Board duties ranged from picking student editors to trying to mediate disputes
between administration and the newspaper.190
In some cases, the student newspaper has been responsible to student government
rather than publications boards. In such situations one problem was the amount of control
the student governing board wanted to exert over the student newspapers. Sometimes the
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student board directly imposed its political perspective on the newspaper. Sometimes
journalism departments or schools administered student newspapers as laboratories or
workshops. In this situation, the newspaper was produced under the direct supervision of
the faculty.191
By the 1960s, nearly 1200 campus papers were governed at least in part by college or
university administration. Most of these student newspapers received funding from studentactivity fees or through direct appropriation of university funds. These financial ties with the
institution made the colleges or universities the newspaper publishers.192
The official recognition and support offered by the various colleges and universities
involves at the same time certain obligations. By informing its readers on matters of interest
and importance to members of the college community, the student newspaper plays an
important role, particularly in creating a sense of “community” within the students and the
college as a whole. It is also useful to the faculty and administration as a sounding board of
student attitudes.193
With such physical and financial arrangements, it was not a surprise that there was
disagreement and confusion over the role of the campus newspaper. For instance, there was
a great deal of debate about whether the newspaper was a student publication or if it was an
official publication of the college or university. And, given the controversy, there was
disagreement about who was ultimately responsible for the contents of the paper, the
students or the administrators.
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Often, the administrators did not elucidate the situation. Administrators either tried
to back away from responsibility for the student paper or else they tried to block the
appointment of editors that they perceived to be hostile to what administrators believed to
be the institution’s best interest.194
In addition, the campus newspaper usually enjoys a monopolistic position on
campus. While this alone is not unique in the publishing if a community newspaper, the
importance of monopolistic status is the accompanying subsidy that enables the
undergraduate publication to publish daily in large institutions.195
Controversies over the Student Press:
The student press was involved in numerous controversies during the 20th century.
For instance, during the 1930s student newspapers were involved in controversies such as
the compulsory Reserve Officer Training (ROTC) programs on campuses and other antimilitary and anti-war activities of the time. Another volatile campus issue during the 1930s
was the presence of Communist organizations on college campuses. However, during the
1950s the campus press was unusually silent. This silence reflected the general mood of the
time. However this silence was shattered by the civil rights movement of the early 1960s and
then by student opposition to the Vietnam War.196
However, Vietnam War or the civil rights movement in the 1960s did not cause most
of the problems. Instead, the language and the changing mores, including vigorous advocacy
and editorial treatment of the news, were at the root of most of the problems. For instance,
Pennsylvania State Rep. Russell J. LaMarca said that he would withhold funding for the
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University of Pittsburgh if any state funds were used to finance the “obscenities and
vulgarities” that he found in student publications. He stated, “I don’t feel like sending $36
million to a university that doesn’t know what good taste is and doesn’t have the guts to
inform its students what good taste is.”197 Not only were state legislators discontented with
the new boldness of language found in student newspapers; but so were the members of
boards of trustees and regents, university presidents, parents, faculty, alumni and editors of
general circulation newspapers. However, the language used by college newspapers in the
1960s that caused so much trouble is now common in newspapers and magazines.198
What is expected from the Campus Newspaper?
Almost every educational institution has a newspaper. Newspapers resemble the
professional press in that they seek to serve a definite group of people with news, opinions,
and entertainment. Some campus papers are barely more than a bulletin while others cover
local and national news.199 Further, a college newspaper is a specific publication whose
policies, philosophy, ethics, and articles are distinct from those of any other publication. It is
an instrument that has a particular and important place in an educational institution. In many
ways, the college paper expresses the policies and purposes of the institution, and reflects the
effect of the educational process upon its students.200 In addition to educating students in
the newspaper industry, the objectives of the paper also include helping the student and the
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college or university understand each other and promoting a greater desire to participate in
student activities.201
One of the basic problems for the student press during turbulent times, like the
1930s, 1940s, and 1960s, is that its various constituents perceive its role differently. For
instance, university administrators and members of the boards of trustees and regents
generally believe that the campus paper is an arm of the institution that should reflect the
members’ values of society and institution. These administrators want the newspapers to
report administrative decisions and policies accurately and fairly. Sometimes this means that
the expectation is that the student newspaper will speak favorably about the university
administration.202 The student editors and reporters tended to view themselves as following
in the honorable footsteps of the great journalistic crusaders and trust that reporting the
news in such a spirit will not always find the trustees and administrators in the right.203
The students for whom the newspapers are published turned to the paper for a
variety of reasons ranging from an interest in campus issues to current events. Likewise,
both students and faculty often saw the paper as a bulletin board for events that lists routine
but important meetings that relate to campus life. The faculty and staff of a college or
university looked to the newspaper for news that might influence their current jobs, future
employment, or working conditions. Faculty members in journalism departments often saw
the newspaper as a tool for training students for their future careers in the field of
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journalism. Critics of the university, both on and off campus believed that the newspaper
was a source of information that could help them fuel their attacks on the institution.204
Differences and Similarities Between the General Press and the Campus Press:
Like the general press, the student paper serves a fairly well defined audience that
includes students, faculty, staff and administration as well as the surrounding campus
community. A general circulation paper has an established distribution area that usually
encompasses a town or metropolitan area. However, some newspapers have a large national
or regional audience. Although the audience of the campus press is not as diverse as the
general press, it is far from homogeneous. In addition to students, the readers of the student
newspapers might also include activists, university sports fans, and editors and reporters for
general circulation newspapers. Both general circulation and campus newspapers depend on
advertising for a significant portion of their revenue.205
However, a number of important differences also exist between campus and general
circulation newspapers. The size and circulation of a campus newspaper will never be as
large as a general circulation paper in a metropolitan area. Likewise, the student community
differs from the general population. While general circulation papers receive the vast
majority of their income from advertising, campus papers are financed by advertising and by
funds from the college or university that they serve. Another important distinction is that
students who are usually much less experienced than the professional journalists that work at
a general circulation papers produce college and university newspapers.206
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Further, the creation of a student newspaper differs from that of a general circulation
paper in a variety of ways. The student newspaper differs from the general press because
there are longer lapses between the writing and the printing of the paper. During the 1930s,
the lapses could be up to 24 hours on a college daily and three to four days on some weekly
papers. Another key difference was that students usually held a particular staff position for a
year, a semester, or a term. No sooner did one staff become competent than its term ended
and another staff took over.207
Because universities were, in effect, requiring every student to subscribe, they
assumed some responsibility for the newspaper’s quality. Universities could not force
students to purchase daily an inaccurate or inadequate bulletin of essential campus
announcements nor should they force students to purchase an advertising handbill or
dodger. The editors, seeking financial support, agreed in effect to publish all official
announcements in an accurate and timely fashion. They also agreed that there should be a
larger amount of reading material than advertising. The students recognized this obligation
and concluded that the advertising space should never occupy more than one third of the
newspaper’s total area.208
Funding the Campus Newspaper:
Financing of Student Publications:
During the 1950s and 1960s, some student newspapers were financially secure. For
example, The Cornell University Sun showed a sizable profit each year. The student newspaper
at DePauw was entirely self-supporting, even to owning its own building on campus.
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Students are charged with full responsibility for the financial and editorial operations of the
paper and it receives no financial support from the school budget.
The financing of student publications presents a perpetual problem. Campus or
university papers can be financed by subscription sales, by subsidy, or by advertising. In
decades past it was believed that student newspapers should only require subsidies to get
started. Eventually, papers need to be self-supporting. However, funding from subscriptions
or student fees is seldom enough to fund the newspaper. Therefore, the question of
advertising in student newspapers has always been an important one. Often, the business
aspect of the newspaper that is necessary to make the publication financially sound runs
against its ethical responsibilities to its audience.209
The most remunerative advertisements are normally those that encourage the use of
products disapproved by college or university authority. For instance, the stand taken by the
Daily Orange at Syracuse University in regard to cigarette advertising is particularly poignant.
In the Syracuse situation, the faculty and the staff were willing to accept financial difficulty
rather than accept advertising that was contrary to the university’s principles. The Daily
Orange was one of the first daily collegiate newspapers not to carry tobacco advertising.210
The Daily Orange had greater freedom than the majority of undergraduate newspapers
of the time. When it decided to reject tobacco advertising in 1932, the Daily Orange was thirty
years old. In 1921 the student editors and managers of the newspaper found themselves in
financial difficulty and appealed to the student body as a whole. In a mass meeting, the
student body passed a resolution that every student should be compelled to subscribe to the
paper. However, there was no authority behind their action and it was not enforced. A year
Ruth Strang Group Activities in College and Secondary School (New York: New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1941) p. 185.
210 Burges Johnson “Cigarette Advertising and Censorship” School and Society 32, (December 31, 1932) pp. 856856.
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later the students appealed to the administration, which agreed to assume financial
responsibility for the paper and allotted a student fee that paid for the newspaper.211
Syracuse University’s attitude on tobacco advertising was a logical outcome. The
tobacco industry, specifically the cigarette manufacturers, carried on a skillful and vigorous
propaganda, which had certain definite characteristics in the eyes of the university
administration. Its goal was to create an appetite instead of creating a demand. In addition,
the advertisements demanded large spaces for pictorial display as well as letter-press.212
Opening the pages of Syracuse University’s Daily Orange to such tobacco displays
would make it possible for the student advertising manager to fill the entire area allotted for
advertising with cigarette ads. This would essentially eliminate the local merchants from
advertising in the newspaper. If the paper were made larger to accommodate both local
businesses and tobacco ads, it would be necessary to change the one-third allotment for
advertising space.213
In addition to the Daily Orange, Blair Academy, a private college in Blairstown, New
Jersey also did not carry cigarette advertising. The Blair Academy Breeze did not accept any
cigarette advertising because of a faculty rule prohibiting such advertising.214
Because of the strong opposition to smoking on some university campuses, the
campus newspaper’s tobacco advertising “would be daily saturating the campus with
skillfully prepared propaganda in direct opposition to the athletic and physical education
departments’ efforts to keep smoking on campus to a minimum.” In addition, Syracuse
Burges Johnson “Cigarette Advertising and Censorship” School and Society 32, (December 31, 1932) pp. 856856.
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University urged women not to smoke by telling them to “keep kissable” and meditate upon
“nature in the raw.”215 Representatives of the tobacco industry were offended by Syracuse
University’s stand against tobacco telling them that they belonged with the “ichthyosaurus,”
the “dodo” and the “great auk.”216
University policy was not the only factor preventing cigarette advertising in college
and university newspapers. Some cigarette manufacturers chose not to advertise in particular
newspapers because of high inch rates. For instance, R.J. Reynolds did not advertise in the
following newspapers during the 1930s because of high rates: the Loyola College Greyhound,
the Millsaps College Purple & White, the Woodberry Forrest Oracle, the Lake Forest Stentor,
the Upsala College Gazette, the Union College Cardinal & Cream, the Cumberland University
Collegian, and the Randolph-Macon Yellow Jacket.217
Advertising and Commercial Speech:
Although journalism is public business, it is still a private industry. Therefore, the
newspaper industry had the rights and privileges under the law pursuant to conducting a
private business as it applied from the 1920s-1960s. During this time period, the newspaper
could refuse and accept advertising as it saw fit. And, this right to refuse advertising was
tested in the courts. Under the law a newspaper retained the right to what it would and
would not print. At the same time, the newspaper was legally protected as en entity of public
value. The judicial logic behind this principle is as follows: if a newspaper were considered a
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“common carrier” and required to print every advertisement that it received it would be
equally obligated to print all of the news that it received.218
The courts agreed that college officials as well as student editors of publications in
private colleges could reject any and all advertising at any time for any reason whatsoever.
And, the publication was not obligated to provide a reason for rejecting the advertising.
However, in public colleges, the courts would not allow college officials the authority to
deny access to the advertising columns of college publications. But the Courts would uphold
the right of student editors, who they said were not legally agents of the state, to reject
advertising as they see fit. If the college official rejected the advertisement, it would be an
impermissible state action. If the student editor rejected the advertising, it would be
constitutionally protected.219
Advertising, or commercial speech, is part of that class of expression that does not
enjoy full protection of the First Amendment. However, in more recent years the courts
have been expanding the scope of that protection.220 When college and student publications
accepted advertising, they became responsible for libelous content of that advertising.
However, since New York Times v. Sullivan (1964),221 advertising that advocates ideas,
expresses opinions, or is political in nature has enjoyed First Amendment protection. Only
product and service advertising was subject to government regulations. And the regulations
that apply to the commercial press also apply to the collegiate press.
According to a survey published by James Crimmins in 1968, of the student
newspapers stating that they had any restrictions, 52 percent vested this power of decision
James C. Crimmins Successful Publishing on the Campus (New York: New York: Newsweek Inc. 1968) p. 71.
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on the advertising manager. Almost 20 percent vested the power in a university
representative, while the remaining 28 percent gave the responsibility to the editor or
publications board. Regarding restrictions, 78 percent had restrictions against specific
products. However, the restrictions were not spelled out. The restricted products were what
one would expect them to be – 58 per cent had restrictions on liquor advertising, 46 percent
had restrictions on tobacco advertising, 8 percent had restrictions on drugs, and 8 percent
restricted political advertising. Even though the tobacco industry discontinued its cigarette
advertising in 1963, only 46 percent of universities had formal restrictions against tobacco
advertisements in 1968.222
Funding from National Advertising:
For decades, the college market in the United States has been a lucrative target for
advertisers. Competition in the college market has been fierce. Lawsuits, confrontations,
and squabbles have resulted from this intense competition.223
Until the late seventies, one company, National Educational Advertising Services
(NEAS), sold all of the national advertising that appeared in college newspapers. NEAS was
a subsidiary of Reader’s Digest.224 However, in 1976 the Supreme Court ruled that NEAS held
a monopolistic position and was in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.225 National
Educational Advertising Services sold national advertising space in student newspapers on
behalf of the campus papers. NEAS sold space in the newspapers to national advertisers,
billed the advertisers or their advertising agencies, deducted a commission for itself, and
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remitted the remainder to the newspaper.226 However, student newspapers did have the right
to refuse advertising sold by NEAS.
By 1967 NEAS was selling more than $3,000,000 worth of national advertising for
college newspapers every year. A 1968 study by James Crimmins reported national
advertising revenues in excess of $250,000 or $6,440 per paper. Daily newspapers received a
larger portion of the national advertising but it represented a smaller percentage of their total
incomes. For example, the average daily paper received $30,000 from NEAS or 14% of its
total revenue. The average weekly with advertising revenues of $10,000 or less received more
than 86 percent of its total advertising revenues from NEAS. The average newspaper
received 24% of its advertising income from NEAS.227
National advertisers had a large say in the campuses they targeted. The bigger, betterknown, and more prestigious institutions received the most national advertising. Among the
papers that Crimmins studied, 80% of NEAS advertising went to schools that were among
the top 201 in the nation as selected by the Associated College Press.228
The sale of advertising was necessary to the survival of the student newspaper
because the college community was seldom, if ever, willing to subsidize the paper sufficiently
so that advertising could be eliminated. In spite of the fact that campus newspapers were
often under funded, next to intercollegiate athletics, the college paper was the largest
financial undertaking on most campuses in 1962. However, unlike athletics, the college
newspaper derives financial a large amount support from the campus community and a
variety of advertisers. However, it is important to mention that not all of student advertising
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revenue comes from national advertisers. Some local or regional advertisers also advertise in
campus publications.229
However, the sale of advertising in campus newspapers during the 1950s and 1960s
was often rather counterproductive. Sometimes the cost of the advertising that seemed to be
borne by the advertisers was actually borne by the students. For instance, in some cases, the
printing costs for student papers were paid by student fees. These fees would need to
increase if additional pages were printed to accommodate larger advertisements or a greater
number of advertisements. If a newspaper was mismanaged, the advertising revenue did not
cover the cost of the additional pages. In addition, very little advertising that was found in
student newspapers could be defended as socially productive. For instance, the growth of
both cigarette and fashion advertising resulted in an increase in the size of the newspaper.
This increase in size usually increased the cost of the production so that relatively little profit
was earned from the advertising.230
The Importance of School-Newspaper Advertising:
An understanding of successful school-newspaper advertising comes in part from
knowing its importance. Before the middle of the 1960s, the importance of student
newspaper advertising could be considered in five ways (1) benefits to the advertiser, the
sender of the message; (2) benefits to the consumer, the receiver of the message; (3) benefits
to the publications that prints the advertisements; and (4) benefits to the student solicitor,
who sells the advertisement.231
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From the community merchant’s perspective, there were six specific purposes of
advertising. These goals were (1) to sell goods; (2) to create demands; (3) to introduce styles
and customs; (4) to seek goodwill; (5) to keep the product or advertiser’s name before the
public; and (6) to introduce a new business or announce a change in location. If a given
student-newspaper advertisement fulfilled one or more of these purposes, then the
community merchant benefits.232
There could be many rewards for a school publication advertising program. With
additional money from advertising revenue, a journalism program can expand. For example,
special “extras” can be published, larger issues can be printed, or the school newspaper can
be published more frequently. A more professional publication can be published because of
the increase in the size or number of issues could provide more space or number of issues
gives room for fuller coverage of school activities, which in turn can be a determining factor
for better school spirit. In addition, students can gain valuable experience by selling
advertising in addition to the usual editorial duties.233
Student Newspapers at The University of Tennessee:
The publication of a campus newspaper is one of the oldest traditions at the
University of Tennessee. The first journalistic efforts of the University, then known as the
East Tennessee University, were created and edited by the Senior Class of 1840-1841, and
continued in the hands of the Senior Class until 1843. The contributors were never revealed
as they signed their names with Greek letters.234 The history of university-sanctioned
newspapers at the University of Tennessee begins with the semi-monthly publication of The
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University Times-Prospectus beginning on November 3, 1871. The first publication to take the
name Orange and White was published on February 24, 1900 as a weekly publication and was
later published semi-weekly. The Orange and White was published at the main campus in
Knoxville and at the Memphis campus and was under the direction of the publications
council starting in 1916.235 Unfortunately, very few records exist for the Orange and White
because the majority of them were destroyed in a campus fire.236
Student publications played an important role in school spirit at The University of
Tennessee. In the early 1920s, the students created a movement to obtain a fee, called a
blanket tax, to cover admission to athletic events and to pay for publications. The staffs of
the student publications, such as the Orange and White, actively supported the fee. Although
the fee did not pass in 1922, interest in the fee continued until it was passed in 1927 by a
75% student majority vote.237 The first female editor-in-chief, Katherine Goddard, was
elected during the 1920s; she assumed the position on February 1, 1923.238
On March 26, 1931, the paper first became a semi-weekly and it was printed for the
first time on standard newsprint with seven columns to a page. The change enabled the use
of an improved style of make-up and more feature stories were placed on the first page. The
entire last page was dedicated to sports. Due to wartime restrictions, the paper reverted to a
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weekly in 1943. However, it regained its semiweekly status after the war.239 In addition, in
1940 the Orange and White changed its name from Orange and White to The Orange and White.240
Funding for the Orange and White was problematic, especially during the Depression
when the University faced significant financial woes. The legislature reduced funds for the
University in 1931. The trustees tried to compensate in part by increasing the maintenance
fee from fifteen to twenty dollars. The same year, the trustees dropped the Student Activities
Fee, which had been $13.25 a quarter. This meant that the fees were actually slightly reduced.
The Student Activities fee had provided a primary source of funding for the Orange and White
newspaper.241 The headline of the May 23, 1933 edition read, “Trustees to Kill Activities
Fee: Athletics, Musical Groups, Publications Dealt a Severe Blow.” The financial difficulties
that the newspaper faced became evident later that same year in a column entitled “Orange
and White Goes A-Begging For Curtains” published on October 13, 1933. The column reads,
It is nothing new for the Orange and White to be accused of selling its journalistic soul.
But for the first time it is true. The paper makes no bones about it. Boldly and
openly it is willing to trade (1) column of publicity (the only coin it has) to the Home
Economics Club for (1) set of window curtains for the editor’s office.
The paper’s financial woes continued into the 1940s. The Orange and White sponsored a
subscription contest. Campus fraternities and sororities competed to obtain paid
subscriptions to support the paper. A trophy and recognition in the paper were to be
awarded to the winner.242
In addition to its financial woes, the paper also addressed the growing popularity of
cigarette smoking. On Friday March 1, 1935, the Orange and White published an editorial
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entitled, “Cigarettes, Candy, Chewing Gum!” The column laments students’ tendency to
litter on campus. The column reads,
Anyone interested in determining the favorite brand of cigarettes of UT students
need not employ a blindfold method of selection. All that he would need do would
be count the number of each brand, which constantly litter the entrances to Ayres
Hall. He need not limit himself to this, but could count the empty packages also.
A new student newspaper, The Daily Beacon, was established at the University of
Tennessee in 1967 and was published four times per week. Soon afterward, the paper began
publishing issues five times a week and continues to do so publishing about 180 issues per
academic year.243
Tobacco Experiment Stations at Universities in the Southeast:
By the 1950s, the tobacco industry had collaborated with many universities in the
South to learn how to better cultivate tobacco. The primary experiment stations were located
at universities in North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky.244
During the spring of 1928, Clyde B. Austin, the founder of the Austin Tobacco
Company, asked the University of Tennessee to consider establishing a tobacco research
facility in Greeneville, Tennessee. Austin, along with a number of other prominent tobacco
men, believed that the state needed a tobacco research station and that the location should
be in the state’s leading burley tobacco growing region. 245
The idea took shape during the state legislature’s 1930-1931 session. A bill was
passed that granted $25,000.00 for the purchase of land on which a tobacco research station
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would be established.246 This facility would be a cooperative effort between The University
of Tennessee and the United States Department of Agriculture’s office of Tobacco and Plant
Nutrition. The Tobacco Experiment Station opened in the spring of 1932.247
During the first decade of the Tobacco Experiment Station’s existence, the Station’s
primary goals related to the establishment of the facility. Although experimental studies had
been conducted during this period, no significant breakthroughs were reported. During the
war years, the station lost much of its manpower. The work at the station came almost to a
standstill and was in desperate need of direction.248 However, the changes brought about by
World War II that necessitated the production of more tobacco and the technology that
would make this possible would set the stage for the station’s work over the next twenty-five
years. According to Charles Click, the work conducted at the station during these years was
the most influential in the station’s history. Advances in plant breeding and agronomics
resulted in a number of major discoveries that have been beneficial to the farmer.249
After the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General’s Report, tobacco production in the United
States changed drastically. The change from unfiltered cigarettes to the filtered low-tar
version enabled cigarette manufacturers to use a lower quality tobacco in their product.250
This trend also resulted in an increased use of foreign tobaccos imported from Africa, Asia
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and Latin America. Therefore, the tobacco station changed its focus from creating new
varieties and better quality tobacco to cultivating more tobacco at a reduced cost.251
In Click’s opinion, the contributions made by the University of Tennessee Tobacco
Experiment Station to the American tobacco industry are immeasurable.252 The role played
by the station in increasing American tobacco production has placed tobacco near the top of
the list of U.S. agricultural exports. The economic benefit derived from the increased
production has placed tobacco near the top of the list of U.S. agricultural exports. From the
early advances made against black root rot disease to the high yield varieties that are popular
today, the station’s tobacco breeding program has had a large influence on the tobacco
industry in the United States.253
Conclusion:
Cigarette and tobacco promotion have been an important part of the collegiate
culture at colleges and universities across the nation. However, financial woes have also been
an important part of the history of student publications. Because of the desperate need for
funding, the campus newspaper’s student-centered goal was compromised by its advertising.
Unfortunately, the funding from the tobacco companies did little to help the newspaper’s
financial woes.
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Chapter Four: The FTC’s Role in Ending Tobacco Advertising in Student
Newspapers on College and University Campuses
During the 1950s and 1960s, student newspapers at colleges and universities were
major vehicles for cigarette advertising and promotion. Student newspapers were attractive
to the tobacco industry because they were a relatively inexpensive medium that targeted
young adults who were largely unaware of the risks associated with cigarette smoking.
Cigarette companies were important advertisers on campus and their advertising consumed
much of the advertising space in student newspapers. However, as scientific and medical
reports began to surface that linked cigarette smoking with cancer, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) began to take action against the tobacco industry. And, ultimately, these
actions resulted in the removal of cigarette advertising from student publications. This
chapter traces the FTC’s involvement in tobacco advertising regulation during the 1950s and
1960s that resulted in the end of tobacco advertising in student newspapers.
Government agencies offered young people little protection from cigarette
advertisers during the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time period numerous college
newspapers and some high school newspapers carried numerous cigarette advertisements. In
fact, nearly 2,000 college publications, mainly newspapers, received over 40 percent of their
advertising revenue from the tobacco industry.254 In this litigious age, it is difficult to
imagine cigarette advertisements blatantly targeting youth and young adults yet going
relatively unnoticed.
It would be assumed that the FTC would protect college students from
unscrupulous tobacco advertisers who were blatantly trying to persuade a new generation to
become addicted to tobacco. However, during the 1950s and early 1960s the FTC was
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relatively powerless against the powerful Tobacco Industry. Until the eve of the Surgeon
General’s Report in 1964, the FTC had little success regulating cigarette advertising.
College Newspapers and Cigarette Advertising:
College newspapers and tobacco shared a relationship that spanned over 40 years
and five decades. Although most college student newspapers accepted advertising dollars
from the tobacco industry without any controversy, some colleges did take action and pull
the cigarette advertisements of their own accord. For instance, Main Events, the campus
newspaper at City College in New York City and Maroon, the campus newspaper at
University of Chicago, both dropped cigarette advertisements before the Tobacco Institute,
the public relations arm of the tobacco industry, finally pulled the advertising because of
pressure from the FTC in 1963. However, dropping cigarette advertising from student
newspapers was not a simple matter. It involved contracts, possibly the loss of the school
paper, and even lawsuits. On October 29, 1952 Main Events announced that it planned to
drop all cigarette advertising. Part of an editorial that underlined the issue stated:
We feel that we are condoning cigarette smoking by allowing placement of
advertising space at a time when it was impossible to overlook the facts of
cigarette surveys.255
Three issues later the newspaper was out of money, it stated that it wished,
to express its deep regrets that the financial solvency of this newspaper – and
apparently many other school papers across the country – depends, to such a
large extent, upon a product which, according to the evidence, contributes so
largely to the death of thousands each year.
Because the issue at stake here is not the publication life of a single
newspaper, but whether or not the collegiate press must inevitably fold when
outside advertising (primarily cigarette) is the basic source of its financial
survival.256
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The Nation printed an editorial on January 26, 1963 entitled “Collegians and the Weed:”
Apparently Main Events is the first college newspaper to discontinue cigarette
advertising on the initiative of the staff… The vaunted editorial
independence of the great American press is here being tested, and the fact
that the test is on a small and local scale does not alter the principle
involved.257
Soon after The Nation article, the Catholic weekly, America, and the Medical Tribune, a national
weekly for physicians, devoted space to the story. The public response was immediate –
especially from the physicians. The City College school administrators were given the
necessary funds to continue their campus paper.258
Earle Ubell, the New York Herald Tribune’s science editor, discussed the issue in a
letter to the City College students. The majority of the eight-page issue discussed the
controversy. More than 500 of the 6,000 copies that were run were sent to student college
newspaper editors with the front-page comment:
We have no wish to point out individuals and tell them not to smoke; what
you do is your own business. But especially for the young people who each
semester enter the colleges of the nation…freshmen and seniors alike, whose
understanding of this complex story is limited or made lopsided by the
continual barrage of advertising through radio-TV, newspaper and magazine,
and their own college press, we urge responsible editors of the country to
help offset the potentially dangerous effects of smoking by using their good
offices to discuss the issue for the benefit of all students.259
These comments were issued April 29, 1963 – two months before the Tobacco Institute’s
recommendations that cigarette advertising be dropped from all college publications.
On the same day at the University of Chicago, the American Cancer Society’s Illinois
division in conjunction with Coccyx, the University of Chicago group organized to eliminate
cigarette advertising from the college daily, held a conference attended by editors and
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editorial assistants from 18 colleges in the metropolitan area. The purpose of the conference
was to work to persuade editors to discontinue cigarette advertising and to enlist them in a
drive to write anticigarette material. The presenters at the conference included a surgeon, the
editor of the campus newspaper at the University of Chicago, and an advertising executive.
The conference presented evidence on smoking and urged editors, if they were convinced
that smoking and lung cancer were causally related, to refuse to renew their cigarette
advertising contracts for the 1963-1964 academic year. Or, they might publish anticigarette
advertisements created by Coccyx, the first series of which was entitled “On Campus Cancer”
as a parody of “On Campus,” a column by popular humorist Max Shulman that was
sponsored by Phillip Morris and Marlboro cigarettes.260
However, not everyone on campus was pleased with the decision to pull the
advertising from college newspapers. For instance, in 1963 the advertising manager of
Maroon defended cigarette advertising by stating:
Cigarette advertisements are highly lucrative and, therefore, highly desirable.
Esthetically speaking, cigarette advertisements are generally praiseworthy for
their art and good taste.261
Even into the 1980s, twenty years after the advertising was removed, many college
newspapers worked to convince the tobacco industry to advertise in college newspapers. For
instance, in a letter dated October 20, 1981 from Ann Shank-Volk, the president of College
Newspaper Business Advertising Managers Incorporated (CNBAM), to the Tobacco
Institute, the members of CNBAM ask the Tobacco Institute to reconsider their voluntary
ban on college newspaper advertising. The letter states,
We, the members of College Newspaper Business and Advertising Managers
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Inc. (CNBAM), request that the voluntary ban on advertising in college
newspapers be rescinded by the Tobacco Institute. CNBAM is a national
organization of over fifty major college newspapers. The college market itself
is a lucrative one, consisting of 12,000,000 full and part-time students. 79%
of these students read their college newspaper on a regular basis. CNBAM
believes that by advertising in college newspapers, your industry would be
making an economic, efficient media purchase aimed at the youth market,
which is consistently supported the tobacco industry.262
In spite of CNBAM’s efforts to regain tobacco advertising, the Tobacco Institute did not
renew its college newspaper contract.
Tobacco Litigation and the Formation of the Tobacco Institute:
The first lawsuit involving three of the six major cigarette companies claiming that
cigarette smoking caused lung cancer was filed in March 1954. All six manufacturers were
involved in litigation based on similar claims. The primary legal issues that the industry faced
centered around advertising, antitrust issues and health concerns. These concerns resulted in
the creation of various tobacco related organizations that represented the interests of
tobacco manufacturers. These organizations managed the industry’s legal, research, and
communications issues.
For the tobacco industry, the key defense strategy in the smoking and health
litigation has been to try the plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s strategy is to try the
corporate defendants. During the tobacco litigation of the 1950s and 1960s, the plaintiffs
essentially asserted that the defendants have conspired to propagate “the deadly delusion of
an ‘open question’ concerning the issue of smoking and health.”263 For instance, one
complaint alleged that:
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The defendants, individually and as members of the tobacco industry, conspired to
misrepresent and through their concerted action, misrepresented to the users of
cigarettes, and failed to warn users of cigarettes of the dependency induced by
cigarette use and the adverse consequences of cigarette use.264
The primary allegations against the industry assert that the industry combined to deprive the
public of certain scientific data and that it used advertising to help persuade the public that
the cigarette habit was safe.265
However, the tobacco industry itself had profited from public health concerns for
years, and had built business around consumer health concerns. Most cigarette makers had,
at some time, employed advertising campaigns that suggested health benefits offered by their
particular brand, such as "smoother on the throat," "Not a cough in the carload," "More
Doctors smoke Camel," among others. In the early 1950s cigarette producers introduced
more filtered cigarette brands to ease consumer fears. For instance, Pall Mall advertised that
the unfiltered, yet longer, Pall Mall cigarette successfully filtered the smoke through the
tobacco to help "Guard against throat scratch.” As the industry capitalized on health fears,
they simultaneously worked to disprove the claims that smoking caused serious illness.266
Although the tobacco industry had successfully dealt with controversy in the past, it
seemed that more significant action was now in order. A December 14, 1953 meeting of the
cigarette industry tobacco executives resulted in a call to develop a "pro-cigarette" public
relations entity. The industry felt that the most effective way to face this growing problem
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was to employ public relations counsel. On December 15, 1954 the tobacco industry hired
Hill & Knowlton, a New York-based public relations agency, to create the trade association.
Within the month, Hill & Knowlton and the industry collaborated to provide public
relations for the industry and, simultaneously, fund research to study the damaging claims
being made against its product. The Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was
officially formed in January 1954.267
Providing counter arguments against the mounting evidence against the tobacco
industry became a primary function of the TIRC. The 1952 Reader’s Digest article entitled
“Cancer by the Carton,” the studies by Drs. Wynder, Graham and Croninger that
successfully induced cancer by painting cigarette tar on the skin of laboratory mice and the
corresponding British study by Richard Doll, forced the tobacco industry to acknowledge
the "major scientific and public relations problem" it was facing. Therefore, the industry
could no longer ignore the mounting evidence that linked cigarette smoking with cancer and
other diseases.268
In January of 1954 the tobacco industry announced its “Open Question” position in
“A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers.” The four primary elements of this position as it
evolved in the 1950s were:
1.

It has not been scientifically established that smoking is a cause of disease,
particularly lung cancer.
2. The solution lies in more research to which the industry is committed.
3. Scientists have been unable to establish any ingredient as found in cigarette smoke,
which has produced lung cancer in animals or human beings.
4. The industry believes that cigarettes are not injurious to health.269
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In spite of the fact that the tobacco industry claimed in 1954 that the TIRC was
formed with the function of sponsoring independent research into smoking and health
issues and to resolve the “Open Question” regarding tobacco and health, the actual function
of the TIRC was, as SAB (Scientific Advisory Board) Chair, Dr. Clarence Cook stated in
1954, “[T]o build a foundation of research sufficiently strong to arrest continuing or future
attacks” on the tobacco industry.270 Furthermore, one of the TIRC’s major activities from
1954-1958 and thereafter was to serve as the public relations vehicle for the tobacco industry
in interviews, speeches, and testimony before Congress, the FTC, and in court.271
In 1955, the FTC issued guidelines to prevent cigarette advertisements from making
direct or indirect health related claims in their advertising. One effect of this legislation was
to prevent the tobacco industry from making any claims that product improvements, such as
filtration, had any beneficial health effects. Then, in 1959 the FTC enacted a rule that
prevented companies from mentioning tar or nicotine levels in their cigarettes because it
could be referred to as a health claim.272
The tobacco industry created the Tobacco Institute (TI) in 1958 to replace the
TIRC’s public relations and legal functions and the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) to
continue the TIRC research functions. The Tobacco Institute’s primary objective was to
publicize "the industry's position on the smoking and health issue, representing the industry's
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position to the Congress and the state legislatures and generally stating the industry's
position to the public on issues ranging from smoking and health to taxation and all
legislation affecting the industry."273 Led by attorney-based committees (the Committee of
Counsel) and Covington and Burling (TI counsel), the Tobacco Institute was comprised of
the tobacco lobby, legislative, public relations, state affairs, and federal affairs branch of the
tobacco industry.
The Tobacco Industry, Federal Regulations and the FTC:
History of Tobacco Advertising:
During the period 1913-1953, cigarette consumption in the United States boomed.
Many believe that this increase in consumption was the direct and intended result of the
tobacco industry’s advertising and marketing efforts. Throughout this time period, few legal
or moral restraints were placed on cigarette promotion. Even before print advertising was
common, picture cards were included in every cigarette pack. To encourage the smoker to
purchase more cigarettes, the cards would be printed as part of a series. A series might
include pictures of celebrities, athletes, scantily clad women, and of businessmen who made
the transition from rags to riches.274
When print media advertisements gained popularity in the 1930s and 1940s, the
themes of glamour and safety became widely circulated. Virtually every major movie star and
professional athlete promoted a brand of cigarettes. Smoking was also very prevalent in the
movies. These promotional techniques were targeted at the youth and young adult audience
whose desire to emulate celebrities would lead them to start smoking. As part of their goal
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of increasing the market, the tobacco industry also sought to target women and soldiers.275
However, for all of the “glamour” of cigarette smoking, market research uncovered
that smokers did experience some unpleasant physical side effects related to smoking. The
most notable side effects of smoking were coughing and a scratchy throat. For instance, a
brand history of Pall Mall indicates that in 1948 product research found that “a large number
of smokers suffered from throat irritation in various degrees. Consequently, the copy line
that Pall Mall “filters the smoke” was changed to “filters the smoke on the way to your
throat.” The addition of “on the way to your throat” proved to be an even more effective
copy line. Likewise, Chesterfields were advertised as not adversely affecting the “nose,
throat, and accessory organs,” Phillip Morris contained “DiGel” to remove irritants, Camel
invited smokers to a 30-day test of the effect of Camels on their “T-Zone,” Lucky Strike
used UV-rays and toasting to remove harsh irritants, and Kools went further by promoting
their menthol as being good for a cold. However, R.J. Reynolds went the furthest by stating
that Camels aided in digestion, gave students a lift and additional energy, contained 28% less
nicotine, and did not affect an athlete’s wind.276 The majority of these offenses were found
in both student publications and general circulation periodicals.
Although information dating back to the 1930s was adequate to trigger the industry’s
duty to warn its consumers about the possible dangers of tobacco use, or at least put the
tobacco industry on notice, evidence linking cigarette smoking and cancer was established
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during the early 1950s. In addition to failing to warn the public in the face of increasing
scientific evidence, the industry also resisted a number of warning proposals. Therefore, the
tobacco industry had several documented opportunities to adopt a voluntary warning label
before the government mandated warning labels.277
The Case Against Tobacco:
The case against the tobacco industry was threefold. First, as a part of the general
corporate “conspiracy/misconduct” case, the public statements being released to the public
through advertising with the internal state of awareness of the strength and validity of the
connection that was established between smoking and various diseases. For instance, even as
the Arthur D. Little Company was replicating, albeit with diminished results, the mousepainting studies that had previously demonstrated that cigarettes contained carcinogens,
Liggett was promoting its L&M filter as “Just What the Doctor Ordered.” While the
research should have caused concern about the product, the advertising was clearly created
to reassure the public about the safety of the product.278
Second, one could argue that the tobacco industry’s marketing efforts were
irresponsible by stating that the promotional design was created and implemented with the
single-minded goal of increasing the cigarette market. Advertising is viewed as the leading
factor in smoking initiation with a particular emphasis on youth, young adults, and women,
and in smoking continuance in the face of growing public knowledge of increased health
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risks. For instance, the two themes of safety and glamour appeared repeatedly from 19131964, with a special emphasis on safety throughout filter cigarette’s introductory era from
1953-1955 and the “tar derby” from 1958-1960. During this time period, celebrity
endorsements saturated the advertising media. A powerful component of this argument is
the FTC’s finding, that was held up on appeal, that many of these advertisements were
deceptive and misleading.279
The death-knell of the use of celebrity endorsements came with the Cigarette
Advertising Code. Additional regulations also damaged the industry. For instance, the
inclusion of warning labels on cigarette packs and, later, in cigarette advertising encouraged
the industry’s advertising to become more subtle. However, the themes of glamour and
safety persisted nonetheless. Glamour was no longer personified in recognizable celebrities
but in the anonymous happy, healthy individuals depicted in the advertisements. Claims of
safety were cleverly implied in advertisements for “safer” cigarettes that were low tar, low
gas, had charcoal filters, or all natural. The intent and effect of both was the same: to deviate
from the legally required warning label and reassure smokers in their decision to start and
continue smoking.280
FTC and Government Regulation:
The FTC flirted with cigarette advertising regulations since the 1930s, going after
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manufacturers who made unproven health claims about their products.281 However, the
1950s and early 1960s are perhaps the most important era in cigarette regulation. Public
health concerns drove cigarette manufacturers to compete in rival advertising campaigns
promoting their filters (The "Tar Wars" or "Tar Derby"). In the early 1950s, only 2% of
cigarettes had filter tips. However, by 1960, 50% of cigarettes were filter tips. The reason this
drastic change in cigarette marketing was the publication of the first major study that
definitively linked smoking to lung cancer. Mortin Levin’s epidemiological survey of Buffalo
lung cancer patients between 1938 and 1950 appeared in The Journal of the American Medical
Association. His controversial and shocking finding: smokers were statistically twice as likely
to develop lung cancer as non-smokers. Because of the scientific research that was beginning
to connect smoking with cancer, FTC started to complain that cigarette advertisements that
touted the physical benefits of smoking were deceptive in 1950.282 However, the ultimate
finding of the FTC’s 1950 R.J. Reynolds decision was that cigarettes were not “appreciably
harmful” to healthy smokers.283
An article in U.S. News & World Report stated the FTC’s position on cigarettes and
cigarette advertising very clearly. The article stated the FTC’s position that,
For smokers, one cigarette is about like another. Cigarettes do not sooth the
throat, help digestion, or relieve fatigue according to the findings of the
Federal Trade Commission. All cigarettes contain some poison and one
brand is no less irritating than any other brand. Cigarette smoking is not
good for the individual.284
The Commission reached these conclusions after an investigation of tobacco industry
advertising claims. The findings are based on laboratory tests conducted by the Food and
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Drug Association and testimonies made by medical professionals.285
In proceedings culminating in 1950 with cease and desist orders against every major
tobacco company, the FTC found virtually all cigarette advertisements had been false,
misleading, and deceptive.286 For instance, in the proceedings against R.J. Reynolds, the FTC
found that many of the celebrity endorsements were deceptive because either the celebrities
did not smoke or they did not smoke Camels exclusively.287 The Chesterfield “Nose, Throat,
and Accessory Organs Not Adversely Affected by Smoking Chesterfields” campaign was
also the subject of an FTC investigation that resulted in a cease and desist order entered
against Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company.288
A statement in an April 5, 1950 press release issued by the FTC explains the
Commission’s response to claims that some cigarettes contain fewer irritating substances
than others. The FTC’s release of the cease and desist order against Camel and Old Gold
reads,
In any event, it is declared that smoke is an “irritant” – containing as it does
the substances carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nicotine, ammonia, and
various aldehydes, including formaldehyde, tars, and formic acid. The
Commission found that the smoke from all the leading brands of cigarettes
contains all the leading brands of cigarettes contains all of these irritating
substances “in essentially the same quantities and degree.” And, “being an
irritant,” the Commission pointed out, “the smoke will irritate disordered
throats,” and “excessive smoking” of any brand will irritate throats even in
normal healthy condition.289
Regarding R.J. Reynolds’ use of celebrity appeals in Camel advertisements, the release said,
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The Reynolds Company is further forbidden to represent that Camels differ
in any of those respects from other leading brands of cigarettes, or to use any
testimonials which contain any of the prohibited representations or which are
not “factually true in all respects.”290
The FTC decision in the Chesterfield case stated that the advertisement reported the
results of a survey of 30 smokers who smoked Chesterfield cigarettes for a six-month period.
During this time period, a physician examined the research participants every two months.
At the end of the six months, the smokers were not adversely affected by smoking
Chesterfields. However, the FTC noted that the study extended beyond the initial six
months for an additional eighteen-month period. During this latter period, four of the 30
participants displayed coughing spells that were attributed to smoking. 291
In 1951, American Tobacco Company’s Lucky Strike Cigarettes received a cease and
desist order from the FTC because it was in violation of the Federal Trade Commission’s
previous rulings and the Federal Trade Commission Act. American Tobacco Company was
ordered to cease and desist from any advertising that:
1.) Lucky Strike cigarettes or the smoke therefrom contains less acid than do
the cigarettes or the smoke therefrom any of the leading brands of cigarettes.
2.) That Lucky Strike cigarettes or the smoke therefrom is less irritating to
the throat than the cigarettes or the smoke therefrom of any of the other
leading brands of cigarettes.
3.) That Lucky Strike cigarettes or the smoke therefrom contains less nicotine
than do the cigarettes or the smoke therefrom of any of the four other
leading brands of cigarettes.292
The following year, R.J. Reynolds received a modified order to cease and desist from
the FTC. On January 17, 1952, the FTC mandated that Camel cigarettes stop the implying
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the following in its advertising:
1.) That the smoking of such cigarettes encourages the flow of digestive
fluids or increases the alkalinity of the digestive tract or that it aids digestion
in any respect.
2.) That the smoking of cigarettes relieves fatigue or that it creates, renews,
gives or releases body energy.
3.) That the smoking of such cigarettes does not affect or impair the “wind”
or the physical condition of the athletes.
4.) That such cigarettes or the smoke therefrom will never harm or irritate
the throat, nor leave an aftertaste.
5.) That the smoke from such cigarettes is soothing, restful, or comforting to
the nerves, or that it protects against nerve strain.
6.) That Camel cigarettes differ in any of the foregoing respects from the
other leading brands of cigarettes on the market.
7.) That Camel cigarettes or the smoke therefrom contains less nicotine than
do the cigarettes or the smoke therefrom contains less nicotine than do the
cigarettes or the smoke therefrom of any of the four other largest selling
brands of cigarettes.293
Later that same year, the FTC was looking into Phillip Morris’ claim that their
cigarettes are less irritating.294 On February 5, 1952 the FTC found the following aspects of
the Phillip Morris to be false and deceptive and would be banned by Examiner Earl J. Kolb’s
order.
That by the use of a… hygroscopic agent as a moistener, Phillip Morris
cigarettes would be rendered nonirritating or less irritating than those brands
in which other hygroscopic agents are employed.295
The FTC also prohibited Phillip Morris from stating:
That Phillip Morris cigarettes cause no irritation to the upper respiratory tract
and are less irritating to that area than other leading brands.
That they have any value in alleviating or removing irritation of the nose or
throat due to smoking.
That they may be smoked as much and as often as one likes without irritation
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to the throat.
That they give protection from smokers coughs, the effects of inhaling or
from throat irritation due to inhaling.
That the leading brands are more irritating than Phillip Morris or that
irritation caused by smoking lasts longer when such other brands are used.
That the smoke from Phillip Morris cigarettes will not affect the breath or
leave an aftertaste.296
In the December 1, 1952 case, Federal Trade Commission v. Liggett Myers Tobacco
Co, the FTC found cigarettes definitively not to be a drug. Section 15 (c) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act states,297
The term ''drug'' means (1) articles recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States,
or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (2)
articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (3) articles (other than
food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals; and (4) articles intended for use as a component of any article
specified in clause (1), (2), or (3); but does not include devices or their
components, parts, or accessories.298
As a result of this finding, cigarette manufacturers were prohibited from advertising that
cigarettes could be smoked without inducing any adverse affects on the nose, throat, and
accessory organs.
Because cigarettes were not defined as a drug, jurisdiction was conferred upon the
court to issue an injunction against the alleged false advertising under sections 12 and 13(a)
of the FTC Act that states that it is unlawful for person, partnership, or corporation to
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disseminate false advertising.299 As a result of this ruling, Liggett and Myers was forced to
stop implying that Chesterfield cigarettes were less irritating.300 The other major cigarette
companies such as Lorillard, American Tobacco Company, and R.J. Reynolds were involved
in similar legal actions involving the FTC in 1952.
In spite of the FTC’s legal actions against the major tobacco companies, many of the
brands continued to advertise using the very claims that were just banned. For instance, in
1953 Chesterfield advertised that its cigarettes were “Always milder,” “Better tasting,”
“Cooler smoking,” and generally not irritating. In response to Liggett and Meyers’
continued reluctance to follow the FTC’s orders the Commission stated,
This is the second action instituted by the Commission to halt allegedly false
and misleading advertising that Chesterfield cigarettes can be smoked
without inducing any adverse effect upon nose, throat, and accessory organs
of the smoker…The present complaint alleges that the respondent’s
advertising represents directly and by implication that Chesterfield cigarettes
not only will have no adverse effect on nose and throat and accessory organs,
but also (1) that the smoke from Chesterfield cigarettes is milder and cooler
and consequently less irritating to the user than other cigarettes, (2) that the
smoke from Chesterfield cigarettes will sooth and relax the nerves of
smokers irrespective of the physical condition or the smoking habits of the
smokers, and (3) that the smoke from Chesterfield cigarettes does not leave
an unpleasant aftertaste in the mouth. These claims and representations,
according to the complaint, are false, misleading, and deceptive.301
After chastising Liggett and Meyers for not heading previous rulings, the FTC complaint
mentions that Chesterfield cigarettes are not the only offending brand and that the
Commission had previously instituted proceedings and issued orders against American
Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, P.J. Lorillard Company and Phillip Morris & Co.
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prohibiting the use of a variety of claims, some being of the same general nature as were
involved in this complaint.302 In spite of the FTC’s adamant complaints regarding health
claims made by tobacco companies, particularly Liggett & Meyers’ Chesterfield cigarettes, a
hearing examiner later dismissed the charges against Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. on the
grounds that there was not significant public interest, that such statements were merely
“puffing” terms, and that the counsel for the complaint had failed to make a prima facie
case.303 Likewise, the cases against the other companies including Phillip Morris were also
dismissed.304
After nearly four years of frustrating dealings with the tobacco industry, the Director
of FTC’s Bureau of Consultation, Charles E. Grandey, contacted the presidents of the major
tobacco companies urging them to adhere to some proposed industry standards. The FTC
defends its desire for further regulation by stating:
Recent scientific developments with regard to the effects of cigarette
smoking have increased the Commission’s interest in advertising claims made
for such products and have increased the Commission’s interest in
advertising claims made for such products and have increased its
responsibility under the law to prevent the use of false or misleading
claims.305
The letter continues by stating that the proposed standards are part of a voluntary code and
would not modify the provisions of any existing cease and desist order. Grandey also wrote
that he believes that the proposed standards are in accordance with the industry’s desire to
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resolve any scientific questions about its product. The letter closed by asking the tobacco
industry executives to provide comments and suggestions about the facility of the FTC’s
proposed standards as well as an indication of whether each particular company would be
willing to abide by the proposed voluntary standards.
The FTC’s 1954 proposed standards, for instance, prohibited cigarette
advertisements from claiming “directly or by implication that cigarette smoking in general or
the smoking of any brand of cigarettes is ‘not harmful’ or ‘not irritating’.” The proposed
standards also required that advertisements should not imply any medical approval of
smoking. Further, the advertisements should not represent directly or indirectly that the
smoke of any brand of cigarettes contains any less nicotine, tar or resins than any other
brand of cigarettes.306
The suggested standards for cigarette advertising were:
Cigarette advertisements-1) Should not represent directly or by implication that cigarette
smoking in general or the smoking of any brand of cigarette is
beneficial to health in any respect,
2) Should not represent directly or by implication that cigarette
smoking in general or the smoking of any brand of cigarettes is (a)
not harmful or (b) not irritating,
3) Should not represent directly or by implication, including
illustrations, that by virtue of its ingredients, method of manufacture,
length, added filter, or for any other reason the smoke of any brand
of cigarette contains less nicotine, tar, resins, or other deleterious
substances unless such representation is supported by impartial
scientific test data, which are current at the time of dissemination of
the claim, and which conclusively prove the existence of the claimed
differences to a significant degree and the claim is limited to the
particular deleterious substance or substances.
4) Should not refer to (a) the throat, larynx, nose or any other part of
the body (b) digestion (c) energy (d) nerves or (e) doctors,
5) Should not use any word, term, illustration or combination thereof,
in such a way as to indicate medical approval,
F.T.C. “The FTC Proposes Standards To Cigarette Companies” September 15, 1954. Bates Number:
963016070/6071 <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hrk85f00> (Retrieved 30 August 2006).
306

100

6) Should generally be limited to the subjects of quality, taste, flavor,
enjoyment, and other similar matters of opinion,
7) Should make no comparative claims regarding the volume of sales of
competitive brands or the purchase of particular types, qualities or
grades of tobacco unless such a claim is based on verified current
information,
8) Should contain only genuine testimonials that represent the current
opinion of the author who currently smokes the brand named.
NOTE: By publishing any testimonial the advertiser makes all of the
direct and implied representations contained therein and all of the
standards herein listed apply thereto.
9) Should not contain claims accounting to false disparagement of
other cigarette manufacturers and their products.307
The purpose of these 1954 “cigarette advertising guides” that were to apply to the
entire industry was to close the loopholes in its brand specific decrees. Although the guides
specifically prohibit all references to “throat, larynx, lungs, nose or other parts of the body,”
or to “digestion, nerves or doctors.” A later press release emphasized that “no advertising
should be used which refers to either the presence or absence of any physical effect of
smoking.”308 The guides also prohibited all tar and nicotine claims unless definite scientific
proof existed that the claims were true. However, the guides specifically allowed the
advertising of pleasure and taste.309
The tobacco industry appeared to be relatively accepting of the FTC’s proposed
code. For instance, in American Tobacco Company’s President, Paul M. Hahn’s, reply to
FTC Director Charles Grandey’s letter he said that American Tobacco Company is in full
sympathy with the FTC’s general objectives in its efforts to eliminate questionable claims
and implications from all cigarette advertising. However, Hahn continued by stating the
advertising of American Tobacco Company’s brands, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall and Tareyton
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cigarettes, were completely free from of any questionable claims and implications. Therefore,
Hahn stated, that American Tobacco Company should “look with favor upon any process
that would provide an effective means of bringing about general adherence to such a policy
throughout the cigarette industry.”310 Hahn continued by stating that American Tobacco
Company intended to continue its policy of making no questionable claims or implications
in the advertising of its cigarettes. American Tobacco Company would also be willing to
abide by any standards that it deems fair and proper. To that end, American Tobacco
Company said that it believed that statements made by advertisers should be “truthful, clear,
understandable, and warranted by facts.”311
As a result of the implementation of the code, cigarette advertising changed track
within a matter of months. Instead of advertisements that showed dark stains on filters or
referred to the heath concerns related to smoking, advertisements featured good taste and
pleasure. The cigarette advertising practices that are now condemned, such as the upbeat
quality of the advertisements and the alluring portraits of the joys of smoking at work and at
play, date from the implementation of the FTC’s code in 1955. When it prohibited the
mention of doctors and coughs, the FTC removed the most powerful weapons from the
small cigarette companies. Even in the face of more convincing cancer research, the sales of
cigarettes came back with force in 1955 and continued strongly through the late 1950s and
early 1960s.312
In 1955, after the hearing examiner dismissed the charges against Liggett and Meyers

Hahn-PM, ATCO “Letter to Charles M. Grandey Regarding the FTC’s Proposed Advertising Standards”
September 21, 1954. Bates Number: 990774811/4812 <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/apd65f00>
(Retrieved 1 September 2006).
311 Hahn-PM, ATCO “Letter to Charles M. Grandey Regarding the FTC’s Proposed Advertising Standards”
September 21, 1954. Bates Number: 990774811/4812 <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/apd65f00>
(Retrieved 1 September 2006).
312 Calfee, John E. “The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Regulation Past” Regulation, 1997 Volume 20(3):
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n3d.html> (Retrieved 28 July 2006).
310

102

and other tobacco companies on grounds that the claims were puffery, the FTC ordered that
the proceedings before a hearing examiner continue to decide if the makers of Chesterfield
cigarettes used false advertising when they claimed that their cigarettes were “Milder,”
“Soothing and Relaxing,” and had no “Unpleasant After-Taste.” By reversing this decision
and remanding the case to the examiner, the FTC stated:
We do not agree with the examiner’s findings that the representations
“Milder,” “Soothing and Relaxing,” and “Unpleasant After-Taste” are
laudatory, harmless, or mere “puffing” terms.313
Recognizing that misleading representations are difficult to distinguish and that “puffing” is
usually an expression of opinion, the Commission stated:
In our judgment, the questioned representations present sufficient factual
issues – as to qualities which Chesterfield cigarettes may or may not possess
– to warrant completion of these proceedings.314
Although the FTC disagreed with the examiner’s general conclusions, the
Commission agreed with the examiner in dismissing the charges revolving around the use of
the word “cooler.” The FTC agreed with the examiner’s finding that there was “no evidence,
certainly no substantial evidence on the issue of coolness.” However, the Commission
wanted the rest of the examiner’s decision to be overturned. As further grounds for
reversing the hearing examiner’s decision, the Commission said:
We also do not agree with the hearing examiner’s conclusion that a prima
facie case has not been established. There is in the record considerable
uncontroverted respectable evidence that is relevant to the issues here
involved. Our view is that a prima facie case has been established, by which
we do not necessarily mean that on the basis of the present record an order
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to cease and desist would issue, but rather that there is in the record reliable
evidence which, when considered in connection with reasonable inferences
which may be drawn therefrom, would probably support an order in the
absence of rebutting evidence.315
Another issue that was causing additional concern at the FTC was centering on the
claims being made about the new filter tip cigarettes. On May 6, 1955 FTC’s Director of the
Bureau of Consultation, Charles E. Grandey, wrote a letter to Horace G. Hitchcock of the
Manhattan law firm Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside, Wolff & Brophy; the law firm
represented the tobacco industry. Grandey wrote,
In recent weeks there has been a noticeable broadening of claims made for
filter tip cigarettes. It is therefore especially requested that your company reexamine its present claims for its products, particularly filter tip cigarettes, in
light of proposed Guide No. 2. If, upon reexamination, your company finds
that any of its claims are not in harmony with the suggested guides, it is
requested that the necessary changes to that end be made.316
The new advertisements for the filter tip cigarettes implied that filters made cigarette
smoking less harmful. This claim was in clear violation of Guide No. 2 that stated that
cigarette advertisements “Should not represent directly or by implication that cigarette
smoking in general or the smoking of any brand of cigarettes is (a) not harmful or (b) not
irritating.”
The late 1950s brought more charges against the tobacco industry. After 1955, the
fear of cancer persisted but most means for exploiting that fear were prevented. The
publicity linking cigarette smoking to cancer took its toll on the industry and smoking began
to decline. The industry’s response to these events was the aggressive marketing of filtered
cigarettes. Filters had been on the market before but had not achieved a significant market
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share. The market share for filtered brands grew from 10 percent in 1954 to 35 percent in
1957.317 The reason for this increase was the belief that filters significantly reduced the
amount of “tar” that the smoker ingested. Therefore, filters were marketed with direct
appeals to smokers’ health concerns. For instance:
L&M: “This is it. L&M filters are just what the doctor ordered!”
Kent: “What a priceless difference in PROTECTION a few extra pennies
make!”
Viceroy: “New Health-Guard filter makes Viceroy better for Your Health.”
Parliament: “Recessed Filter – Maximum Health Protection.”318
This theme of reassurance surfaced again in the “tar derby,” in which many cigarette brands
competed to position themselves as being lower in tar and nicotine than the other brands.
Finding this competition identical to a new barrage of health claims, the FTC ordered this
practice stopped in 1959-1960.319
In 1957 the FTC began to pursue antitrust action against Phillip Morris, Inc.
Specifically, the FTC issued a complaint that Phillip Morris was in violation of the Clayton
Act. The FTC complaint stated that Phillip Morris “violated and is now violating the
provisions of subsection (d) of Section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the RobinsonPatman Act (U.S.C. Title 15 Section 13).”320 The Robinson-Patman Amendment to the
Clayton Act requires that, if promotional allowances are given they be made available to all
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competing customers on proportionally equal terms.321 The FTC charged that Phillip
Morris,
1) Paid allowances in varying amounts to some customers, but did not do so or
offer to do so, in any amount, to other competing customers.
2) In paying such allowances to competing customers, did so in amounts not
equal to the same percentage of such competing customers’ net purchases
and not proportionately equal by any other test; and did not offer or
otherwise accord or make available such allowances to all such competing
customers in amounts equal to the largest of such percentages, or
proportionately equal by any other test.
3) In paying such allowances to competing customers, required some of them
to comply with certain terms and to furnish or make certain reciprocal
service or payments, but did not require others to do so in any manner or
amount, or required them to do so in a less burdensome manner or in lesser
amounts, and did not proportionally equal by any test.
4) In determining allowances to be paid competing customers, did so on the
basis of individual negotiations with each such customer, which resulted in
proportionately unequal, different, and arbitrary terms.322
As an example of this unlawful treatment of customers, the complaint cites a record of
payments made in 1956 to various retailers for items such as posters, carton displays, counter
displays, and change trays. The complaint continues by listing the amounts paid to various
companies selling the Phillip Morris brand through vending machines. Allowances were also
granted to customers functioning as tobacco wholesalers. For example, The Metropolitan
Tobacco Company of New York City was paid $50,000.00 in allowances in 1956, yet nothing
was offered to any of the other wholesale customers competing with it.323
The cigarette market underwent another informational jolt in 1957. Health experts
began to argue that reducing the tar content in cigarettes would be likely to reduce the risk of
lung cancer as more studies linking smoking and lung cancer were published. Attention
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quickly focused on the newly popular filter cigarettes whose tar and nicotine yield had not
yet been publicly revealed. Congressional hearings were held on filter cigarette advertising,
new tar and nicotine ratings were published in Consumer Reports, and a two part series on
cigarette filters appeared in Reader’s Digest. Each report concluded that filter cigarettes had
been so greatly modified to enhance flavor that their tar and nicotine yield was generally no
better than that of nonfilter cigarettes.324
This news initiated the great “Tar Derby.” Notwithstanding the FTC guides,
vigorous advertising of tar and nicotine content returned, new filter brands were introduced,
and existing filters were improved. And, in a development that the FTC had earlier thought
to be technically impossible, the tar and nicotine levels of nonfilter cigarettes was
significantly reduced. However, the FTC guides continued to prohibit tar and nicotine claims
that were not based on scientific proof. But, with so much noncommercial data on the
subject of filters becoming available in technical journals and in the popular press, the
“sound scientific data” requirement became another large loophole in the Commission’s
policy.325
In July 1957, the Senate introduced a bill that would have required a mandatory
warning on cigarette packs. That same month, the House of Representatives introduced a
bill that required the disclosure of tar and nicotine levels on cigarette packs. The tobacco
industry was in opposition to both bills.326
However, during this time when FTC regulation was needed most, the Commission
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was found to be relatively unable to enforce any standards on the tobacco industry. In 1958
the FTC was the subject of hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary
Affairs, over which Representative John A. Blatnik (MN) presided. This Subcommittee was
concerned with FTC efficiency in the field of false and misleading advertising in several areas
that included filter-tip cigarettes. The topic of advertising for filter-tip cigarettes was of
concern to the Subcommittee because of the health related claims that the filter-tip cigarette
manufactures were making and because of the fact that the filter-tip cigarettes often
contained more nicotine than previous unfiltered cigarettes. Many of the advertisements for
filter-tip cigarettes made claims that the tips would remove the elements of smoke that
endangered the public’s health. However, the true effectiveness of the filters often came into
question. The level of nicotine and tar in cigarettes also was a cause for concern. For
instance, L&M cigarettes produced by Liggett & Myers contained 1.5 milligrams of nicotine
and 11 milligrams of tar in 1955. However, two years later there was a 70 percent increase in
nicotine and a 33 percent increase in tar. In 1958 when L&M introduced its filter, the tar
content climbed to 17 milligrams. In June of 1958, six prominent brands of cigarettes were
all advertising the lowest tar content.327
While the FTC failed to protect consumers against these false claims, it is also true
that the FTC lacked the power to do so. The power of the FTC was limited in controlling
tobacco advertising because it did not have the power to ask a court for an injunction when
tobacco was concerned. The FTC has this power when the advertising is related to other
products such as foods, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. Therefore, the FTC needed this
power to effectively govern cigarette advertising.328
The Tar Derby’s climax came during 1959. All six major manufacturers were in the
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process of mounting major advertising campaigns to introduce their new lower tar brands,
when the FTC intervened. In December of 1959, the Bureau of Consultation at the FTC
started to negotiate secretly with the six companies. First, every claim about levels of
nicotine and tar would be considered an implied claim of positive health effects. Second,
epidemiological evidence of the health effects related to cigarette smoking would be
mandated for future claims. Everyone realized that this type of evidence did not exist and
could not be produced for many years.329
The furious Tar Derby was still raging in 1960 when the FTC, which previously had
not achieved complete success in trying to get tobacco manufacturers to moderate their
claims about filter cigarettes, put its foot down and announced that no more tar-and-nicotine
claims would be permitted in cigarette advertising.330 Early in 1960, the Commission
announced it had achieved a significant success from its negotiations with the six companies.
The FTC negotiated a "voluntary" industry-wide ban that removed nearly all mention of tars
and nicotine instantaneously. For instance, Kent advertisements changed its slogan from
"significantly less tars and nicotine than any other filter brand" to "designed with your taste
in mind." Likewise, Lorillard reintroduced the unfiltered king-size version of Old Gold, and
created a new advertising campaign that would center on the slogan "tender to your taste."
Once again the tobacco industry returned its traditional and usually successful course—
advertising pleasure, flavor and taste against a backdrop of glamour, beauty, and ease. The
formula worked, its success was proven by all-time highs in sales.331
For six years that followed, cigarette advertising was devoid of all references to tar
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and nicotine. Likewise, information regarding nicotine and tar nearly disappeared from
nearly all other sources as well. Consumer Reports stopped publishing its tar and nicotine
ratings and Reader’s Digest continued to do so only occasionally. The new advertising
regulations doomed the new low-tar brands. Regarding the FTC intervention, one
advertising professional noted: "[Y]ou build a better mousetrap and then they say you can’t
mention mice or traps.”332
A Second Attempt at a Voluntary Advertising Code:
In 1963, the United States Department of Justice in collaboration with the FTC
began seeking out ways it could create a “voluntary” advertising code that would define
“good advertising practices” and eliminate “undesirable advertising.” In a May 20, 1963
letter to Robert L. Wald of Wald, Harkrader & Rockefeller, the legal counsel of P. Lorillard
Company, from Lee Loevinger, the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice, undesirable advertising is “advertising that makes an appeal to
young persons or which attempts to glamorize smoking by relating it to youth, sex, romance,
success, and so forth.” The letter continues to state P. Lorillard Company was prepared to
submit to the Department of Justice an advertising code that might be adopted.333
Because of its legal dealings with the FTC and legislature, the tobacco industry
considered whether it was advisable to adopt a voluntary advertising code in 1964. In a
meeting of Liggett executives and J. Walter Thompson, Liggett’s President, Zach Thoms
asked the advertising agency to do some exploratory research on a voluntary advertising
code. The proposed code included a warning label that was to have read:
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This product is intended for the use of adults only. Excessive use may be
injurious to health, and in certain cases, even moderate use may be
inadvisable.
However, the tobacco industry had some concerns about how a voluntary cigarette
advertising code might relate to antitrust laws. For instance, in the May 20, 1963 letter to
Walt of Lorillard Tobacco Company from the U.S. Department of Justice stated the
following in reference to potential antitrust concerns that might arise from following the
proposed code, “The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has concluded that the
Department will not institute criminal proceedings against the tobacco companies and/or
their representatives…”334 In a June 19 letter to a Washington law firm representing the
industry, Antitrust Division Chief, William, H. Orrick, Jr. noted that the Federal Trade
Commission was considering standards to regulate cigarette labeling and advertising and that
the House Interstate Commerce Committee would be conducting hearings on a number of
bills that would establish regulations for tobacco advertising. "Under these circumstances,"
Mr. Orrick wrote, "it would be inappropriate for us to give any sanction to the permanent
establishment of a private organization, setting industry standards until the views of
Congress and the Federal Trade Commission have been made known. In the meantime,
however, we assure you that no criminal antitrust prosecution will be brought by us as a
result of adherence to the code." 335 If the tobacco industry was not protected from antitrust
laws, the code’s provisions might raise technical questions of restricting competition through
limiting advertising.
Under the terms of the 1964 code, the manufacturers agreed not to advertise on
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certain television programs and in certain types of periodicals that targeted a younger
audience. Specifically, the code’s provisions generally banned the use of celebrity
endorsements, advertising in college newspapers and other media directed primarily at those
under the age of 21, health claims, and the use of models under the age of 25 or who appear
to be under the age of 25. The tobacco industry also agreed not to solicit the trade of
persons under 21 years old through the distribution of free cigarette samples.336 However,
the code also discouraged marketing techniques such as trade names for filters (Kent’s
"Micronite" name, for example, was banned), further reducing the stock of code phrases
used to remind smokers of health fears. In 1966, Time magazine observed, "between the
federal Trade Commission and their own industry’s self-imposed Cigarette Advertising
Code, cigarette salesmen have just about been reduced to saying that a smoke is a smoke."337
The authority to enforce the code was given to the Code Administrator who was
empowered to assess up to $100,000.00 in damages. The first and only Code Administrator
was New Jersey Governor Robert B. Meyner.338
Although withdrawing advertising from student newspapers was part of the Cigarette
Advertising Code of 1964, the formal decision to withdraw campus advertising was brought
before the Tobacco Institute during meeting on June 18, 1963. The minutes from the
meeting state,
Mr. [Robert B.] Walker announced that The American Tobacco Company
had already decided to terminate its entire college promotional program and
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that the decision was effective and being implemented. Mr. [William S.]
Smith stated that R.J. Reynolds had already cancelled its advertising in college
publications for the coming fall and that the Reynolds company had also
decided to terminate its college promotional program.
Mr. [Morgan J.] Cramer stated that the Lorillard Company had also already
decided to terminate its college advertising and promotion. Mr. [Edwin P.]
Finch indicated that Brown & Williamson Corporation had been considering
the matter, and that it had decided to terminate its program. Mr. [Zach]
Toms said that the Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company’s current view was
that it was going to terminate its college promotion, with the possible
exception of college publication advertising using the same copy as they used
in national magazines and newspapers. Mr. Paul Smith said that Phillip
Morris had been considering the question of college advertising and
promotion, but that Mr. Cullman was out of the country and that Phillip
Morris had not reached any decision on its policy.339
In addition to their general consensus, with the exception of Phillip Morris, that cigarettes
should no longer be advertised in campus newspapers, the major tobacco companies also
decided how they were going to publicize the issue. The minutes for June 18, 1963
continued
It was the consensus of the group that the Institute should not affirmatively
seek to publicize the individual decisions of the various companies to give up
college advertising and promotional activities. On the other hand, it was felt
that, if Mr. [George V.] Allen [President of the Tobacco Institute] should
receive inquiries from the trade press or other areas, it would be proper for
him to reemphasize the industry’s position that smoking is an adult custom
and report the fact that, to avoid any confusion and misunderstanding in the
public mind as to this position, a number of the member companies of the
Institute had each decided to discontinue college advertising and promotional
activities.340
On June 19, 1963 the Tobacco Institute’s public relations agency, Hill & Knowlton,
issued the following statement to the press on the issue of advertising in college newspapers:
In response to a question from Peter Bart of The New York Times,
George V. Allen, president of The Tobacco Institute, Inc., today made the
following statement:
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"The tobacco industry's position has always been that smoking is an
adult custom. To avoid any confusion or misconception in the public
mind as to this position, a number of member companies of the
Tobacco Institute, I understand, have each decided to discontinue
college advertising and promotional activities."341
The next meeting of the Tobacco Institute held on July 9, 1963 referenced the large
amount of publicity that was centering on decision to discontinue advertising in student
newspapers. Nearly every major daily newspaper in the nation covered the decision. The
minutes of the meeting stated:
In view of the amount of publicity and speculation expected to attend any
announcement bearing on cigarette advertising or promotion, it was
suggested by several members that President Allen's announcement should
be the only statement of the Institute's activity and that none of the members
should speak to the press with respect to the Institute's decisions. It was of
course recognized, however, that any press inquiry relative to the decisions or
policies of an individual company was peculiarly a matter for the particular
company concerned rather than for the Institute.342
Usually pressure from the FTC had been the impetus for “self-regulation” in the
tobacco industry. However, in the case of student newspapers, it seems that the negative
publicity that the industry was receiving for advertising on campus motivated the decision, at
least in part. The minutes from the July 9, 1963 meeting of the Tobacco Institute also reflect
the concern about public opinion. The minutes from the meeting continued by stating,
There then ensued discussion of the continued appearance in the press of
repetitious anti-tobacco charges, and the view was expressed that to many
members of the public these repetitions of old charges against tobacco were
not recognized as such, but were possibly accepted as new material
supporting those who have attacked tobacco. The question was considered
whether any steps could be taken by the Institute to correct misconceptions
that probably resulted from some of the activities of groups which were
attacking the use of tobacco as, for example, the possible use by the Institute
of ads in newspapers or other media, which would present facts relating to
Hill Knowlton; Public Relations Counsel. "Statement on College Advertising and Promotion". 19 Jun 1963.
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tobacco and health and correct some of the distortions and misconceptions
which may have arisen.343
Although public opinion certainly factored into the discontinuation of campus
newspaper advertising and the adoption of a new advertising code, the impact of the
impending release of the Surgeon General’s Report in January of 1964 also factored into the
decision-making process. For instance, in September of 1963 Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Company’s Surgeon General’s Committee met about the potential consequences of the
Surgeon General’s Report and the potential FTC and FDA regulations that might result
from the report’s findings.
When the 1964 Code was enacted, it was heralded as an exercise in “responsible”
self-regulation. However, the Code proved not to be true regulation at all. First, the office of
the Code Administrator “practically died stillborn.” Even though he had the ability to enact
some small changes in advertising practices, such as persuading Liggett to discontinue its use
of the term “snowy white” to describe its filter, Governor Meyner found that whenever he
endeavored to employ the full scope of his authority, the tobacco industry withdrew from
his supervision.344 For instance, Lorillard withdrew from the Code when it was fined for
running an unapproved advertisement. All of the cigarette companies except R.J. Reynolds
and Phillip Morris followed. However, the judge in the Lorillard case testified that it
withdrew from both the Code Authority and the Tobacco Institute because it wanted to
promote True cigarette’s nicotine and tar levels, a practice forbidden by the code.345 After
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resisting its own self-regulation, the industry moved into the comfortable position of
regulating each other’s compliance with the Advertising Code.346
In addition, the Code did not significantly impact the Tobacco Industry’s historic
reliance on the two advertising themes of safety and glamour. Of course, the identifiable
film, television and sports stars no longer appeared in the advertisements. However, in their
place appeared depictions of happy, healthy, macho, or glamorous models occupied in a
range of exotic or enviable social activities. Like the preceding celebrity advertisements,
these messages were designed to increase the cigarette market.347
Furthermore, the Institute’s declaration that smoking was “a custom for adults,” and
thus, presumably not one for non-adults, did have one result that applied on a more general
basis than merely the college publication level. In the Fall of 1963, the American Tobacco
Company began an extensive campaign for Lucky Strike cigarettes in which the advertising
copy stated, “smoking is a pleasure meant for adults.” This sentiment appeared under a
headline spread over two pages that asserted, “Lucky Strike Separates the Men from the
Boys…But Not from the Girls.” On the left hand side of the page, the first part of the
headline was illustrated by a photograph of a helmeted, Lucky Strike-smoking racecar driver
who was smilingly flourishing a winner’s cup as he received the envious glances of youth
pressing close behind him. The second part of the headline was illustrated by a shot of the
same model –still equipped with his cigarette, smile and cup but without the young male
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fans. Instead, the driver is being hugged by a female admirer. Therefore, the advertising
professionals used the FTC regulation to transform their advertising message to illustrate the
theme that cigarettes are not for boys, thus achieved the opposite effect by making the
smoking of Lucky Strike the act that turns a boy into a man.348
Finally, a Victory for the FTC?
The much heralded cigarette advertising code went into full effect on January 1,
1955. Although there is no effective way to rebut the proposition that cigarette companies
submitted to the Code’s authority, critics of the code believe that they did so only to the
extent that it served their economic purposes. For instance, some Congressional
Representatives felt that the FTC’s Code had not gone far enough. Representative John
Blatnik’s Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations organized hearings to investigate the FTC’s response to misleading advertising
by the tobacco industry. And, the report from the hearings concluded that the FTC failed to
fulfill its duty by not intervening further. The subcommittee swiftly dissolved and further
hearings were cancelled. Some believed that the cancellation was evidence of the strong protobacco forces within Congress.349 However, others believed that the Code was a very
effective FTC regulation. A case could be made that Governor Meynor, and by inference,
the Advertising Code, affected significant long-term changes in cigarette marketing practices.
Ultimately, when it was released, the political impact of the 1964 Surgeon General’s
Report was enormous. Within weeks, the FTC published a draft trade rule requiring health
warnings in advertisements. The FTC proposed the initiation of proceedings relating to “the
advertising and labeling of cigarettes. In June of 1964, rule-making proceedings were
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initiated to require a health warning on packages, effective January 1, 1965, and advertising,
effective July 1, 1965. The proposed warning was that “cigarette smoking is dangerous to
health and may cause death from cancer and other diseases.”350
The 1966 Report of Code Authority of the National Association of Broadcasters
details four pages of changes in cigarette advertising techniques that were initiated by the
Code Administrator. Furthermore, Governor Meynor rejected a number of advertisements
and issued a set of procedural regulations. He also helped create regulations that restricted
advertising during television programs that had a viewing audience that was over 45 percent
under the age of 21. The Code also kept tobacco advertising out of school newspapers.351
The 1964 Surgeon General’s Report was the needed impetus that brought the
normally passive FTC to action. However, the FTC faced numerous obstacles. In June of
1964, FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon declared in testimony before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that the FTC had decided on a ruling that a strong
health warning be put on every cigarette package and included in every advertisement.
However, the committee gave Mr. Dixon a hostile reception. The FTC’s proposed ruling
led those sympathetic to the tobacco industry to accuse it of discriminating against a legally
sold product and of usurping the legislative functions of Congress.352
The FTC did not receive any support from President Johnson. In fact, the White
House intervened to delay putting the agency’s ruling into effect. In spite of what the
Surgeon General said about the hazardous effects of cigarette smoking, the opposition to
cigarette advertising regulation was formidable. Tobacco was a one-billion-dollar-a-year
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agricultural product and a ten-billion-dollar-a-year consumer product, from which federal
and state governments gained over four-billion-dollars-a-year in tax revenue. The
Department of Agriculture regularly subsidized it with millions of dollars in price supports.353
At the time of the Surgeon General’s report, the tobacco industry was spending $250
million each year on advertising. The weight of the combined strength of the tobacco
industry and its allies was felt in the form of the proposed legislation named the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Bill of 1965. This legislation appeared to protect smokers by
requiring a warning on cigarette packs (Caution: Cigarette Smoking May be Hazardous to
your health). However, in the end, it would actually constitute a legislative triumph for the
tobacco lobby. This piece of legislation was considered a victory for tobacco because it
prevented the FTC or any other government agency from mandating that tobacco
companies include a health warning in their cigarette advertising for the next four years. The
cigarette manufacturers continued merchandising their products with new vigor.354
Although it endured some hard blows, the American cigarette industry remained
undefeated. For instance, although the industry received a great deal of negative publicity, if
you measured the influence of cigarette advertising against the anti-tobacco information,
advertising and pro-smoking messages still claimed an undisputed victory. The initial drop in
cigarette sales caused by the Surgeon General’s Report and the Reader’s Digest articles was
ultimately recovered. From 1953 to 1970 the number of cigarettes smoked in the U.S. in a
year increased from three hundred and eighty seven billion to more than half a trillion. Only
part of this market growth could be explained by an increase in population or on an adult
per capita basis. Therefore, the prosperity of the American tobacco industry, in spite of its
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problems, was still greater than any other period in history.355
Therefore, the anticipated Surgeon General’s report alone did not necessitate the
creation of the FTC’s Code and the removal of the advertisements in the college student
newspapers. Nor, was it the case that medical findings had no role, because without the
release of the medical reports and statements during the 1950s and 1960s the collegiate
community’s response as well as the FTC’s response to the issue would likely have been
even slower. But there were a variety of other factors that influenced how the medical
statements and reports were translated into a regulatory strategy, and those factors eventually
tipped the balance in the direction of tobacco advertising regulation.
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Chapter Five: Results From the Study of The Orange and White
In order to better understand the influence that cigarette manufacturers had on
college campuses, this study looks at the advertisements that were printed in The Orange and
White. The internal tobacco industry documents show that the same national advertisements
were printed in dozens of universities across the nation.356 Therefore, the advertisements
printed in The Orange and White are fairly representative of what one would find in any large
university in the United States.
Research Models:
The data analysis for this paper is divided into two parts. The first section provides
charts and graphs that provide descriptive statistical information about the data. The analysis
examines the number of advertisements that were printed in The Orange and White each year,
the brands that were advertised, and the creative strategies and tactics that were used. After a
discussion of the charts and graphs, the paper follows with a discussion of the advertising
campaigns that were used for each brand during the decade being examined. (All figures are
located in the appendix that starts on page 217 and ends on page 348.)
Taylor’s Strategy Wheel:
Researchers who study creative and message strategy have recognized the
importance of mapping the various strategies in advertising. One model that maps various
creative strategies is Taylor’s Six-Segment Strategy Wheel. The strategy is based in the Foote,
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Cone, & Belding (FCB) Grid. The FBC Grid combines high and low level involvement and
left and right brain specialization.357
The first division of the strategy wheel divides the wheel into a “Transmission view”
and “Ritual view,” based on the work of James Carey. The terms “informational” and
“transformational,” “claim” and “image,” and “rational” and “emotional” have also been
used to label this distinction. The wheel identifies six message strategies, three transmissionbased strategies and three ritual-based strategies.358
The first strategy wheel segment (ego segment) is characterized by the Freudian
Psychoanalytic Model. Products that are ego-related fulfill consumer’s emotional needs.
These products allow the consumer to make a statement about who he or she is. The role of
communication is to show how the product fits within the consumer’s definition of who he
or she is. The second strategy wheel segment (social segment) is characterized by the
Veblenian Social-Psychological Model. In this segment, products are used to make a
statement to others and emotional needs are fulfilled by products that are visible to others.
Appeals are directed towards being noticed, gaining social approval. The third segment
(sensory segment) is based in Cyrenaics philosophy. Products provide consumers with
moments of pleasure. Communication transforms the product into a pleasurable moment.
The Pavlovian Learning Model characterizes the fourth segment (routine segment).
Consumer decisions are motivated by rational buying motives. However, consumers do not
invest large amounts of deliberation time and buy according to habit. Urgent needs
characterize the fifth segment (acute need). Consumers desire pre-purchase information but
time constraints limit the research process. Communication serves to build brand familiarity
R. E. Taylor “A six-segment message strategy wheel.“ Journal of Advertising Research, (1999) 39, 6
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and recognition so that the brand is known and trusted. The sixth segment (rational
segment) is typified by the Marshallian Economic Model. Consumers are assumed to be
rational, conscious, and deliberative individuals. The consumers’ desire for product-related
information is high. Product messages aim to inform and persuade (see Figure 1).359
Advertisements were coded according to which segment represented the dominant
strategy in the message. However, many messages use multiple strategies. However, for the
sake of the charts and graphs, only one dominant strategy was selected. If multiple strategies
were used in a campaign, they are discussed later in the results section when specific
advertisements and campaigns are addressed.
Message Appeals:
Like creative strategy, the individual tactics and appeals that are used in an
advertisement are important elements to examine. Creative strategy is usually thought to be
the larger ideas that govern a particular advertising or marketing campaign. Message appeals
and tactics are the particular techniques that are used to accomplish the ends of the selected
strategy. Therefore, the tactics are the particular persuasive devises that work to help
accomplish the advertisement’s general persuasive goals. Usually, presenting productrelated data and statistics is not enough to alter a consumer’s attitude or behavior. Some
appeal or incentive needs to be employed to create change. Message appeals include reward
appeals and emotional appeals.
Although people experience an array of emotions, three basic emotions are used
most frequently in advertising. The three appeals that are used most frequently used are
fear, humor, and warmth. Within the context of emotional appeals, humor is the emotional
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appeal that is used most frequently in cigarette advertisements.360 Although humor appeals
are the most frequently used emotional appeal in cigarette advertising, many scholars argue
that humor does not persuade. However, research has shown that 20-44% of television
commercials use humor. Some research-supported guidelines suggest males are more
influenced by humor and that humor promotes positive affect and less counter arguing.361
In addition to examining the influence of emotions, one can also examine the
influence of the communicator. Traditionally, communication scholars have devoted
considerable attention to “source credibility.” A source that is perceived to possess high
levels of expertise by receivers as trained, experienced, skillful, informed, authoritative, able,
and intelligent. Of course, different expert sources are important in different persuasion
areas.362 For instance, some tobacco advertisements made use of experts such as
tobacconists and physicians to promote the safety and quality of the product.
On the other hand, sometimes consumers respond to persuasion from sources that
are similar to themselves. Examples of similar sources are people with the same problems,
the same concerns, who are the same age, and who have the same interests and preferences.
In addition, researchers have found that similarity increases message compliance.363 The
similarity or “peer appeal” has a stronger influence on audience members when the source is
a member of the same age group as the consumer.364 In addition to similarity, physical
attractiveness also plays a role in advertising. There is considerable evidence that attractive
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people are perceived to be more likable, friendly, interesting, poised, to make more money,
and so forth.365
The use of celebrity can be another extremely effective source tactic. Celebrities are
most effective when the celebrity is an individual that consumers have a strong attachment
for. Second, children are strongly influenced by celebrities who are currently “in.”366
Receivers also tend to follow the recommendations of celebrities if doing so helps them
adapt to their environment. Another factor that can influence whether a celebrity will
effectively endorse a product is the degree of match-up between the product and the
celebrity spokesperson.367
Another way through which a spokesperson, celebrity, expert or otherwise, might
influence consumers is through a power relationship. Individuals in a power relationship can
use rewards and punishments when influencing others. According to Raven, there are six
basic types of social influence: informational, referent, expert, legitimate, reward, and
coercive. The primary types of social influence observed in cigarette advertising were
referent, reward, expert, and informational.368 Referent influence stems from the fact that the
receiver identifies with the source or influence agent. The term “referent” is used to parallel
the use of the term “referent group” in sociology. Referent group identification has a strong
influence on behavior.369 When a person is attracted to another, and perceives similarity
between them, he or she may comply with a request. Generally, any appeal to similarity or
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mutual attraction can be called an instance of referent influence. A speaker that has expert
influence or power over the receiver if the receiver believes that the source has superior
knowledge or ability. Expert influence often influences private behavior or private adoption
of beliefs. Reward influence is exerted if the agent can provide a positive incentive to a
particular audience member. Sources who reward their audiences often promote more
positive interactions between the target audience and the source. Further, agents who reward
targets do not necessarily increase the extent to which the target identifies with them.
Speakers also can try to influence through the use of information not previously available to
receivers, or to employ logic or argument that receivers have not considered. Informational
influence includes attempts at influencing others based on the content of the message, a
message including facts, evidence, testimony or logical argument. Informational influence
results in both a change in overt behavior and in private beliefs.370
In addition to coding advertisements according to the six segments of the Strategy
Wheel, advertisements were also coded according to the persuasive message appeals that
were used. These message appeals are called “creative tactics” in the charts and figures in
this chapter of the paper. The creative tactics listed in the charts and figures include:
celebrity appeals, referent appeals, informational appeals, humor appeals, reward appeals,
and expert appeals. In order to differentiate celebrities and experts appeals from tactics that
involve using a similar and/or attractive source, the term referent is used for non-expert and
non-celebrity sources. However, it should be noted that some of the literature does use the
term referent to encompass celebrity, expert and similar and/or attractive sources. The only
tactics that were not derived from the literature were those that intended “to entertain” the
audience. This category emerged from the data. For instance, a number of cigarette
Erwin P. Bettinghaus and M.J. Cody Persuasive Communication: Fifth Edition (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace
College Publishers, 1994) pp. 71-145.
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advertisements used puzzles, games, or riddles to entice their audience to interact with their
advertisement and product. Each advertisement was placed into only one category.
The Orange and White was published from September until June of each academic year.
Because advertising campaigns in student newspapers are generally printed according to the
academic year instead of the calendar year, the academic year was used for counting and
classifying advertisements. However, in order to save space in the charts and graphs, the
academic years are referenced according to the first year of the academic year (For instance,
the 1920-1921 academic year is referenced as 1920).
General Frequency Information for The Orange and White from 1920-1963:
From 1920-1921 academic year to the 1963-1964 academic year, The Orange and White
published a total of 2,399 advertisements that promoted the sale of cigarettes. The first
cigarette advertisement appeared on February 24, 1921 and the final advertisement appeared
on November 26, 1963. The 2,399 cigarette advertisements were published in a total of
1,650 issues of The Orange and White. The average number of cigarette advertisements to
appear in a single issue of The Orange and White from the 1920-1921 academic year to the
1963-1964 academic year equals 1.5 ads.
Figure two shows the number of newspapers that were published, by decade, from
1920 to 1963. The second chart provides a comparison of the number of cigarette
advertisements that were run in The Orange and White from the 1920-1921 academic year to
the 1963-1964 academic year (see Figure 3). As the chart shows, the 1920s had the fewest
number of advertisements with only 244 advertisements printed. The 1950s have the highest
advertising frequency with a total of 966 advertisements. If the first and second charts are
compared, it becomes evident that the increases in advertisements are not always linked to
an increase in newspapers published. For instance, the largest number of editions of The
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Orange and White were published in the 1940s, however, the 1940s had relatively few
advertisements for cigarettes (see Figure 2).
Figure four shows the variation in the number of cigarette advertisements printed in
The Orange and White each decade. The graph clearly shows that even though the 1950s
represents the highest frequency cigarette of advertising, other decades surpass or match the
1950s in the number of cigarette advertisements published. For instance, the 1930s and the
1960s surpass the 1950s at times. Likewise, at times, the 1920s nearly matches or surpasses
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1960s advertising frequency (see Figure 4).
Figure five shows the frequency of advertising as it relates to the twelve most
frequent cigarette advertisers in The Orange and White. As the decades progress from the
1920s to the 1960s the number of cigarette advertisers steadily increased. One of the primary
reasons for the increase in advertisers is the increase in the number of cigarette brands
offered due to the introduction of filtered brands. However, the most popular unfiltered
brands, Chesterfield, Camel, and Lucky Strike advertise consistently until 1963 in spite of the
introduction of filters (see Figure 5).
Figure six shows the most frequent cigarette advertisers for unfiltered cigarettes.
Because filters were not introduced until the 1950s, this chart represents some of the largest
cigarette advertisers in The Orange and White. Overall, Camel, Chesterfield (Chester.), and
Lucky Strike (Luckies) are the most frequently promoted brands (see Figure 6).
Although their overall numbers are far lower than the unfiltered brands, the major
filtered cigarette brands were more prevalent than their unfiltered counterparts from the mid
1950s until the end of cigarette advertising in 1964. The top four advertisers were Tareyton,
Marlboro, Viceroy, and L&M or Liggett and Meyers. Although a menthol cigarette, Salem is
included because it also advertised its filter (see Figure 7).
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From the 1920s until the 1960s three major creative strategies dominated cigaretteadvertising campaigns found in The Orange and White. From the 1930s until the 1960s the
sensory approach dominated. However, in the 1920s and early 1930s the social strategy was
most frequent because the social acceptability of smoking was in question. Likewise, during
the late 1950s and early 1960s the social approach became more important because of the
health consequences associated with smoking (see Figure 8).
Cigarette Advertising in the Orange and White during the 1920s:
The 1920s are a significant decade for cigarette advertising in campus newspapers
because cigarette advertising began in campus newspapers during the 1920s and because
cigarette advertising was working to make cigarette smoking more socially acceptable. Social
acceptability was an essential issue among potential female smokers. The first cigarette
advertisement appeared in the Orange and White on February 24, 1921. Chesterfield was the
advertiser. Although cigarette advertising had a rather slow start during the 1920s, by the end
of the decade cigarette advertising had a consistent place in the student newspaper. During
the 1920s, a total of 244 cigarette advertisements were printed in the 300 issues of the Orange
and White printed from 1920 to 1929. Thus, an average of .82 advertisements appeared in
each edition of the newspaper.
During the 1920s, cigarette advertising increased but the advertising trend does not
show a steady increase. Instead, the record shows a series of spikes. The following academic
years had the greatest frequency of cigarette advertisements 1921-1922, 1926-1927, 19271928, and 1928-1929 academic years.371 The following academic years had the lowest
frequency of cigarette advertising 1920-1921, 1922-1923, 1924-1925, and 1925-1926 (see
Figure 9).
Please note that the years listed on graphs represent the first year of the academic year. For instance, the
year 1920 represents the 1920-1921 academic year.
371
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Four brands were advertised during the 1920s, Chesterfield, Old Gold, Fatima, and
Camel. Chesterfield was the most frequently advertised brand with a total of 84
advertisements or 34% of the total advertising. Camel follows Chesterfield with a total of 73
advertisements or 30% of the advertising. Old Gold comes next with 61 advertisements or
25% of the advertising. And, Fatima is last with a total of 26 advertisements or 11% of the
advertising (see Figures 10 and 11).
As both of these charts demonstrate, social strategies were the most prevalent
approaches used in cigarette advertising in the Orange and White during the 1920s. Social
strategies represented 67% of the advertising, or 164 total ads. The second most popular
segment was the rational segment with 49 advertisements, or 20%, of the total number of
cigarette advertisements. Both the ego and routine strategies comprised 5% of the total
cigarette advertisements or 12 advertisements. The sensory approach was used in 7
advertisements or 3% of the total advertisements (see Figures 12 and 13).
During the 1920s, the referent appeal was the most prevalent approach used in
cigarette advertising in the Orange and White representing 52% of cigarette advertising or 127
advertisements. Humor appeals were the second most prevalent tactic used in cigarette
advertising in the Orange and White representing 21% or 51 advertisements. Tactics that
served to inform the audience represented 11% or 27 advertisements. Appeals that
emphasized a particular brand’s value or price represented 8% or 19 advertisements. Tactics
that focused on brand loyalty represented 4% of the advertising or 10 advertisements.
Celebrity appeals represent 3% of cigarette advertising or 7 advertisements. Reward
influence comprised 1% of cigarette advertising or 3 advertisements (see Figures 14 and 15).
One of the primary reasons that the referent appeal and social strategy seemed to
dominate the Orange and White advertising campaigns during the 1920s was the need to make
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cigarette smoking socially acceptable. During the 1920-1921 academic year, the vast majority,
12 of the 13 total advertisements, of the cigarette advertisements only featured men. The one
advertisement that featured a woman did not depict her as a smoker. Chesterfield was the
only advertiser during this academic year. No people were featured in the cigarette
advertising campaign during the 1921-1922 academic year. Fatima was the only brand
advertised. During the 1922-1923 academic year 15 of the 16 total advertisements only
featured men and the one advertisement that depicted both sexes did not show either person
smoking. Fatima was the only brand promoted. During the 1924-1925 academic year, no
cigarette advertisements appeared in the Orange and White.

For the 1925-1926 academic

year, the advertisements featured men only. Camel was the only advertiser. For the first time
during the 1926-1927 academic year, more than one cigarette advertiser bought advertising
space in the Orange and White. Chesterfield, Old Gold, and Camel advertised using primarily
men in the 41 advertisements that appeared in the Orange and White. A few ads featured
women and three advertisements depicted women smoking. During the 1927-1928
academic year, Chesterfield, Camel, and Old Gold continued to advertise and the number of
women in advertisements continued to increase. Of the 50 advertisements printed, 35
featured women and eight of the 35 showed women as smokers. More than half of the
advertisements featured women. In the 1928-1929 academic year, 20 of the 42
advertisements featured women in some capacity. Again, about half of the advertisements
included women. And, Chesterfield, Camel, and Old Gold continued to be the primary
advertisers. During the 1929-1930 academic year the number of cigarette advertisements fell
to 25 and Old Gold and Chesterfield were the only advertisers. However, 15
advertisements, nearly two-thirds of the total, featured women (see Figure 16).
Advertisements published in the Orange and White During the 1920s:
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Chesterfield:
The first cigarette advertisement was printed in the Orange and White on February 24,
1921. The advertisement for Chesterfield Cigarettes was a quarter of a page in size. The
campaign utilized a social strategy that marked occasions for smoking cigarettes. For
instance, the example in the figure provided (see Figure 17) centers on a sitting for a portrait.
The man being photographed is nervous but the photographer makes him smile by showing
him a package of Chesterfields. Therefore, this soft-sell approach shows that cigarettes can
be used to put someone at ease. The primary tactic that is used is humor. The headline
reads, “ I smiled – and he shot me.” This initially shocking statement is further explained
through the text. The text reads:
“I smiled – and he shot me.”
AFTER MONTHS and months,
MY WIFE Persuaded me.
SO I went around
TO THE photographer,
AND GOT mugged.
WHEN THE pictures came,
I SHOWED them to a gang,
OF AMATURE art critics,
AND PROFESSIONAL crabs,
DISGUISED as friends
WHO FAVORED me.
WITH SUCH remarks as
“DOESN’T HE look natural?”
“HAS IT got a tail?”
“A GREAT resemblance.”
AND THAT last one
MADE ME sore.
SO WHEN friend wife
ADDED HER howl
I TRIED again.
THIS TIME they were great.
FOR HERE’S What happened.
THE PHOTOGRAPHER said,
“LOOK THIS way please”
AND HELD up something
AS HE pushed the button,
AND NO one could help
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BUT LOOK pleasant.
FOR WHAT he held up
WAS A nice full pack
OF THE cigarettes
THAT SATISFY.
Other advertisements in this campaign were entitled “Every man in class knew the
answer, “The tale of a dog – with a moral,” and “Transfer? A fat chance!” The
advertisements were targeted at college-aged men.
Humor appeals are used throughout the advertisement in the description of the
situations and the double-meanings of the words that are used. Humor is a tactic that
complements a social strategy because humor is an important facet of social situations.
Although the social strategy is the primary vehicle used to help persuade the audience, a
sensory strategy is also employed. The man being photographs smiles because Chesterfield
cigarettes satisfy.
Because the question of women smoking was a prevalent issue on college campuses,
this first advertising campaign centers on male characters. Only one advertisement features a
female and she is not depicted as a smoker. This Chesterfield campaign lasted until June 2,
1921. Another important feature of this advertising campaign is that it appears to have been
developed for college students. Several of the advertisements mention the collegiate
environment or professors.
After several years without making an appearance in the Orange and White,
Chesterfield advertises again during the 1926-1927 academic year. Again, Chesterfield uses a
social strategy. The advertisement shows men at a nightclub purchasing cigarettes from a
cigarette girl. The dominant strategy in this advertisement is a social strategy. The text reads,
“The natural choice – Out of the whole lot men pick Chesterfield for its genuine tobacco
character –its natural good taste.” The text and the image reinforce the popularity of
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Chesterfield. In addition, the text suggests that smoking is a habit for men. This text might
serve to pacify universities that opposed women smoking (see Figure 18).
However, by the 1928-1929 academic year Chesterfield seemed to be marketing to
both men and women. The text of the advertisements no longer suggested that cigarette
smoking was a practice for men. Women became active participants in the storyline plots
and it was even suggested that they might smoke. To encourage the idea that smoking might
be acceptable for women, a social strategy is used that allows women to fit within a smoking
culture (see Figure 19).
Camel:
On October 20, 1921, the first Camel advertisement was published in the Orange and
White. Instead of using a soft-sell approach like the first Chesterfield advertisements, Camel
uses a rational approach that focuses on product quality. The advertisement describes the
packaging that keeps the tobacco air-tight. Informational tactics reinforces the rational
approach by persuading the consumer by providing privileged facts. Further, the
advertisement states that Camels are for “men who think for themselves.” This reinforces
both the rational strategy and the fact that smoking was not appropriate for college women.
A secondary strategy that is present in this advertisement is the sensory strategy. The primary
objective of the special cigarette packaging is to preserve taste. This campaign ran for the
entire 1921-1922 academic year (see Figure 20).
Camel did not advertise in the Orange and White again until the 1925-1926 academic
year. This advertisement uses a sensory strategy that positions smoking Camels as a reward
after a long journey. The headline reads, “When silvery moonlight falls on town and field –
and the long, joyous tour home is ready to begin – have a Camel!” This advertisement also
emphasizes an aspirational lifestyle. The advertisement uses a referent appeal in its use of a
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luxury vehicle and a wealthy couple enjoying an evening drive. However, neither person is
shown with a cigarette (see Figure 21).
During the 1926-1927 academic year, Camel continued to combine a sensory strategy
with referent appeals. Instead of an evening drive, this time the context is a formal social
gathering. The headline reads, “Some call it mellowness…” and the text continues by
describing the high-quality tobacco used in Camel Cigarettes. The image in the
advertisement shows a party where men smoke and women are shown in the background
dancing (see Figure 22).
Camel returned to a rational strategy that focused on product-related information
during the 1928-1929 academic year. A secondary strategy that comes into play is the sensory
strategy. The reason that Camel is particular about its product quality is because of the
brand’s desire to make enjoyable cigarettes (see Figure 23).
Fatima:
In its first college advertising campaign in the Orange and White during the 1922-1923
academic year, Fatima made use of a popular advertising figure during the early 20th century,
namely the bellhop. Bellhops or bellboys were frequently called upon to perform services for
hotel guests. These errands could include delivering necessary items. And, one such item
could be a pack of cigarettes. The turn of the century bellhop is also a recognizable symbol
of the hospitality industry. Hoteliers take pride in the services they provide. The bellhop’s
image is that of a helpful, friendly individual, someone you can turn to for assistance or
information. The use of the bellhop also communicated luxury because expensive hotels
frequently used bellboys (see Figure 24).
This campaign strategy combines an ego strategy with a routine strategy. The
headline “Day in and day out!” suggests the cigarette can be depended upon to satisfy. The
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large fluted Doric columns and the use of the bellhop suggests the luxury of the hotel and
implies that the cigarette is high quality through association.
Fatima was not the only organization to make use of the bellboy in its advertising.
Numerous advertisers used the bellhop to promote their products. At the turn of the century
bellboys were often black and the black bellboy became a popular icon in the early 20th
century consciousness (see Figure 25).
Fatima changed its campaign for the 1923-1924 academic year. Instead of using the
bellhop and a luxury hotel to communicate quality, Fatima used an exotic social scene. The
headline, “What a difference just a few cents make!” accompanied by a scene from a
downhill skiing resort, suggests that Fatima is a luxury or ego brand. Thus, Fatima continued
with the same ego strategy but changed the execution. Instead of using a bellhop, Fatima
used the appeal of an aspirational social group. Unlike previous advertisements, this
campaign used women prominently in the advertisements. However, the women were not
depicted as smokers (see Figure 26).
Old Gold:
Old Gold began advertising in the Orange and White during the 1926-1927 academic
year. The brand began advertising with the “Something Always takes the Joy out of Life”
comic strip. A renowned cartoonist named Clare Briggs created the comic. Briggs was a
featured cartoonist during the peak of American Newspapering, which spanned from 1900
to 1930. Briggs was born in Reedsburg, Wisconsin in 1875 and resided there until 1884 when
he and his parents moved to Dixon, Illinois. Brigg's cartoons were syndicated across the
country and, by the 1920's, he was one of the most highly paid illustrators in the United
States. In addition to his newspaper work, Briggs also published a number of books of
cartoons, Skin-nay, The Days of Real Sport, Ain't It a Grand and Glorious Feeling, and When a Feller
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Needs a Friend, also reached a large audience.372 Many of the comic strips printed in the Orange
and White featured the titles of his books of cartoons such as “Ain’t It a Grand and Glorious
Feeling” and “When a Feller Needs a Friend.” The comic strip combined a social strategy
that emphasized the social acceptability of smoking and, the importance of smoking Old
Gold in particular, with humor tactics. This particular advertisement emphasizes the
necessity of smoking Old Gold to make a good impression on a date. The fact that Old
Gold does not irritate the throat is of particular importance. The advertisement concludes
with Old Gold’s slogan “Not a Cough in the Carload (see Figure 27).
Like many other cigarette advertisers, Old Gold was eager to prove that cigarette
smoking was socially acceptable for women by the end of the 1920s. Old Gold’s 1927-1928
campaign featured various prominent people who attested that Old Gold cigarettes were the
best. It was the first cigarette campaign to use celebrity tactics in the Orange and White. For
instance, in this particular advertisement heiress Gloria Laura Mercedes Morgan-Vanderbilt
selected Old Gold as her cigarette of choice in a blind taste test (see Figure 28). This
advertisement combines a sensory strategy with a celebrity testimonial tactic to help
persuade women to start smoking.
During the 1928-1929 academic year, Old Gold continued to target women. Instead
of using a taste test, this campaign again focused on persuading the audience that smoking
Old Gold cigarettes does not cause coughing. This sensory strategy appeals to what the
cigarettes do not do. In addition to the sensory strategy, the advertisement uses a celebrity
testimonial tactic. Madge Bellamy praises Old Gold for being easy on her throat (see Figure

“Briggs” Reedsburg, Wisconsin Website, (2000) http://www.reedsburg.com/briggs.htm [Retrieved June 15,
2007]
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29). The campaign also included the testimonial of the famous artist and illustrator James
Montgomery Flagg.373
In addition to celebrity testimonials, Old Gold also published statements from local
tobacconists that were popular with the University of Tennessee students in their
advertisements. For instance, Gray Piper Drug Co., located at 1506 West Cumberland,
Knoxville, TN said,
“The growth of OLD GOLD Cigarettes’ popularity here has been amazing to me,
but what interests me most is the way students stick to the brand after they start
smoking it. OLD GOLD smokers don’t switch.”374
Another leading tobacconist that served University of Tennessee students, J. Blaufeld & Son,
516 Gay Street, Knoxville, TN said,
“OLD GOLD is easily the fastest-growing cigarette in this locality, and I shouldn’t
be surprised before long to find it the most popular cigarette on the campus. The
boys sure do like its smoothness.”375
Because of the tobacco industry’s large budget, cigarette advertisers often could hire
famous artists and designers to create their advertising. Few artists define an age as
completely as John Held Jr. In many ways, he defines the "Roaring Twenties." Harold Ross,
who was a boyhood friend created a feature called “Gay Nineties” that poked gentle fun at
the previous generation. Done in linoleum cuts, these images have come to symbolize the
era almost as much as his flappers are associated with the Twenties.
Seldom have two generations experienced such a gap. Mothers who grew up with
those petticoats and hoopskirts must have looked at their flapper daughters and wondered
how they could have gone so wrong. In popular magazines like Vanity Fair, Harper's Bazaar,
and Redbook, his images of Betty Coed and Joe College were placed weekly before an adoring
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public of parents who longed to see some humor in the situation and the teenaged and
college crowd who looked to them as role and style models. The skirts were never quite that
short, nor were the sheiks quite so pencil-necked, but everyone wanted to believe that they
were. Held's images reassured their delusions.376
Old Gold’s use of Held’s creative abilities helped the brand resonate with a college
audience during the 1920s. The Old Gold campaign’s humor does indeed make fun of the
“Gay Nineties.” The creative strategy is primarily social because it reinforces the idea that
smoking cigarettes is a modern way to distinguish one self from the previous generation (see
Figures 30 and 31).
Old Gold concluded the decade with advertisements that promoted an Old Gold
premium that was being offered with the purchase of Old Gold cigarettes (see Figure 32).
The premium is an Old Gold velour cigarette box. This advertising approach combines a
rational strategy with reward tactics. Again, from the advertisement itself and the design of
the cigarette box, it seems that Old Gold is targeting female smokers.
Summary:
During the 1920s cigarette advertising in the Orange and White increased in its
frequency and in the number of brands being advertised. In addition to increasing in its
regularity, cigarette advertising also became more sophisticated in its message appeals. By the
end of the decade, advertisements were using complex social strategies that associated
cigarette smoking with high social status and helped to make smoking more socially
acceptable for women. Cigarette advertising also seemed to reflect the progressive attitudes
and optimism of the time period. Smoking seemed to be a way to celebrate the financial

Jim Vadeboncoeur, Jr. “John Held Jr.” BPIB http://www.bpib.com/illustrat/johnheld.html#navigate
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prosperity and innovation of the 1920s. Although the advertisements clearly targeted the
college-aged audience, relatively few advertisements used college students.
Cigarette Advertising in the Orange and White the 1930s:
By the 1930s, cigarette smoking had become a very popular habit among college
students. In addition, cigarette smoking was socially acceptable for both genders on college
campuses. Therefore the college market was an important target audience for cigarette
advertising. Advertising frequency steadily increased into the 1930s. Cigarette advertising in
the Orange and White more than doubled. During the 1920s, 244 cigarette advertisements ran
in the newspaper. During the 1930s, 613 cigarette advertisements ran in the 403 editions of
the newspaper that were published from the 1930-1931 academic year to the 1939-1940
academic year. Although the increase in the number of advertisements is large, the
advertising frequency per edition did not change as much as one might guess. For instance,
during the 1920s an average of .82 advertisements ran in each edition of the Orange and White.
By the 1930s the average increased to 1.52 advertisements per edition. Although this increase
is significant, it is smaller than one might have thought because the Orange and White changed
from a weekly to a bi-weekly.
In addition to the change in advertising frequency, the 1930s began with a change in
the basic approach that cigarette advertisers used. More advertisements were using a sensory
strategy instead of a social strategy perhaps because public opinion of cigarette smoking had
changed. In addition, cigarette smoking was depicted as a glamorous and sophisticated habit
that was embraced by both celebrities and socialites.
From the 1930-1931academic year to the 1939-1940 academic year about half of the
613 cigarette advertisements that ran in the Orange and White promoted Chesterfield
cigarettes. Camel maintained a regular advertising frequency with 174 advertisements. And,
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Lucky Strike began to print regular advertisements in the Orange and White. On the other
hand, Old Gold’s numbers remained quite low when compared to the other brands (see
Figures 33 and 34).
During the 1930s, the sensory strategy dominated creative strategy with 251
advertisements or 41% of the total advertising using this approach. The sensory strategy was
the prominent approach in the 1930-1931, 1935-1936, 1936-1937, 1937-1938, 1938-1940 and
1939-1940 academic years. Although the sensory approach was the most frequently used
approach, the social strategy was not far behind with 234 advertisements or 38% of the total
advertising. In fact, the social strategy dominated from 1931 to 1934. A large number of
advertisements, 20% of the total or 123 advertisements, used a rational approach. The ego
strategy was the least frequently used with only 1% or 6 advertisements falling into this
category (see Figures 35 and 36).
Although the social strategy no longer dominated cigarette advertising in the Orange
and White, from a tactical perspective, the use of a socially desirable referent or celebrity was
prevalent; for instance, 71% or 435 advertisements used this type of approach. An
informational approach was fairly common; this approach was used in 74 advertisements or
12% of the total. Using a reward tactic was also used occasionally; 61 advertisements or 10%
of the ads employed this tactical approach. Relatively few advertisements endeavored to
entertain their audience. Only 4% or 25 advertisements used this approach. Few
advertisements used humor to sell their product. Just 2% or 12 advertisements used this
tactic. Using an expert was even more rare with only 1% of the total or 6 advertisements
using this approach (see Figures 37 and 38).
Advertisements published in the Orange and White During the 1930s:
Camel:
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During the 1930-1931 academic year, Camel advertised its new “humidor”
packaging. The term “humidor” refers to a special airtight container that was normally used
to keep cigars moist. As cigars are typically thought of as being the premier or high-end
tobacco product, the use of the term humidor implies quality. Therefore, the primary
strategy that is used in this campaign is a rational strategy that is supplemented by
informational appeal. The sensory strategy is also present in this advertisement. The goal of
the special “humidor” packaging is to preserve the freshness of the tobacco and to enhance
the taste. To support this message, the copy reads, “Smoke a fresh cigarette” (see Figure 39).
In addition to promoting Camels by informing the public about their superior
quality, R.J. Reynolds also financed contests that rewarded consumers for smoking Camel
cigarettes. For instance, the Camel advertisements publicize the fact that Camel cigarettes
awarded $50,000.00 in the past year (see Figure 40).
The following academic year Camel used a sensory strategy. The headline reads,
“Man! They’ve hit it this time!” The image reinforces the sensory strategy by showing a man
smoking a cigarette. The idea of freshness and quality is also mentioned in the text (see
Figure 41).
During the 1933-1934 academic year Camel cigarettes ran a campaign that explained
the trickery involved in various illusions and magic acts. The advertisement makes the
connection that smokers should likewise resist being tricked by tobacco products that do not
adhere to the same standards as Camel. Thus, Camel uses a rational strategy to try to
persuade students to smoke the Camel brand. However, the tactics used in the advertisement
entertain the audience member by revealing the secrets to various magic acts. In the
advertisement provided, Camel provides the reader with the secrets behind the famous
magician Harry Houdini’s Milk Can Escape (see Figure 42). Other tricks that were revealed
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included Hardeen’s packing case escape,377 the Japanese thumb tie illusion,378 and the cut
rope made whole again trick.379
The following academic year, Camel switched to a sensory campaign. In this series of
advertisements cigarettes are prescribed as a remedy to various nervous habits. Through
these ads, cigarettes are recommended as a way to counteract negative or undesirable
sensations. This advertisement seems to be targeted very directly at college students that
may be experiencing stress (see Figure 43). In addition to mussing hair, Camel claims to
alleviate other habits such as newspaper crackling,380 doodling,381 forehead wrinkling,382 and
hair mussing.383
Instead of prescribing Camels for nerves, this advertising campaign promotes
tobacco as a stimulant stating, “After Concentrating…Get A Lift with a Camel.” Again,
Camel uses a rational strategy by promoting the product benefits. The use of a biology
student’s testimonial provides referent tactics that help to reinforce the rational strategy. Like
the other advertisements, this advertisement also uses a sensory strategy as a secondary
persuasive approach (see Figure 44). This campaign includes students from a variety of
majors including pre-med,384 law,385 architecture,386 and history.387 In addition to featuring
students in various majors, it also featured people pursuing various career paths such as
pilots, rodeo riders, engineers, firemen, and explorers.388
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Camel continued to target college students by offering cash incentives for smoking
its brand. Camel also invites college students to try to smoke a pack of Camels and if they
are not satisfied they can return it for a cash rebate. This rational advertising strategy is
combined with referent tactics. The young woman in the advertisement promoting the offer
looks very much like a typical college student (see Figure 45).
In addition to college students, Camel also used athletes to promote its cigarettes.
However, in spite of the change in spokesperson, the strategy remained the same. Both
campaigns use a rational approach to persuasion. In this case professional athletes attest that
Camels “Don’t get your Wind” or impede your athletic performance. This particular
advertisement featured Lou Gehrig’s testimonial and images of Betty Bailey, a champion
diver, George Barker, a track star, Bruce Barnes, tennis champion, and champion golfer,
Tommy Armour (see Figure 46).
From 1937 to 1940 Camel continued promoting the fact that Camel cigarettes “never
get on your nerves.” Each of the advertisements used a sensory strategy that described the
medicinal properties of Camel and used the testimonials of various celebrities and athletes to
support this claim (see Figure 47).
Chesterfield:
In 1930 Chesterfield used a purely sensory strategy. The headline states, “milder and
better taste.” The text follows, “’Promises fill no sack’ – it is TASTE and not words you
enjoy in a smoke.” The purely sensory approach is complemented by the image of a burning
cigarette (see Figure 48).
Chesterfield changed its strategy from a sensory to a rational strategy in January of
1931. Chesterfield’s rational strategy compares the rationale required to select a cigarette
brand with the strategies used to figure out puzzles or optical illusions. Therefore, the
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objective of the advertisement is to communicate the idea that the taste or quality of a
cigarette is easy to determine. So, it should be easy to determine that Chesterfield is the
superior brand (see Figure 49).
In addition to using product features such as taste and quality to promote its brand,
Chesterfield also used the fact that it used Turkish tobacco to sell cigarettes. An advertising
headline reads, “Let’s all go to Turkey.” The mention of exotic Eastern locations such as
Cavalla, Smyrna and Samsoun as suppliers of their tobacco adds to the allure of cigarette
smoking. The familiar image of the Hagia Sophia, a monument that is widely associated
with travel to Turkey, also adds to the exotic feel of the advertisement. Therefore the major
strategies at play in this advertisement are rational and ego related. The use of information is
the primary persuasive appeal (see Figure 50).
Chesterfield changed its strategy again during the 1931-1932 academic year. Instead
of focusing on the product itself, the advertising centers on the greater social context or
meaning of the product. For instance, one major theme is that the smoking habit is
universally accepted - even stodgy grandfathers. However, societal acceptance of cigarette
smoking is dependant upon smoking the right brand of cigarettes (see Figure 51).
For the 1932-1933 academic year, Chesterfield used a more sophisticated approach
for advertising cigarettes. The primary strategy in this advertisement is social. The women in
the advertisement seductively inquires, “Tell me something…what makes a cigarette taste
better?” Presumably, she is speaking to a male smoker who is ready and willing to answer her
request.

In addition to the primary social strategy, a sensory approach is also being used

through the implication that Chesterfields are the best tasting cigarettes (see Figure 52).
Cigarette manufacturers also used advertising to promote the ratio programming that
they sponsored. The performers that were used in the programming also used as
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spokespeople for the particular cigarette brand. This particular promotional advertisement
was printed in a 1934 edition of the Orange and White (see Figure 53).
Chesterfield used a social strategy to promote its brand during the 1934-1935
academic year. Again, Chesterfield uses a social strategy to imply that the approval of others
depends upon smoking its brand. For instance, the Justice of the Peace agrees to marry the
young couple because they smoke Chesterfields (see Figure 54).
During the 1935-1936 academic year Chesterfield changed from a social to a sensory
strategy. The text reads, “I wouldn’t give that for a cigarette that doesn’t Satisfy…that
doesn’t give me what I want in a smoke.” However, an element of peer approval is also
present. The use of a similar source reinforces the social aspects of smoking (see Figure 55).
Like the John Held Jr. advertisements, Chesterfield advertisements poked fun at
college students’ grandparents’ generation. In this appeal that combines a social approach
with humor tactics, two elderly women smoke Chesterfields. The headline reads, “I’m not
saying a word.” Smoking is shown to be a slightly taboo habit that is appealing even to
elderly women. This advertisement ran during the 1936-1937 academic year (see Figure 56).
During the 1937-1938 academic year, Chesterfield continued to use a social strategy
by focusing on occasions where one should smoke. One use occasion advertisement reads,
“First a handshake…then ‘Have a Chesterfield.’” Therefore, this social strategy also includes
elements from the routine segment of the strategy wheel (see Figure 57).
Chesterfield used sensory strategy during the 1938-1939 academic year. In addition
to advertising that Chesterfield gives smokers more pleasure, the advertisement also
promoted local radio programming sponsored by Chesterfield (see Figure 58).
During the 1939-1940 academic year, Chesterfield combined a social strategy with
celebrity tactics. In this advertisement, Chesterfield claims to be the most popular brand of
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cigarettes in the United States. A comparison is made between America’s choice in a beauty
queen and its choice in cigarette (see Figure 59).
Lucky Strike:
Lucky strike first advertised in the Orange and White on October 13, 1931. The
primary message strategy is rational and centers on product information. For instance, the
primary focus of the advertisement is on the moisture-proof cellophane packaging. Like the
Camel advertisements, Lucky Strike compares its packaging to a humidor (see Figure 60).
In addition to the Lucky Tab advertisement, Lucky Strike also used Jean Harlow’s
celebrity endorsement tactics to promote its product. In addition, the advertisement
promotes Jean Harlow and her films (see Figure 61). In addition to Jean Harlow, the
campaign used other female celebrities such as Aviatrix Sally Eilers389 and actress Dorothy
Mackaill.390 Each of the endorsements included a statement that the celebrity was not
compensated for her testimonial and that Lucky Strike actually is her cigarette of choice.
Although the execution of the advertisement is different, the rational strategy remains the
same. However, the rational strategy is combined with a sensory strategy. Lucky Strike tastes
good because of it’s packaging.
During the 1932-1933 academic year, Lucky Strike used a sensory strategy in its
campaign. By using wild animals and Native Americans or other exotic people, Lucky Strike
compared uncured tobacco to uncivilized animals or humans by stating, “Nature in the Raw
is seldom Mild” (see Figure 62).
Lucky Strike changed from a sensory to a social strategy during the 1933-1934
academic year. This campaign focuses its attention on women by featuring a fashionable

389
390

Orange and White, November 6, 1931
Orange and White, October 22, 1931

147

young woman. However the headline that reads, “The Height of Good Taste” suggests both
a social and sensory strategy. Therefore, the advertisement suggests that women should
smoke because it is pleasurable and communicates high social status (see Figure 63).
Again, during the 1934-1935 academic year, Lucky Strike combined sensory and
social strategies. However, instead of capturing a purely aspirational lifestyle, the
advertisement focuses on idealizing the ordinary. This makes the promises suggested in the
advertisement much more attainable than in the previous campaign (see Figure 64).
During the 1934-1935 academic year, Lucky Strike continued to use a social strategy.
However, this time the strategy appears to be used within the context of a dating situation
instead of a social context. The advertisement also uses a referent strategy playing upon the
fact that many people have had disagreements with their significant others and have been at
a loss when considering what to do. Therefore, smoking is promoted as a way to make
amends (see Figure 65).
During the 1936-1937 academic year Lucky Strike used celebrity testimonials to
attest to the fact that Lucky Strike cigarettes are easy on the throat. For instance, Margaret
Sullavan said that “Luckies are the answer for her throat.” In addition, the campaign
included celebrities such as actress Claudette Colbert,391 actress Carole Lombard,392 actor
Cary Grant,393 U.S. Senator Gerald P. Nye,394 and radioman Boake Carter.395 This campaign
combines a sensory strategy with a celebrity appeal (see Figure 66).
Old Gold:

Orange and White, February 4, 1937
Orange and White, March 5, 1937
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395 Orange and White, March 26, 1937
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Old Gold’s strategy focused on keeping kissable. This advertisement uses a sensory
strategy and a referent approach to suggest that Old Gold cigarettes are not as offensive as
other cigarettes and will not diminish your attractiveness. The woman featured in the
advertisement looks to be college-aged so her appearance would resonate well with students
(see Figure 67).
Later during the 1934-1935 academic year, Old Gold maintains the same sensory
strategy that it used during the 1932-1933 academic year. However, the present
advertisement focuses on throat ease instead of “keeping kissable.” In addition, the tactics
changed from using a referent to a celebrity appeal. For instance singer and actor Bing
Crosby said, “My throat is my fortune…that’s why I smoke Old Gold’s” (see Figure 68). Old
Gold also featured other celebrities such as actress Mae West,396 actor James Cagney,397
actress Claudette Colbert,398 and actress Carole Lombard.399
Summary:
In spite of the Great Depression and the increased stress and pessimism that the
economic downturn caused, cigarette advertising in the Orange and White continued to
increase in frequency and size. In some ways, cigarettes seemed to provide the same kind of
escape as the movie industry provided. In fact, the tobacco industry recruited many top film
stars in its advertising campaigns during the 1930s. In addition to film stars, cigarette
advertising also started to position cigarettes as a way to start one’s career path. The industry
maintained its efforts to target women by depicting women of high social standing in its
advertisements and by demonstrating social approval through advertising. In addition, the
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advertisements began to promote the habit as a way to manage stress and relax. R.J.
Reynolds Camel brand used very targeted advertisements that used college students to
promote the effectiveness of its brand. Although the number of advertisements featuring
college students and targeting the college audience increased, the majority of the brands
simply targeted young people and were not specifically aimed toward the college audience.
Cigarette Advertising in The Orange and White during the 1940s:
Cigarette advertising in The Orange and White400 during the 1940s was very sporadic
because of the outbreak of the World War II. Because the nation was at war, many of the
advertisements made cigarette smoking seem patriotic. In fact, many used the testimonies of
servicemen and women to promote their product. From the 1940-1941 academic year to the
1949-1950 academic year The Orange and White published 500 editions. A total of 346
cigarette advertisements appeared in the 500 editions published, averaging .69 cigarette
advertisements per newspaper.
Although the number of cigarette advertisements dropped during the 1940s, the
number of brands being advertised increased. In addition to Chesterfield, Camel, Old Gold
and Lucky Strike, Phillip Morris, and Raleigh also advertised during the 1940s. As the
graphs show, Chesterfield and Camel were the most advertised cigarette brands and Old
Gold and Lucky Strike were the least advertised brands in the in The Orange and White during
the 1940s. Chesterfield and Camel were the most heavily advertised brands from the 19401941 to the 1942-1943 academic years (see Figures 69 and 70). However, due to the war
effort, advertising either stopped completely or nearly stopped from the 1943-1944 to the
1945-1946 academic year. In addition, the editorial content published in The Orange and White
also was significantly decreased. Cigarette advertising in The Orange and White made a healthy
The name of the student newspaper at the University of Tennessee changed from Orange and White to The
Orange and White in 1940.
400
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comeback from the 1946-1947 to the 1948-1949 academic year. However, cigarette
advertising dropped in 1949 for an unknown reason.
During the 1940s, the sensory strategy dominated cigarette advertising in The Orange
and White with 59% of all advertisements using a sensory approach. The social strategy was
the second most common with 27% of the advertisements falling into this category. The
third most often used strategy was the rational approach with 12% of all advertisements
using reason to reach consumers. During the 1940s, ego, acute need, and routine strategies
were not widely used in cigarette advertisements (see Figures 71 and 72).
Overall, tactics using celebrities were the most popular advertising approach during
the 1940s; 47% of the cigarette advertisements in The Orange and White used celebrity tactics.
The referent approach was the second most popular tactic with 36% of the advertisements
using this approach. Although the referent appeal was the most popular during the first half
of the decade, celebrity appeals dominated the latter years during the 1940s. If combined,
83% of all the advertisements used an aspirational individual to promote cigarettes. The
informational approach also was somewhat popular with 12% of advertising using
information as the primary tactic. Few advertisements used reward, expert or humor tactics
during the 1940s (see Figure 73 and 74).
Advertisements published in The Orange and White During the 1940s:
Camel:
During the 1940-1941 academic year, the first Camel campaign employed a social
approach. The advertisements in this series focused on men who had succeeded in their
particular career paths. In the advertisement shown (see Figure 75), an air traffic controller
relates the keys to his career path and tips for picking a good cigarette. Therefore, cigarette
smoking is implicitly positioned as a way to fit into the business world. Camel also uses
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referent tactics. These tactics are made clear in the fact that the careers featured in the
advertisements are both appealing and glamorous.
During the following year, Camel began to use rational strategy combined with a
social strategy to promote its brand. Its advertisements combined celebrity with product
information. Usually a celebrity spokesperson, in this case Evelyn Doman, promotes the
virtues of smoking Camel cigarettes. The advertisement also promotes the fact that Camel
cigarettes contain 28% less nicotine than the other four largest selling brands. Lower
nicotine is promoted as a product benefit but the advertisement does not give the reader any
reason why lower levels of nicotine are better (see Figure 76).
For the 1941-1942 academic year, Camel used the same approach by promoting the
product using a spokesperson and product related information. However, because of the
outbreak of WWII, the spokesperson was a member of the armed forces. It is important to
note that this military based approach was used even before Pearl Harbor Day, which
officially involved the United States in the war effort (see Figure 77).
Using the armed forces in Camel advertisements continued into 1942-1943 academic
year. In this campaign, Camel used jargon or slang from the various branches of the armed
forces to build rapport with its patriotic audience and establish the fact that its brand has a
close relationship with the armed services. The headline reads, “In the Air Force they say –
‘Dodo’ for the new flying recruit, ‘Kite’ for airplane, ‘hit the silk’ for taking to parachute,
‘Camel’ for their favorite cigarette.” Therefore, this social strategy is combined with the
powerful referent appeal of a member of the Air Force. In addition to the Air Force, this
advertising campaign featured servicemen from the other branches of the military such as
the army and navy (see Figure 78).
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After a three-year break, Camel resumed advertising in The Orange and White in 1947.
The primary message in this series of advertisements was that, “More people are smoking
Camels than ever before.” In addition to the social strategy implied in promoting the
popularity of the cigarette, Beryl Davis401 was the celebrity spokesperson for the brand. Big
band singer Beryl Davis was born in England; the daughter of famous bandleader Harry
Davis. Beryl Davis spent her formative years on tour with her father's orchestra, eventually
becoming the act's featured vocalist. In 1944, Davis was recruited to join Glenn Miller's
Army Air Force Orchestra (see Figure 79). Other featured musicians and singers included
“Skitch” Henderson,402 Patty Andrews,403 Al Nevins,404 and Desi Arnaz.405
During the 1948-1949 academic year Camel began to use a rational appeal in its
college advertising. In this campaign, Camel urges students to give its cigarette a 30-day test
for mildness. Although the primary appeal is a rational appeal, the secondary appeal is
sensory because the smokers are testing the cigarette for mildness (see Figure 80).406
Chesterfield:
During the 1940-1941 academic year, Chesterfield created advertisements that
focused on the social acceptability of smoking. Using a referent appeal, this advertisement
features a woman conversing with her father about smoking. The headline reads, “Right
Dad…it’s the one cigarette that really satisfies.” In addition to the referent appeal, the
advertisement promotes the satisfaction that one gets from smoking (see Figure 81).

The Orange and White, October 3, 1947
The Orange and White, October 8, 1947
403 The Orange and White, October 15, 1947
404 The Orange and White, October 22, 1947
405 The Orange and White, October 29, 1947
406 The Orange and White, October 3, 1947
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By the 1941-1942 academic year, the Chesterfield campaign strategy changed to a
patriotic effort that supported World War II. The headline reads, “The Order of the Day is
Chesterfield Milder, Cooler…Better-Tasting” (see Figure 82).
During the 1942-1943 academic year, Chesterfield advertised again using a patriotic
appeal. However, this time the brand used an army medic to attest to the quality of
Chesterfield brand cigarettes. This rational appeal combines the expertise of a physician with
a product-focused argument (see Figure 83).
The following academic year, Chesterfield continued to use advertising that related
to the war effort. In this advertisement, the social strategy implies that popular people, like
Tailgun Smitty, smoke Chesterfields. And, if you want the service person that you care about
to be popular like Tailgun Smitty you ought to send him plenty of Chesterfields. However,
the advertisement also makes use of a sensory approach (see Figure 84).
During the 1945-1946 academic year, Chesterfield used a referent approach to
promote its brand in The Orange and White. The beautiful woman featured in the
advertisement promotes the ABC slogan that stands for, “Always Buy Chesterfields.” The
headline implies brand loyalty and suggests a routine strategy (see Figure 85).
Chesterfield’s tactics changed during the 1947-1948 academic year. Instead of using
a referent appeal, the tactics changed to a celebrity appeal. Although the celebrity, Lauren
Bacall, is the primary feature in the advertisement, the strategy is based in the sensory
segment because the focus is on enjoyment that smoking cigarettes provides. In addition to
promoting Chesterfield, the advertisement also mentions that Lauren Bacall will be starring
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in the film “Dark Passage.” Other featured celebrities included actor James Stewart407, actress
Loretta Young,408 actress Claudette Colbert,409 and actor Ronald Regan410 (see Figure 86).
Chesterfield returned to the routine strategy during the 1948-1949 academic year by
using the ABC “Always Buy Chesterfield” slogan. However, Chesterfield combined the
ABC slogan with a celebrity appeal. As in the previous campaign, the spokesperson, in this
case Rita Hayworth, is promoting her new film “The Loves of Carmen.” In addition to Rita
Hayworth’s testimonial, Chesterfield includes the testimonial of a college student from the
University of Colorado (see Figure 87). In addition to Rita Hayworth, Chesterfield
advertisements also included actress Betty Grable,411 singer Perry Como,412 actress Jane
Wyman,413 and actor Gary Cooper.414
Phillip Morris:
In its college campaign for the 1943-1944 academic year, Phillip Morris featured
Johnny Roventini, the famous Phillip Morris bellboy. Alfred E. Lyon, Philip Morris' Vice
President for Sales, and Milton Biow, the famous president of the Milton Biow advertising
who managed the Philip Morris Inc. account discovered Johnny Roventini in the Hotel New
Yorker lobby during an April evening in 1933. Johnny Roventini served as one of the Hotel
New Yorker’s corporate images. The Hotel New Yorker had been featuring the Brooklyn
born, 48-inch youngster on its souvenir post cards as "the smallest bellboy in the world."
The corporate executives along with their bellhop were to take a little-known cigarette brand
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and move it to number four in national sales in five years time.415 Therefore, to The Orange
and White audience, the Phillip Morris bellhop was a well-known figure. Therefore, this
advertisement combines a sensory strategy with celebrity tactics (see Figure 88).
Johnny Roventini reappeared during the 1948-1949 Phillip Morris campaign. In this
series of advertisements, Roventini is featured in his own comic strip called “Campus
Capers” that targeted college students. The comic strip is a social drama where Phillip
Morris cigarettes save the day by eliminating cigarette hangover and by building students’
vocabularies. The overall strategy is social but the tactic is entertaining college students.416
Old Gold:
Old Gold advertised only during the 1946-1947 academic year. The campaign was
designed with simplicity in mind. The Lorillard Tobacco Company wants to emphasize the
fact that they are tobacco men and that the only thing that they attest about their product is
that it is made for enjoyment. This advertisement works almost exclusively on a sensory level
(see Figure 89).
Raleigh:
Like Old Gold, Raleigh only advertised in The Orange and White for one year. During
the 1947-1948 academic year, Raleigh used a sensory strategy and celebrity tactics to sell their
brand. In this advertisement, Tyrone Power, an American film actor who appeared in
numerous of films from the 1930s to the 1950s, often as a swashbuckler or romantic lead,
promoted the brand. The primary product feature that is promoted is the fact that the
cigarette is moisturized to minimize throat irritation and increase enjoyment (see Figure 90).
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Other celebrity spokespeople include actress Joan Crawford,417 actor and decorated naval
officer Douglas Fairbanks Jr.,418 and actress Gene Tierney.419
Summary:
Cigarette advertising in The Orange and White during the 1940s was influenced by the
outbreak of the Second World War. World War Two influenced cigarette advertising in two
ways: 1.) The frequency of advertising was reduced in the 1940s due to a shift in marketing
efforts due to the war. 2.) The advertisements that were present in The Orange and White often
used patriotic themes to promote cigarette smoking. In addition to the new marketing
strategies instigated by the war, many of the advertisements used the same strategies and
tactics as before. Common approaches included social approval, celebrity appeals, and
rational strategies. Although throat irritation and coughing had been referred to before in
advertisements, during the 1940s advertisements began to refer to the healthfulness of
particular brands as well as nicotine content for the first time in The Orange and White.
Cigarette Advertising in The Orange and White during the 1950s:
The 1950s was the decade with the largest number of cigarette advertisements. A
total of 966 cigarette advertisements appeared in 355 editions of The Orange and White. On
average, 2.72 advertisements appeared in the newspaper. The Orange and White was published
both weekly and bi-weekly. The paper was published bi-weekly during the 1950-1951 and the
1951-1952 academic years. The paper was published weekly from the 1952-1953 to the 19591960 academic year. A number of factors influenced the large number of advertisements in
the newspaper. In general, cigarette smoking was a socially acceptable habit during the
1950s. In addition, new brands and varieties of cigarettes were introduced into the cigarette
The Orange and White, February 12, 1947
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419 The Orange and White, February 26, 1947
417
418
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market. For instance, several new filter brands and menthol-flavored cigarettes were created
during this time period.
From the 1950-1951 academic year to the 1954-1955 academic year, unfiltered
cigarettes were the most popular product advertised. Starting with the 1955-1956 academic
year and ending with the 1958-1959 academic year, filtered and unfiltered cigarettes
advertised with a similar frequency. However, cigarette advertising in general began to dip
from 1955-1956 academic year to the 1957-1958 academic year. By the 1959-1960 academic
year, the frequency of filtered cigarette advertising surpassed the pre-1955-1956 levels for
advertising unfiltered cigarettes. Menthol cigarette advertising fell behind both the filtered
and unfiltered brands. But, during the 1959-1960 academic year the frequency of advertising
among the menthol brands surpassed that of the unfiltered brands (see Figure 91).
In total, 552 of the 966 cigarette advertisements promoted unfiltered brands.
Unfiltered cigarette advertisements represented 57% of the total cigarette advertisements
that appeared in The Orange and White. Lucky Strike was consistently the most frequent
advertiser with 221 advertisements. Camel and Chesterfield also were major advertisers with
over 100 advertisements each. Phillip Morris, Old Gold and Pall Mall also advertised in The
Orange and White. And, although they were not consistent advertisers, they did have a
significant presence during certain years. For instance, Pall Mall was the most frequent
advertiser in the unfiltered segment during the 1958-1959 academic year. But, it did not
advertise in The Orange and White from the 1950-1951 to the 1957-1958 academic year (see
Figures 92 and 93).
During the 1950s, 255 of the 966 advertisements printed in The Orange and White
promoted filtered cigarettes. In total, 26% of the cigarette advertisements in The Orange and
White related to filtered cigarettes. Filtered cigarette advertising steadily increased from the
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1952-1953 academic year to the 1955-1956 academic year. Cigarette advertising dropped
during the 1956-1957 and the 1957-1958 academic years. However, the advertising frequency
resumed during the 1958-1959 and the 1959-1960 academic years. With a total of 77
advertisements, Tareyton was the most frequently advertised brand. Viceroy’s advertising
rates were nearly the same as Tareyton with a total of 75 advertisements. Marlboro, Winston,
and L&M also were frequent advertisers with over 55 advertisements each (see Figure 94
and 95).
Three primary strategies dominated the cigarette advertising in The Orange and White
during the 1950s. These three strategies were the rational, social, and sensory strategies. The
sensory dominated with 50% of the advertising falling into this category. Although the
sensory strategy dominated, it was the primary strategy during the 1950-1951, 1955-1956,
1956-1957, 1958-1959, and 1959-1960 academic year. However, the sensory and rational
strategies also dominated creative strategies certain years. During the 1951-1952 and the
1952-1953 academic years the social approach dominated. Likewise, the rational approach
dominated 1954-1955 academic year, which was the year after the Reader’s Digest article was
published warning the American public about the harms of smoking (see Figures 96 and 97).
During the 1950s, the referent tactic was the most popular in cigarette advertising in
The Orange and White with 35% of the advertising falling into this category. The referent
approach was the most prevalent approach during the 1950-1951, 1951-1952, 1952-1953,
and the 1955-1956 academic year. The humor approach was the second most popular tactic
with 32% of the advertising using this appeal. Although the humor approach was the second
most popular appeal, it was the most frequent appeal during the 1953-1954, 1954-1955,
1956-1957, and the 1958-1959 academic year. Information was another tactic that was fairly
prevalent with 18% of cigarette advertisements printed using this approach. In spite of the
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fact that using entertainment was not one of the most popular tactics, it was the most
popular appeal during the 1959-1960 academic year. Celebrity tactics and reward appeals
were also occasionally employed (see Figures 98 and 99).
Unfiltered Brands Advertised During the 1950s:
Lucky Strike:
At the start of the 1950-1951 academic year, Lucky Strike advertised using a series of
contests that would reach nearly every college campus in the U. S. In the first series of
contests, Lucky Strike challenged students to write “Happy-Go-Lucky” jingles about Lucky
Strike. Lucky Strike offered $25.00 cash prizes for winning jingles. For instance, a winning
entry from Brooklyn College reads, “In art class we may disagree, if Goya beats Van Dyke.
But one thing is unanimous, We all pick Lucky Strike.” The campaign’s appeal is social
because it reinforces the idea that cigarette smoking is popular among college students.
Every edition of the Orange and White would feature winning jingle submissions from around
the nation. The jingles are intended to be humorous and entertaining. The jingle contest ran
until the 1954-1955 academic year (see Figures 100 and 101).
During the 1954-1955 academic year, Lucky Strike changed its contest from jingles
to “droodles”. “Droodles” are humorous picture puzzles that should relate to smoking
Lucky Strike. Like the previous contests, a $25 dollar reward is offered for featured
“droodles.” Again, the primary tactic that was used is humor. In the advertisement below,
the sensory strategy dominates (see Figure 102). However, in other “droodle”
advertisements, the strategy is social.
During the 1956-1957 and 1957-1958 academic years, Lucky Strike changed its
contest from “Droodles” to “Sticklers.” “Sticklers” are jokes or riddles that rhyme. For
instance, one example reads, “What do you call a dirty bird? …a murky turkey.” Again the
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goal of the contest is to show that Lucky Strike is a popular across college campuses. The
humorous approach is used to entertain students (see Figure 104).
Camel:
Camel began a series of cartoons called “Campus Interviews on Cigarette Tests”
during the 1950-1951 academic year. This humorous approach profiled various animals and
proves that in spite of their idiosyncratic traits, they agree that Camel is the best cigarette.
For instance, even though the “Long-Wattled Umbrella Bird” lacks the common sense to get
out of the rain, he still knows that Camel is the best cigarette. The advertisement continues
by stating that “More People Smoke Camels than any other cigarette!” and that students
should give the brand a 30-day trial (see Figure 105). Therefore, this series of
advertisements combines humor with a social strategy. This cartoon continued through the
1951-1952 academic year. Other featured cartoon characters included “The Blow Fish,”420
“The Flicker,”421 and “The Common Loon.”422
In 1952, Camel changed from the “Campus Interviews on Cigarette Tests” cartoon
to the “…But Only Time Will Tell” cartoon. The objective of the cartoon is to convince
college students to try smoking and to give the habit time before they decide. For instance,
the cartoon shows a fraternity house and fraternity brothers testing out a new cat to see if it
is a good mouser. But, just because it doesn’t catch a mouse immediately doesn’t mean that
it cannot catch mice. In the same way, students should give smoking a fair try. Camel
provides a rational argument for trying smoking that is complemented with humor tactics
(see Figure 106).
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During the following academic year, Camel advertised using a celebrity approach that
used a social strategy. The campaign slogan was, “Camels Agree with More People” and
focused on “How the stars got started.” In this particular advertisement, Dick Powell was
the celebrity spokesperson. In addition to providing his testimonial on cigarettes, he also
gives the story of how he got his start in the music industry by singing with a choral group at
Little Rock College. Dick Powell was a famous singer, actor, and director (see Figure 107).
Other Camel spokespeople included baseball player Mickey Mantle,423 actress Lisbeth
Scott,424 actress Maureen O’Sullivan,425 actor Tyrone Power,426 and actor William Holden.427
The primary strategy of 1955-1956 Camel campaign is sensory. However, the
advertisements also emphasize the idea that cigarettes are a way to celebrate special
occasions and relax after a job well done. For example, the text in the advertisement
provided reads, “When you’ve worked pretty late, And the issue looks great…Why not
celebrate! Have a CAMEL!” (see Figure 108).
Camel continued to used a social approach during the 1956-1957 academic year.
However, instead of addressing the pleasure of smoking directly, Camel promotes its
cigarette as the “real cigarette.” The headline reads, “Have A Real Cigarette…have a Camel!”
This headline, accompanied by a photograph of a documentary film cameraman implies that
Camels are for real men (see Figure 109).
Camel ended the 1950s by returning to the cartoon approach that it used at the
beginning of the decade. The cartoons used a humor appeal but the overriding strategy is
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sensory because both the caption of the cartoon and the headline relate to the product’s
quality and taste (Figure 110).
Chesterfield:
To start off the 1950s, Chesterfield used a cigarette-smoking test to appeal to college
students on a rational level. The headline reads, “Open ‘Em, Smell ‘Em, Smoke ‘Em –
Easiest Test In The Book.” Then, the student is challenged to compare Chesterfield with any
other cigarette (see Figure 111).
During the 1951-1952 academic year, Chesterfield’s advertisements featured various
competitive and Ivy League universities to show that their brand is the most popular among
the most accomplished college students. For instance, the advertisements featured Rice,428
Northwestern,429 Princeton,430 Cornell,431 University of Virginia,432 M.I.T.433 and many others.
Because the advertisement focuses on the popularity of the brand and the fact that many
college students, like themselves, smoke Chesterfield, the primary campaign strategy is social
(see Figure 112).
As health concerns regarding smoking begin to surface in the popular press,
Chesterfield changes its campaign strategy to a more rational approach during the 1952-1953
academic year. Therefore, Chesterfield presents its own scientific evidence that proves that
the “Nose, Throat, and Accessory Organs” are not harmed by smoking Chesterfield. In
addition, Chesterfield claims that its report is the first ever such report published about a
cigarette. In fact, the report even claims that it studied heavy smokers that smoked up to 40
cigarettes a day (see Figure 113).
The Orange and White, November 7, 1951
The Orange and White, October 3, 1951
430 The Orange and White, October 24, 1951
431 The Orange and White, October 31, 1951
432 The Orange and White, October 17, 1951
433 The Orange and White, November 28, 1951
428
429

163

Like Camel, Chesterfield also used celebrity tactics during the 1953-1954 academic
year. However, Chesterfield combined the appeal of a celebrity with ordinary college
students. The appeal of the advertisement is primarily social as it shows Chesterfield to be a
popular cigarette. In this particular situation, Ray Anthony is the celebrity. Anthony is an
American songwriter, trumpeter, bandleader, and actor. He is known for “The Bunny Hop”
and the “Hokey Pokey.” In addition, the advertisement features two female college students
who also provide their testimonials (see Figure 114).
During the 1955-1956 academic year, Chesterfield changed its strategy from a social
strategy to a sensory strategy. The headline reads, “Packs More Pleasure because it’s More
Perfectly Packed!” The change in strategy is evident because of the focus on pleasure. Some
of the tactics changed used to execute the strategy also changed. Instead of using celebrity
or source similarity tactics, the Chesterfield advertisement used source attractiveness to
promote its brand. The use of a sex appeal complements the use of an attractive source.
Both the image of a beautiful model reclining with a cigarette and the tone of the copy seems
more sexual in nature than previous advertisements (see Figure 115).
Like Camel’s campaign from the previous year, Chesterfield also tries to position its
cigarette as the masculine cigarette. This advertisement reads, “Men of America: The TestDriver. Nothing satisfies like the BIG CLEAN TASTE OF TOP-TOBACCO” (see Figure
116). Other featured professionals included a law enforcement officer,434 uranium
geologist,435 highway architect,436 and a U.S. Air Force pilot.437 Although the tactics are based
in a referent appeal and there are social elements of the advertisement, the primary strategy is

The Orange and White, November 7, 1958
The Orange and White, October 24, 1958
436 The Orange and White, October 17, 1958
437 The Orange and White, October 10, 1958
434
435
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sensory because the product focus is on enjoying the tobacco. Chesterfield ran the “Men of
America” campaign during the 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 academic years.
Phillip Morris:
Like Chesterfield, Phillip Morris started out its 1950-1951college campaign with a
rational appeal that challenged students to test Phillip Morris cigarettes. This particular
advertisement features a woman and reads “Believe in Yourself! Don’t test one brand alone
– compare them all!” This advertisement seems to work toward empowering women and
would resonate with female college students for this reason. Like the other Phillip Morris
advertisement, this advertisement includes the slogan “Call for Phillip Morris” and features
the bellhop Johnny (see Figure 117).
In 1951, Phillip Morris changes from a rational strategy to a sensory strategy that
focuses on celebrity testimonials. In this case, Desi Arnaz and Lucille Ball attest that Phillip
Morris does not cause throat irritation. In addition to providing their testimonial, they also
promote the new “I Love Lucy” show on CBS. Again, the bellhop Johnny and the slogan
“Call for Phillip Morris” appear at the bottom of the advertisement.
From 1954-1957, Phillip Morris cigarettes sponsored the Max Shulman column. The
column was created by Leo Burnett Company, Inc.438 Shulman was a 20th century American
writer best known for his television and short story character Dobie Gillis. His writing
usually centered on young people, particularly in the college setting. After his success with
the Gillis character, Shulman continued to write. His humor column, "On Campus," was
syndicated in over 350 collegiate newspapers at one point. This particular column entitled,
“Husbands, Anyone?” focuses on how coeds select their future husbands (see Figure 119).
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Old Gold:
During the 1956-1957 academic year, Old Gold resumed advertising in The Orange
and White. Like Lucky Strike, Old Gold also used a contest. The contest was called Tangle
Schools. The headline of the advertisement suggests a sensory approach by stating, “No
Other Cigarette Can Match The Taste of Today’s Old Gold’s.” To enter the contest,
students needed to untangle the names of well-known schools and send them in to the
address listed on the advertisements. Therefore, because the advertisement involves a
puzzle, entertainment is the primary tactic in this campaign (see Figure 120).
Pall Mall:
Pall Mall started advertising in The Orange and White during the 1958-1959 academic
year. The strategy for the campaign was purely sensory. With the headline, “So friendly to
your taste!”439 The campaign compares the experience of smoking cigarettes with eating fine
foods such a various fruits and vegetables and shrimp. It’s obvious that the advertisement is
capitalizing on the pleasure associated with smoking (see Figure 121).
Filtered Brands Advertised During the 1950s:
Winston:
Although sensory appeals are popular across cigarette brands, they are particularly
popular among filtered brands. Filtered brands want to assure smokers that their brand
provides the same flavor and their unfiltered counterparts. In addition to focusing on flavor,
it appears from the photograph that smoking is being depicted as a way to start a
relationship. Therefore, the advertisement also has strong social elements and uses a referent
appeal (see Figure 122).
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Winston began using its famous “Winston Tastes Good! Like a Cigarette Should!”
slogan during the 1955-1956 academic year. This advertisement’s primary strategy is a
sensory strategy. The headline reads, “Winston brings you full flavor!” However, it also has
significant social undertones. Again, smoking is shown as a way to start relationships,
especially with members of the opposite sex (see Figure 123).
During the 1957-1958 academic year, Winston changed tactics from a referent
approach that focuses on relationships to a humor approach that reinforced the overall
sensory strategy. The campaign mimicked a comic strip with the characters ending the strip
with the slogan, “Winston tastes good…like a cigarette should.” In one example that was a
satire of Arthurian legend, Sir Gollyhad, a knight, befriended a dragon that terrorized the
citizens of Camelot by offering the beast cigarettes. The dragon was satisfied and Sir
Gollyhad wins the lady (see Figure 124). Other comics included “Mopy Dick,” a spoof on
Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick,440 “In The Soup”441 a parody of the antics of burglars, and a
comic featuring the ghost “Luke the Spook.”442
L&M:
In addition to advertising the taste and pleasure that filtered cigarettes provided,
some filtered cigarettes promoted the effectiveness of their filter. For instance, the L&M
headline reads, “No filter compares with L&M’s Miracle Tip.” This focus on the filter
properties implies a rational strategy. However, the advertisement also mentioned flavor in a
subhead. Therefore, the sensory strategy is a secondary strategy in this advertisement. In
addition, the advertisement used socialites and a businessman as a referent tactic to promote
the brand (see Figure 125).

The Orange and White, January 31, 1958
The Orange and White, October 4, 1957
442 The Orange and White, November 8, 1957
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L&M launched a similar campaign the following year. The focus remained on the
cigarette filter and the strategy remained rational. However, the photograph and text related
more directly to the college audience. The photograph used a similarity-based referent
appeal as the man and the woman appear to be interacting or starting a conversation thanks
to their mutual smoking habit (see Figure 126).
L&M continued to use the same social and referent approach during the 1957-1958
academic year. However, the focus is on the flavor. But, the similar referent approach
remained the same. The college students in the advertisement say that L&M, “Smokes
Cleaner” and “Tastes Better” (see Figure 127).
Viceroy:
Viceroy combines a rational and sensory strategy. In this advertisement, the taste of
the cigarette and the construction of the filter are important components but it seems that
the construction of the filter and the reasoning behind the smoothness of the taste are
paramount. This advertisement also appears to be directed at college students. The headline
reads, “On Every Campus College Men and Women are discussing why Viceroys are
Smoother” (see Figure 128).
During the 1958-1959 academic year, Viceroy continues to use a rational strategy to
advertise the effectiveness and healthfulness of its filter by stating that, “The Viceroy Filter
Is Made From A Pure Natural Material Found In Fruit” (see Figure 129).
Tareyton:
During the 1955-1956 academic year, Tareyton, American Tobacco Company’s
filtered brand, started to advertise its filtered brand. Like other filtered brands, Tareyton
advertises the fact that “All the pleasure comes thru…The Taste is great!” in its headline.
Therefore, the sensory strategy is the dominant strategy. However, the advertisement also
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mentions the fact that the cigarette has a dual filter. The description of the double filter
seems to suggest a more rational approach is also in play (see Figure 130).
As in the previous campaign, Tareyton used a sensory strategy. The headline reads,
“Gives you more to enjoy – the taste is great! And, the advertisement, like the other filtered
brands, shows smoking as a way to facilitate relationships. However, the effectiveness of the
filter remained as a rational element of the advertising strategy (see Figure 131).
In a campaign that ran during the 1959-1960 and 1960-1961 academic years,
Tareyton used a rational strategy to explain how its dual filter works. The advertisement
shows the two layers that filter the cigarette smoke and the band that shows the division
between the two separate filters. The sensory strategy is secondary as the advertisement
focused on the filters filtering for flavor (see Figure 132).
Marlboro:
Phillip Morris began advertising its filtered brand, Marlboro, during the 1955-1956
academic year. Marlboro’s functional slogan, “You get a lot to like – filter, flavor, flip-top
box” suggests a rational approach. Yet, the image in the advertisement portrayed a rugged
looking man with a tattoo on his hand lending the brand a rather hardened or rebellious
image. This advertisement seems to imply that this filtered brand is not a brand for sissies
(see Figure 133).
During the 1957-1958 academic year, Phillip Morris Co. decided to change its
sponsor of the “On Campus” column from its unfiltered Phillip Morris brand to its filtered
Marlboro brand. In spite of the change in brand, the column remained the same. Max
Shulman continued to make humorous observations about campus life. In this particular
example, Max Shulman discusses Christmas shopping and provides gift ideas for college
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students. Of course, Shulman recommends Phillip Morris brand cigarettes as gift ideas (see
Figure 134).
Menthol Brands Advertised During the 1950s:
Two Menthol brands were advertised in The Orange and White during the 1950s, Kool
and Salem. Salem advertised during the 1957-1958 academic year. The primary strategy in
this advertisement is sensory. The headline reads, “A new idea in smoking…Salem refreshes
your taste.” In addition, the brand advertised the social aspect of smoking through the use of
a referent appeal. The photograph in the advertisement depicts a young couple smoking in a
park (see Figure 135).
Kool advertised using the same sensory strategy as Salem during the 1958-1959 and
1959-1960 academic year, but using a different tactical approach. The headline reads,
“Switch from the Hots to Snow Fresh Filter Kools.” But, the Kool Krossword puzzle
occupies the majority of the advertising space. Therefore, the entertainment tactic is a
significant part of the advertisement (see Figure 136).
Summary:
The 1950s was marked by innovations both in the cigarettes themselves and the
techniques used to market the new brands. During the 1950s, more brands targeted college
students more directly in their advertising. Lucky Strike, Camel, Chesterfield, Tareyton,
Winston, Kool, Old Gold, L&M and Viceroy all created advertisements that directly target a
collegiate audience. Relating directly to college students became more popular than celebrity
and status appeals that were popular in the past. However, relating cigarette smoking to
career success remained a popular approach. The primary innovations in cigarette
production were the introduction of menthol and filtered cigarettes, which resulted in the
introduction of many new brands. Filtered cigarettes initially used a rational approach to
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market their brands by focusing on the healthfulness of the brand and the effectiveness of
the filter. However, by the end of the decade, the rational approach to promoting the filtered
brands was replaced by social and sensory strategies. Menthol cigarettes consistently used a
sensory strategy to promote the menthol flavor.
Cigarette Advertising in The Orange and White from 1960 to 1964:
From 1960 to 1963, 182 editions of The Orange and White were published. During
these three years, 390 cigarette advertisements were printed averaging 2.14 in each edition of
The Orange and White. This number is less than the average of 2.72 cigarette advertisements
published during the 1950s. However, only nine advertisements, all advertorials sponsored
by Marlboro, were published during the 1963-1964 academic year. And, each of the nine
advertisements were published before January of 1964. If only the academic years that span
1960-1961 to 1962-1963 are counted, the average number of cigarette advertisements
published during this time period surpasses the 1950s average at 2.93 advertisements printed
in each edition of The Orange and White.
During the early 1960s, for the first time, filtered cigarettes consistently surpass
unfiltered cigarettes in the number of advertisements published in The Orange and White. In
fact, filtered cigarette advertising reached its peak during the 1962-1963 academic year when
102 advertisements for filtered cigarettes were published. The frequency for advertising that
related to menthol cigarettes generally dropped during the early 1960s. However, menthol
cigarettes were never a primary category of cigarette advertising in The Orange and White (see
Figure 137).
During the early 1960s, Chesterfield was the most frequently advertised unfiltered
cigarette brand with a total of 46 cigarette advertisements printed in The Orange and White.
Chesterfield was the dominant unfiltered brand during the 1961-1962 and the 1962-1963
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academic years. Lucky Strike was a close second with a total of 45 cigarette advertisements.
Lucky Strike was the prominent unfiltered brand in 1960-1961 academic year. Camel was the
third most frequent advertiser with a total of 18 advertisements. Old Gold and Pall Mall also
advertised in The Orange and White but their advertising was relatively infrequent (see Figures
138 and 139).
During the early 1960s, the filtered cigarettes were dominant. The prominent brand
of filtered cigarettes advertised was Marlboro with 77 advertisements published in The Orange
and White. And, Marlboro was the most popular brand advertised from the 1960-1961
academic year to the 1962-1963 academic year. The second most frequent advertiser was
Tareyton with a total of 48 advertisements. L&M was the third most frequent advertiser with
46 advertisements printed in The Orange and White (see Figures 140 and 141).
The dominant creative strategy during the early 1960s was a social strategy with 49%
of the cigarette advertisements in The Orange and White using this approach. The second most
popular strategy was the sensory strategy with 42% of the advertisements falling into this
category. The final strategy used, the rational strategy, was used in 9% of advertisements (see
Figures 142 and 143).
During the 1960s, the humor approach was the most popular tactic used by cigarette
advertisers with 47% of advertisements printed in The Orange and White employing this tactic.
This tactic led in popularity with 47% of the advertisements falling into this category. The
second most prevalent approach was the referent tactic with 32% of advertisements falling
into this category. The tactics of entertainment, reward, and information were used between
5% and 10% of appeals falling into this category (see Figures 144 and 145).
Unfiltered Brands Advertised During the 1960s:
Camel:
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At the start of the 1960s, Camel continued to promote its brand as a masculine
cigarette. This approach combined a sensory and social approach. Again, the brand’s
positioning is social. The referent in this particular advertisement is named Don Pinder and
he is a professional skin diver. The use of this athletic man as a referent reinforces the
brand’s masculine image. However, the headline reads, “Have a real cigarette – have a
Camel.” This statement implies that Camel is stronger or better than other brands. Further,
Pinder is pictured enjoying his cigarette. Other advertisements featured athletes,443 sailplane
enthusiasts,444 and a helicopter pilot445 (see Figure 146).
Camel continued its campaign to position its brand as a masculine cigarette. This
series of advertisements is called “Career Clues.” It features high-level executives who give
their advice on how they succeeded in their particular fields while they endorse smoking
Camel cigarettes. Therefore, the primary goal of this campaign is to create a relationship
between smoking cigarettes and career success (see Figure 147). This particular strategy is
primarily social in nature. Featured professionals included bankers, company presidents and
entrepreneurs.
Chesterfield:
During the 1961-1962 academic year, Chesterfield ran a series of advertisements
called Sic Flics. This series used images from silent films dating from 1920s or perhaps
earlier. In this particular example, a young man is seated on a chicken. In the caption below
he asks, “All I have to do is fly to St. Louis and back and then I’m initiated?” Clearly, this
advertisement refers to the initiation process that is a part of Greek life on campus (see
Figure 148).

The Orange and White, September 30, 1960
The Orange and White, January 6, 1961
445 The Orange and White, May 27, 1960
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During the 1962-1963 academic year, Chesterfield changed to a sensory strategy that
positioned the brand as a masculine brand. Instead of promoting the regular Chesterfield
brand, the Chesterfield King brand is advertised. The headline reflects the sensory strategy
by stating, “Tastes Great because the tobaccos are!” In addition, a young man is shown
enjoying a cigarette (see Figure 149).
Lucky Strike:
Instead of continuing to promote its brand using contests, Lucky Strike introduced a
character named Dr. Frood. Dr. Frood was an eccentric character that offered advice and
clever observations to college students. Usually, the advice was intended to be humorous in
nature. For instance, this advertisement threatens students with a life-sized portrait of Dr.
Frood if they do not buy Lucky Strike Cigarettes. Although this advertisement is atypical
because it does not offer advice, its style and humor is representative of the campaign (see
Figure 150).
In 1961, Lucky Strike replaced Dr. Frood with Lucky Puffers. Lucky Puffers is a
comic strip that personifies cigarettes and casts them into various campus roles. This
approach combines a social strategy with humor tactics to entice college students to smoke
their brand. This particular comic strip is entitled “Saturday Night.” The comic features
cigarettes that are dating, walking down fraternity row, and just going outside for a smoke
(see Figure 151).
During the 1962-1963 academic year Lucky Strike changed its campaign strategy to a
social strategy that would position its brand as a male centered product. This strategy is
similar to the social strategies that Camel and Chesterfield were using. In addition, Lucky
Strike works to persuade its smokers to keep smoking Lucky Strike after graduation. The

174

reason for this appeal is that Lucky Strike is primarily a youth or young adult brand. The
headline reads, “Get Lucky – the taste to start with…the taste to stay with” (see Figure 152).
Pall Mall:
Pall Mall resumed advertising in The Orange and White during the 1961-1962 academic
year. Pall Mall began advertising by publishing the “Girl Watchers Guide.” Part of the social
strategy of the “Girl Watchers Guide” involves joining “The American Society of Girl
Watchers,” sponsored by Pall Mall. This advertising serial used a humorous spoof on “girl
watching” to attract new male smokers (see Figure 153).
The following academic year, Pall Mall ran a similar campaign. However, in this case,
the focus was on identifying the various types of girls on campus. As in the previous
campaign, there is an implicit comparison between bird watching and girl watching. In this
particular case, the campus type described is a “White-Coated Lab-Loon.” Men on campus
are advised not to be intimidated by her and are assured that she doesn’t really want to
compete with them. The copy says that she really has marriage on her mind just like other
coeds. Again, the advertisement combines a social strategy with humorous tactics (see Figure
154).
Filtered Brands Advertised During the 1960s:
Tareyton:
During the 1960-1961 academic year, Tareyton used a sensory approach to promote
its brand. The headline reads, “Filters for flavor – finest flavor by far!” The rational approach
that was used the previous year was still present in the 1960-1961 campaign (see Figure 155).
During the 1961-1962 academic year, Tareyton began to use a combination of a
social and a sensory strategy to promote its product. Tareyton used a Roman theme that
seems to tap into the Greek social life on campus. The headline reads, “Tareyton delivers
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the flavor – DVAL FILTER DOES IT!” The text reads, “Veteran coach Romulus (Uncle)
Remus. “We have saying a Coliseum – Tareyton separates the gladiators from the gladioli.”
It’s a real magus smoke” (see Figure 156).
Winston:
During the 1960-1961 academic year Winston advertised using a rational strategy.
The headline reads, “It’s what up front that counts!” In addition to informing the reader
about the Winston filter, the advertisement also uses the dating context to promote its
brand. The advertisement included the Winston slogan, “WINSTON TASTES GOOD like
a cigarette should” (see Figure 157).
L&M:
During the 1961-1962 academic year L&M began to publish quizzes that related to
relationships, careers, politics and dating. In addition to providing the quiz, L&M tells
students how 1383 students at 138 colleges responded to the items. The primary advertising
strategy is social because the advertisement works to show that college students smoke
L&M. The tactics entertain students through the poll (see Figure 158).
The following year L&M and Chesterfield sponsored a sweepstakes called the “L&M
Grand Prix” that was aimed at college students. The sweepstakes promised to award 50
Pontiac Tempests to college students. The campaign uses a rational strategy and reward
tactics to promote the Chesterfield and L&M brands (see Figure 159).
Viceroy:
During the 1961-1962 academic year, Viceroy sponsored a football contest. Every
week, students were to guess the winners of the next series of big football games. The
$100.00 prizewinner from a previous list also had his picture published in the advertisement.
The names of the winners of the $10.00 prizes were also published in the advertisement.
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Therefore, this advertisement uses a social strategy combined with tactics that entertain its
target audience (see Figure 160).
The next year Viceroy changed to a social strategy that also focused on the sensory
aspects of smoking. The image focuses on socializing in the collegiate atmosphere and the
text centers on taste (see Figure 161).
Marlboro:
The Marlboro Man made his first appearance in The Orange and White during the
1962-1963 academic year. The primary strategy in this advertisement is ego related. The
Marlboro Man is an individual that represents an American ideal to which many men aspire,
which makes him a powerful referent figure (see Figure 162).
From 1960-1963 Max Shulman continued to publish his “On Campus” column for
the Phillip Morris Marlboro brand. The Max Shulman column stands in stark contrast when
compared to the advertisements that feature the stoic Marlboro Man. The column continued
to focus on Shulman’s humorous observations of campus life. This particular column is
entitled “Another Year, Another Dollar.” In this column Shulman celebrates his ninth year
writing the “On Campus” column (see Figure 163). The “On Campus” column was the last
series of cigarette advertisements printed in The Orange and White. The final column that
Marlboro sponsored was printed on November 26, 1963. All of the other brands ended their
campaigns in June of 1963. However, the “On Campus” column continued to be published
starting in 1965. However, Burma Shave and Persona Injection Blades served as the
corporate sponsors.
Menthol Brands Advertised From 1960-1963:
Kool discontinued its Kool Krossword and began to advertise using a sensory
strategy. The advertisement asks if the reader is tired of filter cigarettes and other menthol
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cigarettes, if so the reader is urged to “Come up…All The Way Up to the MENTHOL
MAGIC of KOOL!” The primary image in the advertisement is a young man who looks as
if he is college-aged. Therefore, the advertisement combines a sensory strategy with referent
tactics (see Figure 164).
The Salem campaign during the early 1960s continued with the same natural theme
that was used during the late 1950s. The campaign uses a sensory strategy combined with
referent tactics. The primary image in the advertisement shows a couple enjoying some time
in a park. The headline reads, “Salem refreshes your taste – “air-softens” every puff.”
Therefore, the sensation of smoking is compared with the feeling of fresh air (see Figure
165).
Summary:
During the 1960s cigarette advertising continued its dominating presence in The
Orange and White. Advertising for filtered brands was more prevalent than the non-filtered
brands and the filtered brands had larger advertisements than their non-filtered counterparts.
Detailed explanations of the effectiveness of filters virtually disappeared as social and
sensory strategies dominated cigarette advertising. If filters were mentioned in
advertisements, they were promoted based on what they did not do (ie. impede flavor)
instead of their actual perceived function of filtering cigarette smoke.
Conclusion:
The presence of cigarette advertising gradually increased in The Orange and White from
one single brand being advertised in 1921 to ten brands being advertised by 1962.
Throughout the five decades that cigarette advertising had a presence in The Orange and
White, the major three strategies remained the same: social, sensory and rational. During the
1920s, the goal of cigarette advertising was to gain social acceptance for the habit. Thus, a

178

variety of social approaches were used. During the 1930s cigarette smoking was a way to
escape stress and socialize therefore both sensory and social approaches were common.
However, a combination of rational and sensory strategies was used to advertise particular
innovations in product packaging. During the 1940s, the sensory strategy dominated but
many of the tactics centered on patriotism because of the war effort. The creation of filtered
brands revived the rational strategy to promote the effective filtration provided by a
particular brand. But, social strategies were common to demonstrate the popularity of a
particular brand on campus. The sensory and social strategies returned to dominance in the
1960s when advertising regulations began to control health claims and the filter wars began
to subside. Although the dominant strategy changed by decade, the primary three strategies
were present with a good degree of regularity.
Although the dominant strategies fluctuated a bit by decade, the cigarette industry’s
skill in targeting a student audience generally increased. From the 1920s to the early 1960s an
increasing number of advertisements referred to students or the collegiate environment
directly. This precise targeting was complemented by games and contests that attracted
student participation and interaction with the brand. Because of these sophisticated
techniques, cigarette advertising in student newspapers was truly ahead of its time. The
popularity of cigarette smoking on campus from the 1920s to the 1960s is evidence of the
influence that tobacco advertising can have on young adults. The advertisements that were
printed in student newspapers such as The Orange and White were instrumental in persuading
students that smoking was a desirable, sophisticated, and glamorous habit.
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Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion
One of the primary contributions of this cigarette advertising research is that it
provides information about how the tobacco industry targeted young adults in the absence
of significant governmental regulations. Without government intervention, cigarette smoking
became an important element of collegiate culture from the 1920s to the 1960s. Using
advertising in student newspapers as well as other promotional techniques, college students
across the United States were convinced that smoking was a socially desirable habit and that
smoking would help them adapt to collegiate life and to adult life after college.
The purpose of this last chapter is to discuss some of the most frequent advertising
themes that appeared in The Orange and White and how governmental intervention through
the FTC influenced the various advertising approaches that the tobacco industry was using
to attract new cigarette smokers. The themes that are discussed in this chapter were
identified through examining the cigarette advertisements that were published in The Orange
and White from 1921 to 1963. Therefore, the topics generated in this chapter emerged from a
study of the research itself.
Popular Cigarette Advertising Themes in The Orange and White:
From the early 1920s, when cigarette advertisements began appearing in the Orange
and White, to the early 1960s, certain themes were popular in cigarette advertisements. These
advertising themes were inductively grouped into several categories that emerged from the
study of cigarette advertising in The Orange and White. These categories include
“Matchmakers,” marketing cigarettes as a way to make a connection with the opposite sex,
“Career Advisors,” selling cigarettes by associating smoking with career success, “Study
Buddies,” suggesting that smoking enhances scholastic performance “Smoking and Health,”
promoting the health benefits or physiological consequences of smoking a specific brand,
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“Advertorials and Cartoons,” creating a cigarette advertisement that entertained students by
mimicking editorial content, or “Promotional Advertising,” encouraging students to tune
into tobacco sponsored broadcast programming.
Career Advisors:
From the very beginning of cigarette marketing, the tobacco industry positioned
cigarettes as a way to achieve success in life. From the very beginning of the industrialization
of cigarette manufacturing, Duke realized that upward mobility was an important part of the
American psyche. And, he capitalized upon this facet of American culture by associating
cigarettes with sophistication and success.446
Both Chesterfield and Camel often featured professional looking men smoking their
brands during the early 1930s (See Figure 166).447 However, Chesterfield was the first brand
to directly associate smoking with career success in its advertisements in the Orange and White
(see Figure 167). In this first advertisement from 1933, the headline reads, “I’m working and
Smoking overtime – hence a Milder Cigarette.” From the leather bound books in the
background and his professional attire, the man in the image appears to be a young lawyer.
The man provides his endorsement for Chesterfield by stating, “When I work hard, I usually
smoke more; and when I smoke more I usually work harder – and that’s why I want a
cigarette that is milder.” Therefore, the man suggests that smoking Chesterfield is going to
help him in his work by keeping him alert.
During the 1934-1935 academic year, Camel ran advertisements that made the most
direct connection between career success and smoking. The advertisements featured men
and women from a variety of career and social backgrounds giving their endorsement for
Camel. In addition to featuring men in various careers, the advertisement also features
446
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women in a variety of nontraditional career paths such as being a “Horsewoman” or a “Girl
Explorer.” Careers mentioned in the advertisement include: engineer, transport pilot,
reporter, transpacific flyer, explorer, cameraman, and rancher. Although the individuals are
involved in a variety of different vocations, they all attest to the fact that they “get a Lift with
a Camel” (see Figure 168).
Because of World War Two, the use of the career advisor approach continued to be
popular. During the war, Chesterfield gave a tribute to the workers of America and their
contribution to the war effort in its campaign in The Orange and White (see Figure 169). For
instance the text in one such advertisement reads,
ALL OVER THE WORLD – America’s 900,000 aviation workers combine
their skill and experience to satisfy today’s demand for war necessities.
Thanks to our airplane makers, ground crews and pilots like Capt. Haakon
Gulbranson (shown here), of Pan American airways, needed supplies are
flown to our fighting men all over the world.
On the other hand, if joining the military is considered a vocation, cigarette marketers have
advice to give their audience relating to getting ahead in the armed forces. For instance, the
advertisements give slang terms used in the various branches of the military and the
testimonial from a serviceman (see Figure 170).
During the early 1950s, the popularity of the career advisor approach waned in favor
of other creative appeals. However, from the mid and late 1950s to the early 1960s the
Career Advisor approach returned. The reason for the return of this approach is likely the
fierce competition of filter wars. The brands that used this approach were the older nonfilter brands, Camel and Chesterfield. In addition to using business tycoons, Camel also
connected its brand to stardom. In its 1953-1954 campaign, Camel provided stories of “How
the Stars got started.” In this series of advertisements, Hollywood stars would provide their
endorsement of the brand as well of the story of how they broke into the movie business.
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This approach encourages the reader to connect the brand with becoming famous (see
Figure 171). In the 1956-1957 Camel campaign, the headline read, “HAVE A REAL
CIGARETTE…have a Camel!” In a 1956 advertisement Murray Golub, a civil engineer on
the Conn. Turnpike says, “I want a real cigarette – one I can taste. That’s why I’m a Camel
smoker and have been ever since college” (see Figure 172). Chesterfield had a similar
campaign, however, instead of featuring a testimonial the advertisement gave the forecast for
particular lucrative careers. For example, the text for an advertisement featuring a nuclear
physicist reads, “Experts predict atomic plants will produce 38% of electrical energy required
in the U.S. in 1980. Wanted: more physicists for research and development” (see Figure
173).
It seems that the “Career Advisor” theme was a powerful persuasive approach for
cigarette marketers wanting to target a college audience. Most students attending college are
interested in learning skills that can be applied to a future career. This approach seemed to
be targeting college-aged men as it featured males almost exclusively. In addition, during the
late 1950s and 1960s the advertisements were for non-filtered brands that positioned them
as the more masculine cigarettes. The “Career Advisor” theme seems to combine a social
strategy with a referent tactics. The advertisements present cigarette smoking as a way to
break in to the career world that students are aspiring to join and the advertisements also
present individuals that students hope to emulate when they graduate.
Matchmakers:
Dating and relationships with the opposite sex is one of the most popular appeals in
cigarette advertisements in The Orange and White. Because there was some question about the
social acceptability of women smoking before 1930, most of the advertisements that used a
dating context focused on women approving of their husband or boyfriend’s smoking habit.
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However, once smoking became acceptable for both sexes, advertisements promoted
cigarette smoking as a way to connect with the opposite sex.
Advertisements began featuring cigarette smoking as a way to break-the-ice with a
member of the opposite sex in the early 1930s. Although it might have been suggested that
men and women might smoke together in the 1920s, advertisements first began to feature
couples smoking during the 1930-1931 academic year. In a Chesterfield advertisement that
ran in 1932, the headline reads, “They Click with Me, too – .” The image shows a couple
sharing a pack of cigarettes. The text follows,
THE young man is saying the reason he smokes Chesterfields is because they
satisfy. The young lady agrees with him. She says, “They click with me, too.
I’m not what you would call a heavy smoker. But even I can tell that they are
milder…”
The advertisement seems to reflect the sentiment of the time. It was socially acceptable for
women to smoke. But, women were not to be heavy smokers (see Figure 174). During
1935, Lucky Strike ran a similar campaign. The headline reads, “‘Remember how I brought
you two together.’ I’m your best friend. I am your Lucky Strike.” The image features a
couple sharing a pack of Luckies (see Figure 175).
The matchmaker approach virtually disappeared during the 1940s. However, it
reappeared in The Orange and White in 1954 during the filter wars. It seems that the filter wars
were an impetus for cigarette brands to either develop new strategies or return to previous
strategies that had been successful in the past. Winston, a filtered cigarette, was the first
brand to resume this strategy. In an advertisement that ran in 1955, the headline reads,
“YOU’LL BOTH GO FOR THIS CIGARETTE! Get together on Winston” (see Figure
176). The image features a young man and woman smoking together. Like Winston,
Tareyton also used a matchmaking approach and featured a young man and woman smoking
together (see Figure 177).
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The matchmaking approach was also popular among the non-filtered brands. For
instance, Camel also advertised using a dating theme. The text reads, “When classes are
through, And your girl’s next to you, Here’s a good thing to do – have a CAMEL!” (see
Figure 178). In 1955, Chesterfield also ran advertisements that used a dating theme (see
Figure 179).
Using the matchmaker approach to advertising demonstrated how smoking could
serve a social need. Many young people are interested in dating and meeting people of the
opposite sex. Cigarette manufacturers demonstrated how their product could help facilitate
conversation with new people. The matchmaker theme definitely employs a social strategy
and positions cigarettes as a way to relieve the anxiety associated with communicating with
members of the opposite sex. In addition, the advertisements use a referent tactic by
showing couples that students either relate to or aspire to emulate.
Campus Cigarette:
Many cigarette brands worked to position themselves as the most popular brand
among college students. These advertisements targeted college students very directly by
mentioning their particular school or other colleges and universities by name.
In the 1920s, Old Gold was the first cigarette brand to directly target college
students. The campaign headline reads, “AT LEADING COLLEGES…This is an Old Gold
year” (See Figure 180). Old Gold published statements from local tobacconists that were
popular with the University of Tennessee students in their advertisements. For instance,
Gray Piper Drug Co., located at 1506 West Cumberland, Knoxville, TN said,
“The growth of OLD GOLD Cigarettes’ popularity here has been amazing to me,
but what interests me most is the way students stick to the brand after they start
smoking it. OLD GOLD smokers don’t switch.”448
448

Orange and White, April 12, 1928`
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Another leading tobacconist that served University of Tennessee students, J. Blaufeld & Son,
516 Gay Street, Knoxville, TN said,
“OLD GOLD is easily the fastest-growing cigarette in this locality, and I shouldn’t
be surprised before long to find it the most popular cigarette on the campus. The
boys sure do like its smoothness.”449
However, use of the collegiate theme lost popularity after 1928 and did not reappear
in The Orange and White until the 1950s when it was one of the most popular advertising
approaches. Lucky Strike used the collegiate approach consistently from 1950-1962. Lucky
Strike regularly mentioned specific colleges and universities by named and claimed to be the
most popular cigarette among students. Lucky Strike based its claim on the fact that it
surveyed over 30,000 college students (See Figure 181). Chesterfield also claimed to be the
most popular cigarette at a variety of college campuses that included Rice,450
Northwestern,451 Princeton,452 Cornell,453 University of Virginia,454 and M.I.T.455 The
advertisement asked local tobacconists to certify that Chesterfield was the most popular
brand (See Figure 182).
In addition to making claims about being the most popular cigarette on campus,
various cigarette brands sponsored contests to recruit college smokers. Lucky Strike
sponsored campus contests that included jingles, word puzzles, called “Sticklers,” and
picture puzzles, called “Droodles.” In addition to winning a $25.00 prize, both students and
their universities would be mentioned in Lucky Strike advertisements (see Figure 183).
L&M, Oasis, and Chesterfield, the Liggett and Meyers cigarette brands, sponsored a contest
between Tennessee and Kentucky football fans to see which school could collect more
Orange and White, April 5, 1928`
The Orange and White, November 7, 1951
451 The Orange and White, October 3, 1951
452 The Orange and White, October 24, 1951
453 The Orange and White, October 31, 1951
454 The Orange and White, October 17, 1951
455 The Orange and White, November 28, 1951
449
450
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cigarette packs (see Figure 184). Viceroy also sponsored a contest that centered on school
spirit and college football. In the fall of 1961, Viceroy sponsored a contest where students
were challenged to select the winning teams and scores for select football games. The winner
would win a cash prize and would have his or her picture featured in a Viceroy
advertisement (see Figure 185).
Associating particular cigarette brands with school spirit on campus was a popular
advertising theme during the 1950s and early 1960s. Sponsoring a contest or mentioning
specific colleges and university by name was a way to get students interested in smoking. In
addition, promoting brands based on their popularity on certain college and university
campuses reinforced the idea that cigarette smoking is a desirable habit among students. Like
the “Career Advisor” theme, these advertisements combine a social strategy with a referent
appeal. However, these advertisements focus more intently on the present. Instead of
considering the careers students want to pursue in the future and the social circles that they
hope to join, the advertisements focus on fitting in with their peers and being a socially
desirable member of the campus community.
Study Buddies:
Because college campuses are academic institutions, the primary target audience for
cigarette advertisers was the student population. Students, by their very nature, are
concerned about their academic performance on exams and written assignments. A good
way to appeal to the student population is to make the claim that cigarette smoking enhances
academic performance. The primary ways that cigarette advertisements claimed to enhance
academic performance was by heightening mental acuity and alertness. R.J. Reynolds Camel
brand used this particular tactic regularly from the 1934-1935 to the 1937-1938 academic
year. The advertisements featured male students’ testimonials. The common headline for the
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campaign reads, “GET A LIFT WITH A CAMEL!” Charles Stephens, a pre-medical student
provides his endorsement for Camel cigarettes (see Figure 186). His testimonial reads,
“I’ve followed the recent scientific investigations that confirm Camel’s
‘energizing effect.’ But I already knew from my own personal experience that
Camels lift up my energy and enable me to tackle my next assignment with
renewed vigor. It has definitely been established that Camels are a milder
cigarette.”
In addition to offering his endorsement as a fellow student, Stephens provides scientific
information that relates to the benefits of smoking. In another advertisement published in
the Orange and White on March 29, 1935, Lawrence Alfred Brewer offers his endorsement.
His testimonial reads,
“I’M SPECIALIZING IN HISTORY – French and English history,” says
Lawrence Brewer. “In addition, I have a job in the library for four hours a
day, and I also work up data and material for the debating team. I’ll tell you –
it keeps me going hard. I’ve got more work than time. When I am hard
pressed, smoking Camels is not only a pleasure – it’s a help too. For when I
feel ‘fed up’ – and it seems as though my energy were all used up – I smoke a
Camel and get a lift in energy. Camels have a swell, rich flavor: due, I
presume, to the use of choicer tobaccos. I smoke as many as I want to – for
Camels don’t ruffle my nerves.”
Students continued to offer their testimonials during 1937. However, as time passed the
students provided more ambiguous endorsement that offered less information about them
as individuals. Arthur H. Waldo Jr.’s testimonial reads,
“I GET MORE ENJOYMENT FROM CAMELS” says Arthur H. Waldo
Jr. College Class of ’38. “I’ve found that Camels help offer the strain of long
hours of study. Working out a tough assignment often can make me feel
tense inside. So at mealtime, you’ll see me enjoying my Camels.” Yes, Camels
speed up digestive fluids – increase alkalinity.456
The Study Buddy approach to advertising cigarettes was particularly popular with
Camel cigarettes during the 1930s. However, this creative theme disappeared after the 1930s.
The “Study Buddy” theme used a rational strategy by persuading students that smoking
456

Orange and White, February 18, 1937
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tobacco would enhance academic performance. This rational strategy was combined with
referent tactics. The advertisements showed successful students attributing their academic
achievements to smoking cigarettes.
Smoking and Health:
Although the smoking and health controversy did not become a public concern until
the 1950s, many cigarette advertisements mentioned health related topics in their
advertisements before the dangers of smoking became well known. Before the 1950s,
cigarette advertisements claimed that certain brands did not cause throat irritation or
coughing, aided digestion, calmed smokers’ nerves, and did not influence athletic
performance. Once health and smoking issues began to cause concerns about smoking,
health claims centered on filters and the quality of particular brands of cigarettes.
During the 1920s, Old Gold was the only cigarette advertiser to make health related
claims in the Orange and White. In its campaigns that ran from 1926-1929, Old Gold used its
famous slogan “…not a cough in the carload.” In addition, many of its advertisements
mentioned coughing and throat irritation and prescribed Old Gold as a solution to these
undesirable consequences of smoking. In many of the advertisements, someone has
consistent problems with coughing and their cough disrupts a particular situation, such as a
photo shoot. A friend or relative suggests Old Golds as a coughing remedy (see Figure 187).
During the 1931-1932 academic year, Lucky Strike began to make health related
claims regarding cigarette smoking. The first health related campaign that Lucky Strike ran in
the Orange and White asked the question, “DO YOU INHALE?” The text reassured the
reader by stating, “More than 20,000 physicians, after Luckies had been furnished them for
tests, basing their opinion on their smoking experience, stated that Luckies are less irritating
to the throat than other cigarettes” (See Figure 188). Towards the end of the decade, Lucky
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Strike used celebrities to attest to the healthfulness of their cigarette. In a 1937 advertisement
actor Cary Grant says, “a light smoke rates aces high with my throat.” The advertisement
continues by stating, “A Light Smoke ‘It’s Toasted’ – Your Throat Protection AGAINST
IRRITATION – AGAINST COUGH” (See Figure 189).
Like Lucky Strike, Camel also created advertisements that mentioned the
physiological effects of smoking. However, instead of mentioning the side effects that
smoking Camels does not cause, the brand focused on the positive effects of smoking. For
example, Camel used athletes, such as professional golfers Desmore Sute, Tommy Armour,
and Gene Sarazen, as well as students to attest that smoking soothed their nerves (see Figure
190). Likewise, Camel used the testimonials from athletes such as New York Giants pitcher
Carl Hubbell and tennis champion George M. Lott Jr. to attest that smoking does not
impede athletic performance because “THEY DON’T GET YOUR WIND” (see Figure
191). In addition to not impeding athletic performance, Camel used the testimonials of
students and professionals to claim that smoking was beneficial to digestion (see Figure 192).
During the 1940s, most advertisements connected cigarette smoking with patriotism.
However, Camel continued to mention the physiological benefits of smoking Camel. In
addition to mention the health benefits of the brand, Camel also advertised the fact that it
contained 28% less nicotine than other leading brands. However, the advertisements failed
to mention why a lower nicotine content is beneficial for smokers. To further Camel’s health
claims, it used athletes such as Ralph Flanagan to promote the brand (see Figure 193). Camel
also claimed that smoking Camel did not affect the “T-Zone.” The “T-Zone” was
comprised of the smoker’s nose, mouth, and throat. Camel encouraged smokers to give its
brand a 30-day test to prove the brand’s mildness (see Figure 194). Towards the end of the
decade, Old Gold also made some claims that related to the healthfulness of smoking. This
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simple advertisement emphasizes the fact that the makers of Old Gold are tobacco men and
that the only thing that they attest about their product is that it is made for enjoyment. This
advertisement also seems to be an effort on the part of Lorillard Tobacco Company to
dismiss health concerns about smoking. Although this advertisement does not directly
address health issues, it suggests that health related concerns are not important. Instead, the
tobacco’s quality and enjoyment should be the smoker’s concern (see Figure 195).
During the early to mid-1950s, health claims regarding cigarette smoking increased in
advertisements in The Orange and White. This increase was due to published reports that
linked smoking to health problems and the introduction of filtered brands to help eliminate
public fears about smoking. However, FTC regulations limited any health related claims and
the mention of a particular filter effectiveness, tar content or nicotine content after the mid1950s. Therefore, Health related claims disappeared from The Orange and White after 1958.
Both filtered and non-filtered brands made health claims during the 1950s. Nonfiltered brands such as Camel and Chesterfield promoted the healthfulness of their produced
based on the quality of their product. However, some unfiltered brands such as Lucky Strike,
Old Gold, and Pall Mall avoided health related advertising during the 1950s. Filtered brands
such as Tareyton, L&M, Viceroy, and Winston made claims about the effectiveness of their
filters. Like the 1940s, Camel continued to advertise that its cigarettes had no effect on the
smoker’s “T-Zone” and that smokers should give Camel a 30-day test for “mildness.” Like
Camel, Chesterfield claims that the nose, throat and sinuses are not effected by smoking
their brand. In addition, Chesterfield claims that its high quality cigarettes have low nicotine
content. (See Figures 196 & 197). On the other hand, filtered brands such as Viceroy and
L&M centered on the quality and effectiveness of the filter. For instance, L&M refers to its
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filter as a miracle tip and Viceroy states that its filter is made from the same pure and natural
materials found in fruit (See Figures 198 & 199).
Whether promoting the physiological benefits of smoking or reassuring smokers
about the healthfulness of smoking, the relationship between smoking and health was a
frequent topic in cigarette advertising in The Orange and White. Referring to the physiological
or health related aspects of cigarette is a rational approach to advertising. This rational
strategy uses product information as a means of persuading students that smoking is
healthful or has desirable physiological results.
Advertorials/Cartoons:
In order to entice their audience to read their advertisements, cigarettes brands
mimicked editorial formats. Cigarette advertisements used comic strips, advice columns, and
celebrity columnists to attract readers. This advertorial approach was almost always
combined with humor. However, on a few occasions it was combined with novel or
surprising information. These advertorials usually appeared in serials that ran for more than
one academic year. The Max Shulman column, sponsored by Phillip Morris and Marlboro,
was the longest running advertorial in The Orange and White. Phillip Morris Co. sponsored the
column from 1953-1963. After 1963, when cigarette advertising was removed, Burma Shave
and other non-tobacco sponsors continued the column.
The comic strip was the first advertorial format used by tobacco advertisers in The
Orange and White. The first comic strip printed in the Orange and White was printed on
October 1, 1927. The sponsor was Old Gold. The comic strip was, “Somebody Is Always
Taking The Joy Out of Life,” by a cartoonist named Briggs (See Figure 200). The comic strip
ran during the 1927-1928 and 1928-1929 academic years. However, the title and format of
the cartoon frequently changed. During the 1929-1930 academic year, Old Gold used John
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Held Jr. to create a comic in linoleum cuts that mimicked his famous “Gay Nineties” feature
that poked gentle fun at the previous generation. Old Gold’s use of Held’s creative abilities
helped the brand resonate with the college student audience during the 1920s. (see Figure
201). Old Gold discontinued the comic approach until 1934-1935 academic year when it
began the “AT TRYING TIMES…TRY A Smooth OLD GOLD” comic campaign. This
serial cartoon positioned smoking Old Golds as a “smooth” way to get out of awkward
situations such as being “Pawed by a Pudgy Wudgy” or “Dished by a Dilemma.” In addition
to providing a social use for smoking, the cartoons were intended to be humorous (see
Figures 202 & 203).
Camel began to use a comic strip during the 1932-1933 academic year in its “It’s Fun
to be Fooled…” series. In this series Camel revealed the secrets behind popular magic tricks.
The point of the cartoon was to point out that its fun to be fooled during a magic show but
not when choosing a cigarette (see Figure 204). Although it was popular during the 1930s,
the comic approach did not return to The Orange and White until the 1950s when Camel
introduced the “Campus Interviews on Cigarettes Tests.” This campaign featured a series of
cartoons that personified animals describing their individual smoking habits (see Figure 205).
The serial comic ran during the 1950-1951 and 1951-1952 academic years. The following
academic year Camel advertised with the “…But only Time will Tell” comic. The point of
the cartoon was to try to persuade students that, like everything else, you can only tell if you
like smoking after you have given the habit a chance (see Figure 206). For instance the text
of one advertisement reads,
ONLY TIME WILL TELL how great a student really is! And only time will
tell about a cigarette. Take your time…make the sensible 30-day Camel
mildness test. See how Camels suit you as your steady smoke.
Camel resumed the serial comic approach during the 1958-1959 academic year. This serial
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cartoon used the slogan, “Have a real cigarette – have a CAMEL.” This series of cartoons
focused on the importance of having a real cigarette. And, Camel is, of course, a real
cigarette (see Figure 207). The text adjacent a cartoon reads,
More buxom blondes with shipwrecked sailors insist on Camels than any
other cigarette today. It stands to reason. The best tobacco makes the best
smoke. The Camel blend of costly tobaccos has never been equaled for rich
flavor and easygoing mildness. No wonder Camel is the No. 1 cigarette of all.
Although Camel used the cartoon approach more than any other brand, Winston,
Pall Mall, and Lucky Strike also used comics to advertise their brands. During the 1958-1959
academic year, Winston used cartoons to create a comic satire of popular literary works such
as Arthurian legends and Moby Dick. In each comic, Winston cigarettes allow the hero to
save the day (see Figure 208). Each cartoon ends with the familiar slogan, “Winston tastes
good! Like a Cigarette Should!” Pall Mall also ran a cartoon series called “The Girl Watchers
Guide.” This comic was a satirical guide for young men looking for a mate. The cartoon
series ran during the 1961-1962 and 1962-1963 academic years (see Figure 209). Lucky
Strike’s “Lucky Puffers” comic ran during the 1961-1962 academic year. This humorous
column personified cigarettes and satirized campus life (see Figure 210).
Although cartoons and comics are a popular way to mimic editorial, The Orange and
White also contained other forms of advertorials. For example, the popular Max Shulman
comic, “On Campus” was a column where the humorist provided humorous stories and
observations relating to college and university life. Although the column often was illustrated
with a cartoon, the image was a subordinate feature of the advertorial (see Figure 211). In
addition, Kool’s advertising campaign during the 1959-1960 academic year used a crossword
puzzle format. The “Kool Krosswords” used a popular word game to mimic editorial
content (See Figure 212).
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From the 1920s to the 1960s, advertorials were popular in a variety of forms. Using
the same format as editorial was a popular way for cigarette advertisers to get students
interested in their advertising and entice them to try their product. Advertorials can include
a variety of promotional tactics. Most of the cartoons and advertorials use humor to sell
their brand. Other cartoons present product information or other novel kinds of facts to
advertise the product.
Promotional Advertising:
In addition to purchasing advertising space, cigarette manufacturers also sponsored
radio and television programming. Many cigarette advertisers used their advertising space to
promote their product and their programs. Oftentimes, sponsoring programs also involved
promoting the stars of these broadcasts.
The first advertisements that promoted cigarette-sponsored radio programming
appeared in the Orange and White in 1929. The “Paul Whiteman Radio Hour” was promoted
in a February 28, 1929 advertisement for Old Gold. The text reads,
On your radio…OLD GOLD PAUL WHITEMAN HOUR…Paul
Whiteman, King of Jazz, and his complete orchestra, broadcasts the Old
Gold Hour every Tuesday from 9 to 10 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, over
the Network of Columbia Broadcast System.
Although the advertisement promotes the broadcast, it is subordinate to the image, the
headlines, and main body text. The promotions were printed in Old Gold’s advertisements
from February to October of 1929. Like Old Gold, Lucky Strike included a promotion for
“The Lucky Strike Dance Orchestra” in its 1931-1932 advertising campaign. Again, the
promotional text was subordinate to all of the other text and images in the advertisements.
Chesterfield gave one of its first promotional plugs for its radio shows in a February 19,
1932 advertisement. The promotional text reads,
CHESTERFIELD’S RADIO PROGRAM – Nat Shilkret’s Orchestra and
195

Alex Gray, well-known soloist, will entertain you over the Columbia Coastto-Coast Network, every night, except Sunday, at 10:30 E.S.T.
Like the promotional spots in the other advertisements, the text relating to the radio
programming is the smallest in the advertisement and has nothing to do with the rest of the
cigarette advertisement (See Figure 213).
However, by the end of 1932, Chesterfield was frequently using its entire advertising
space in the Orange and White to promote its radio programs, such as an advertisement
featuring the Boswell sisters. In fact, this advertisement was more focused on the sponsored
broadcast than Chesterfield cigarettes (see Figure 214). Chesterfield continued to run
advertisements that focused almost exclusively on its programming for the remainder of the
1931-1932 academic year. However, the following academic year, Chesterfield ran only one
promotional advertisement for Arthur Tracy in the Orange and White. The rest of the
advertisements only mentioned Chesterfield’s programming in subtext. On May 7, 1937,
Chesterfield printed a promotional advertisement that invited readers to dance and sing with
featured artists Hal Kemp and Kay Thompson on their program at 6:30 on Fridays on C.B.S.
(See Figure 215). Chesterfield’s final promotional advertisement before the outbreak of the
Second World War featured Glenn Miller. The advertisement was printed for the January 10,
1940 issue of The Orange and White.
On April 4, 1933, Camel ran the first promotional advertisement for its “All-Star
Camel Caravan.” The full-page advertisement focused more on the programming schedule
and the stars, such as singers Annette Hanshaw and Walter O’Keefe, than Camel cigarettes.
However, Camel did not run another promotional advertisement for the Camel Caravan in
the Orange and White until October 25, 1935. Again the advertisement focused more on the
programming schedule and the performers, such as Walter O’Keefe, Deane Janis, Ted
Husing and Glen Gray, than the Camel brand itself (See Figure 216). In 1937, Camel
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introduced “Jack Oakie’s College.” The Camel sponsored radio program aired every
Tuesday night and promoted the program several times in the Orange and White. The comic
variety show presented college life as Jack Oakie thought it should be. Jack Oakie was an
actor and comedian who was dubbed "The World's Oldest Freshman" because he was rather
old for the collegiate roles he was frequently asked to play, including roles in College Humor
(1933), College Rhythm (1934) and Collegiate (1935). In the movie Rise and Shine (1941), the 38year-old was asked to play an 18-year-old senior.457 “Jack Oakie’s College” also featured
performances from Benny Goodman’s Swing Band and George Stoll’s Orchestra (see Figure
217). Promoting Camel cigarettes among college students was an integral part of the
program. The following is a vignette from the May 11, 1937 broadcast of “Jack Oakie’s
College:”
GOODWIN:
Now back to the present, ladies and gentlemen. . .
Here's a scene at the Victor Hugo Restaurant, Beverly Hills. One of the most
famous restaurants in the world. A charming young couple has just sat down at a
table in the Palm Garden.
(FADE IN MUSIC)
MAN:
Well, Janet, we've certainly seen a lot today -- Malibu Beach this morning - lunch
at the Brown Derby, watching a picture being shot in the afternoon - and . . .
GIRL:
And now - dinner at one of the finest restaurants in the world!
MAN:
Yes. Well, to be practical, here's the menu! What appeals to you?
GIRL:
U-m-m, let's see. Oh -- this sounds good. Jumbo squab with broccoli and
candied
sweet potatoes.
MAN:
That's quite an order after, an exciting day!
GIRL:
Don't worry, I'll enjoy every bit of it! Oh! Have we plenty of CAMELS?
MAN:
Of course. For "digestion's sake"!
GIRL:
“Biography for Jack Oakie” IMDB http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0642988/bio [Retrieved June 15,
2007]
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You're right! It's grand to enjoy CAMELS. They give you such a delightful sense of
well-being!
GOODWIN:
And, it's not surprising that CAMELS -- the cigarette that's made from costlier
tobaccos -- appear on so many tables in the Victor Hugo. Here's what Hugo himself
says: QUOTE. Our patrons know fine tobacco as well as fine food. CAMEL
Cigarettes are the overwhelming favorite here. END QUOTE. "For digestion's sake
- smoke CAMELS" is a good idea to remember during and after every meal.458
In addition to featuring a number of vignettes and sketches, this particular program featured
actress and singer Judy Garland and Musician Benny Goodman.
Camel also promoted Benny Goodman’s Great Swing Band’s performance on the
“Camel Caravan” in the Orange and White on April 15, 1938. Camel printed another
promotional advertisement for Benny Goodman’s Tuesday night program on January 27,
1939. The program gained popularity when it capitalized on young people’s cravings for
Swing music. The swing music craze spanned from the mid-1930s to 1950. In addition to
Goodman’s Tuesday nigh performances, the advertisement introduced Eddie Cantor’s
Monday evening comedy act. However, in 1940 all promotional advertisements in The Orange
and White stopped because of the war. However, the radio program was broadcast on N.B.C.
radio for over 20 years, spanning from 1933-1954.
In 1947, cigarette-sponsored promotional advertising resumed in The Orange and
White. Phillip Morris along with its famous bellhop promoted “Phillip Morris Night with
Horace Height.” The N.B.C. radio program was promoted as “The Newest Most Thrilling
Hunt in America Including Top Stars from the Colleges” (See Figure 218). Several
advertisements for “Phillip Morris Night with Horace Height” were printed in The Orange and
White during the 1947-1948 academic year. Chesterfield began promoting the “Chesterfield
Supper Club” in The Orange and White on November 19, 1948. The N.B.C. radio program

Generic Radio Workshop Script Library “Jack Oakie College” (May 11, 1937)
http://www.genericradio.com/show.php?id=3c7493ff798a97ae [Retrieved June 15, 2007]
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featured musicians Perry Como, Jo Stafford, and Peggy Lee (see Figure 219).
In 1950, the promotional advertising for cigarette-sponsored radio programming
came to an end. However, in 1952, Phillip Morris began running promotional
advertisements for its new television program “I Love Lucy” (see Figure 220). This series of
advertisements comprised the last promotions for cigarette-sponsored programming in The
Orange and White.
Although cigarette advertisements promoting broadcast programming were far from
the most frequent advertisements in The Orange and White, it is important to mention them
because they demonstrate how various cigarette brands used an integrated marketing strategy
to promote cigarette smoking among college and university students. Many of these
programs use a social strategy by demonstrating the popularity of the brand among students.
Some combine a social strategy with celebrity tactics by associating their product with
celebrities. These advertisements are unique demonstrate how broadcast and print media
worked together to target students. The strategies and tactics that are used in the print
advertisements seem to be consistent across media.
The Use of Endorsements:
A common theme that runs through nearly all advertising approaches is the use of
endorsement. To sell cigarette smoking to the collegiate audience, advertisements used a
variety of testimonials. Cigarette brands used the “Career Advisor” theme, that included the
testimonials of celebrities and successful businessmen, to try to persuade students that
smoking would help them reach their career goals. Advertisements also used student
endorsements in college cigarette and study buddy approach to convince their audience that
smoking was a popular habit among their peers. Cigarette manufacturers also used the
endorsements of celebrities, athletes, and peers to help persuade students about the
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healthfulness of their product. The promotional programming also implicitly or directly
provided the endorsement of the musicians and actors who participated in the broadcasts. In
addition to actual people, cartoons or comic characters also provided their testimonials
about the product.
The use of endorsement was a powerful persuasive tool for cigarette advertisers
because it works to help persuade the young audience that smoking is popular among their
peer group and the social groups that they aspire to join. Therefore the advertisements
communicate that cigarette smoking is both a socially acceptable and desirable habit.
Cigarette smoking is also positioned as a way to create and manage social relationships. For
instance, offering a stranger a cigarette is shown as a way to start social or dating
relationships. It is also depicted as a way to manage uncomfortable or stressful social
situations. Therefore, cigarette smoking is marketed as a tool for young people who need to
learn how to navigate to social system of the adult world that they need to join. In this way,
cigarettes, an unnecessary product, is given a useful and desirable role in American collegiate
culture.
The Influence of Legislation on Advertising Appeals:
Cigarette advertising was very effective at persuading young adults and teenagers that
cigarette smoking was essential right of passage for joining adult society. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recognized that the tobacco industry was engaging in some unethical
practices to entice the college audience. Therefore, the FTC worked to limit the tools that
the advertising industry could use before persuading the industry to completely remove the
advertisements from student oriented publications. One of the most intriguing aspects of
studying cigarette advertising in student newspapers is that the advertisements were virtually
unregulated until the early 1950s. And, the regulations of the 1950s were minimal.
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In January 1930, the FTC passed some of its very first cigarette advertising
regulations. These regulations related to testimonials that Lucky Strike created that were
from celebrities that did not smoke. The FTC ruled that the American Tobacco Co. had to
stop creating advertising that included the testimonies of endorsers that never used their
product. Further, the American Tobacco Co. needed to identify paid testimonials.459
The first celebrity testimonials used in Lucky Strikes included a disclaimer that stated
that the endorsement was made without monetary compensation. For instance, an
advertisement featuring Jean Harlow that ran in the Orange and White on October 29, 1931
included the following statement.
Is Miss Harlow’s Statement Paid For? You may be interested in knowing
that not one cent was paid to Miss Harlow to make the above statement.
Miss Harlow has been a smoker of LUCKY STRIKE cigarettes for 2 years.
We hope that the publicity herewith given will be as beneficial to her and to
Fox and Columbia, her producers, as her endorsement of LUCKIES is to
you and to us.
In addition to including Jean Harlow’s endorsement, the advertisement also mentions her
current films (see Figure 221). This same advertising approach was also used in
advertisements that featured aviatrix and actress Sally Eilers,460 actress Dorothy Mackaill,461
actor Robert Montgomery,462 actor Douglas Fairbanks,463 actress Sue Carol,464 and actress
Mary Ceston.465 Although the advertisements mentioned that the celebrity spokespeople
were not compensated, both the actors and their films received publicity in the
advertisements. In fact, it seemed that Lucky Strike was able to capitalize on the FTC’s
restriction. Actors seemed more credible when the audience was informed that they were not
Stephen Fox The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertisers & Its Creators. (Chicago, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1997) p.116.
460 Orange and White, November 6, 1931
461 Orange and White, October 22, 1931 and February 5, 1932
462 Orange and White, January 15, 1932
463 Orange and White, February 12, 1932
464 Orange and White, February 26, 1932
465 Orange and White, March 4, 1932
459
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being paid for the testimonial. In spite of Lucky Strike’s skillful management of the situation,
celebrity endorsements lost popularity by the mid-1930s. However, in 1937, Lucky Strike
began advertising again using celebrity testimonials. However, the testimonials were printed
without any mention of whether the celebrities were compensated (see Figure 222).
In proceedings culminating in 1950 with cease and desist orders against every major
tobacco company, the FTC found virtually all cigarette advertisements had been false,
misleading, and deceptive.466 For instance, in the proceedings against R.J. Reynolds, like the
previous case against Lucky Strike and American Tobacco Company, the FTC found that
many of the celebrity endorsements for the Camel brand were deceptive because either the
celebrities did not smoke or they did not smoke Camels exclusively.467 The Chesterfield
“Nose, Throat, and Accessory Organs Not Adversely Affected by Smoking Chesterfields”
campaign was also the subject of an FTC investigation that resulted in a cease and desist
order entered against Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company.468
In 1951, the FTC ordered the American Tobacco Company’s Lucky Strike brand to
abandon any claims regarding the acid levels of its cigarettes, throat irritation, and nicotine
levels. Likewise, R.J. Reynold’s Camel cigarettes received a mandate that it had to stop
advertising that smoking Camel brand aids digestion, calms the nerves, increases energy
levels, doesn’t impede athletes “wind,” and that it contains less nicotine than other brands.469
Likewise, the FTC prohibited Phillip Morris from stating that its brand was less irritating

Abrams, T.; Crist, P.; Kaczynski, S.; Marple, W. "Confidential Report Containing Legal Advice and Attorney
Opinion Work Product Regarding Numerous Smoking and Health Issues Relevant to Litigation, Prepared by
Outside Counsel for RJR, with Whom B&W Maintains A Common Legal Interest, and Forwarded to B&W inHouse Counsel". No date. Bates: 681879254-681879715.
p.271. http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/681879254-9715.html (Retrieved 28 July 2006).
467 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 46 F.T.C. 706 (1950). modified, 192 F. 2d 535 (7th Cir. 1951), order modified, 48
F.T.C. 682 (1952).
468 55 F.T.C. 354 (1958) (Bruff Depo. Exh. 7)
469F.T.C. “Modified Order to Cease and Desist” (January 17, 1952) Bates Number: 980300590/059
<http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ogo15f00>
466
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than other brands of cigarettes.470
These regulations initiated a major shift in creative strategy. Before the 1950s, many
of Camel’s advertisements focused on the physiological effects of smoking. For instance, the
brand gave you energy and calmed your nerves but it did not impede your ability to perform
in athletic events or affect the “T-Zone.” Therefore, many Camel advertisements in The
Orange and White encouraged students to consider the effects that smoking might have on
their bodies. However, after 1950, Camel changed tactics and began advertising using stories
of how celebrities and tycoons became successful or light-hearted cartoons to promote its
brand. Likewise, during the late 1940s and early 1950s Chesterfield ran numerous
advertisements to counteract health concerns. After the FTC regulations, the advertisements
in The Orange and White Chesterfield changed its approach and advertised to students by
suggesting that it was the most popular cigarette on college campuses, that it was a popular
cigarette among members of the opposite sex, and by suggesting that people who were
successful in their careers smoked the brand. Health concerns were completely ignored in
advertising for non-filtered cigarette brands.
Another set of FTC guidelines were created in 1954. The purpose of these 1954
“cigarette advertising guides” was to close the gaps in its brand specific decrees. The guides
specifically prohibited all references to “throat, larynx, lungs, nose or other parts of the
body,” or to “digestion, nerves or doctors.” A later press release stated, “No advertising
should be used which refers to either the presence or absence of any physical effect of
smoking.”471 In addition, the guides banned all tar and nicotine claims unless definite
scientific evidence existed to prove the claims. However, the guides permitted the

Calfee, John E. “The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Regulation Past” Regulation, 1997 Volume 20(3):
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n3d.html> (Retrieved 28 July 2006).
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advertising of pleasure and taste.472
Again, these guidelines changed the advertising approaches that were used in The
Orange and White. From the middle of the 1950s to the early 1960s, advertising for filtered
brands was increasing while the advertising for the non-filtered cigarettes was gradually
declining. Instead of advertising referring to the effectiveness of or benefits of various
filters, the advertising began to refer more exclusively to what the filters did not do. For
instance, the filters did not impede the flavor or pleasure of smoking. This change in
approach probably appealed to The Orange and White’s college student audience. Young
people typically are not interested in the long-term health consequences that result from
smoking. Instead, they are more interested how their peers will react to the habit. From the
late 1950s to the early 1960s the tobacco industry created advertisements that focused almost
exclusively on the pleasure and social benefits that cigarette smoking provided. During the
last five years that cigarettes were advertised in campus newspapers, The Orange and White
contained more cigarette advertising than ever before. And, the cigarette advertising was
more image-based than ever before. Thus, in some ways, the FTC increased the appeal of
the filtered brands by preventing them from discussing any health related issues.
Although the FTC regulations might have prevented an older generation from
feeling a false sense of security about the healthfulness of cigarette smoking, the regulations
did very little to help young adults and teenagers who were the industry’s primary target
audience. The FTC regulations prevented the cigarette manufacturers from addressing much
factual product information and forced the industry into highly successful image-based
advertising campaigns that were much more appealing to young people. Not surprisingly,
most students found comic strips and other humorous appeals and collegiate appeals to be
Calfee, John E. “The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Regulation Past” Regulation, 1997 Volume 20(3):
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n3d.html> (Retrieved 28 July 2006).
472
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much more enticing than detailed explanations of the various types of cigarette filters. The
only FTC regulation that protected the college market was the 1964 Cigarette Advertising
Code that prevented cigarette companies from advertising in student newspapers such as The
Orange and White.
The 1964 Cigarette Advertising Code formally brought tobacco promotion in
student newspapers to an end. On June 19, 1963, the Tobacco Institute formally decided to
pull its advertising from student media. American Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds,
Lorillard, and Liggett and Myers all agreed to discontinue their cigarette advertising
immediately. During the meeting of the Tobacco Institute, Paul Smith of Phillip Morris said
that their company had not made a decision on the question of college advertising.473 Phillip
Morris was the last cigarette advertiser to remove its cigarette promotions from The Orange
and White. The code did not formally go into effect until 1964. Consequently, the final
Marlboro sponsored Max Shulman column was printed in The Orange and White on
November 26, 1963. It was the very last cigarette advertisement to be printed in the student
newspaper at The University of Tennessee.
Research Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research:
Although this research endeavored to present the topic of cigarette advertising in the
college press as completely as possible, there are some areas where the present study falls
short. First, the research only studied the student newspaper at the University of Tennessee.
Even though the cigarette industry’s media records suggests that the same advertisements
were printed in nearly every college newspaper, college media sales organizations such as
NEAS and CBAM suggest that schools with larger enrollments receive more national
advertisements than smaller schools. Therefore, it is possible that the research presented in
Temko, S.L. "The Tobacco Institute, Inc. Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Executive Committee".
18 Jun 1963 (est.). Bates: 2022975647-2022975650. http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2022975647-5650.html
473
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this study is not representative of smaller colleges and universities. In addition, it is also
possible that religious schools also might have rejected the cigarette advertising because
certain denominations consider smoking to be a vice. Thus, it might prove to be helpful to
compare the cigarette advertising at a large school like the University of Tennessee with
tobacco advertising that was printed at smaller or private colleges.
In addition, one could argue that because the University of Tennessee is located in
the southeastern United States, which is the primary tobacco-growing region, it would be a
more fertile environment for cigarette advertising. Therefore, comparing the frequency of
cigarette advertising at the University of Tennessee with another institution of similar size
outside of the southeast could prove helpful. However, industry documents do suggest that
it is likely that regional differences would be minimal.
Another possible limitation of the study is that very little information regarding the
creative inspiration behind the advertising campaigns is accessible for research. Interviewing
the advertising creatives and the tobacco marketers that inspired the various campaigns
would be extremely useful to furthering this line of research. However, because the
advertisements are between 44 and 86 years old, and because few records exist regarding the
creative teams, this information would be nearly impossible to find for the majority of the
campaigns.
Presentism is also a limitation of this research. It is difficult to examine cigarette
advertising without considering all of the information that has become publicly available
since 1963. Of course, the audience that read these advertisements did not have all of the
information about smoking and viewed the habit very differently than most people do today.
Therefore, the way that these advertisements are considered in 2007 is much different than
they would have been considered 44 to 86 years ago. Perhaps future research could interview
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people who were students when these advertisements were printed to get a more accurate
perspective on how these advertisements were interpreted when they were printed.
However, because of the age of some of the advertisements, it is unlikely that participants
could be found to discuss the earlier decades.
Another area of study that could be explored more fully is the influence of tobacco
representatives or sales people on campus and their role in persuading students to smoke.
This research and other studies have reported that the cigarette industry used professional
sales representatives and students to promote cigarette smoking on campus. There are still
many unanswered questions regarding the techniques and objectives used in this area.
Likewise, research suggests that the tobacco industry lobbied public relations and public
information officers on college and university campuses to create a tobacco friendly
atmosphere for students. More information could be learned about these efforts and how
successful the tobacco industry was in its persuasive efforts to sway college administrators.
Even though this research has its limitations, it does present a first glance into how
cigarette manufacturers targeted college students by advertising in student newspapers such
as The Orange and White. This study provides the reader with a general idea regarding the
frequency of cigarette advertising in student newspapers, the persuasive strategies and tactics
that were used, as well as some popular creative themes and approaches that were devised to
appeal to students from 1921 to 1963. Instead of providing definitive answers to questions
about the influence of the tobacco industry on campus, it is hoped that this research will
compel others to ask more questions about this subject. In many ways, this research seems
like a starting point rather than the end for a particular stream of research.

Conclusion:
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In conclusion, this dissertation provides the reader with a glimpse into a relatively
unknown world. Very little research in advertising or history makes any reference to the
presence of tobacco on college and university campuses from the 1920s to the 1960s. This
research provided insights into the strong presence of cigarette advertising in student
publications on college and university campuses, using The Orange and White as a case study.
It is hoped that this research will help reveal how and why generations of America’s young
adults and youth became attracted to cigarette smoking and, eventually, addicted to nicotine.
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Figure 3: Advertisements by Decade
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Figure 5: Graph
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Figure 6: Major Cigarette Advertisers 1920s-1960s (Unfiltered)
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Figure 8: Creative Strategy – 1920s-1960s
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Figure 9: Number of Cigarette Advertisements 1920-129

Figure 10: Brands Advertised During the 1920s
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Figure 11: Cigarette Brands by Percent – 1920s

Figure 12: Creative Strategy During the 1920s
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Figure 13: Creative Strategies by Percent

Figure 14: Persuasive Appeals and Tactics – 1920s
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Figure 15: Appeals and Tactics by Percent – 1920s

Figure 16: Graph
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Figure 16: Men and Women in Advertisements in the 1920s
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Figure 17: Chesterfield 1921474

Figure 18: Chesterfield 1927475

474
475

Orange and White, March 10, 1921
Orange and White, April 7, 1927
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Figure 19: Chesterfield 1928476

Figure 20: Camel 1921477

476
477

Orange and White, October 26, 1928
Orange and White, October 20, 1921
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Figure 21: Camel 1926478

Figure 22: Camel 1927479

478
479

Orange and White, April 15, 1926
Orange and White, January 23, 1927

228

Figure 23: Camel 1929480

Figure 24: Fatima 1923481

480
481

Orange and White, May 16, 1929
Orange and White, April 11, 1923
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Figure 25: Pears’ Soap 1911 482

Figure 26: Fatima 1924483

482
483

Overland Monthly, April 1911
Orange and White, January 31, 1924
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Figure 27: Old Gold 1927484

Figure 28: Old Gold 1928485

484
485

Orange and White, October 1, 1927
Orange and White, May 27, 1928

231

Figure 29: Old Gold 1929486

Figure 30: Old Gold 1930487

486
487

Orange and White, March 18, 1929
Orange and White, January 16, 1930
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Figure 31: Old Gold 1930488

Figure 32: Old Gold 1930489

488
489

Orange and White, March 6, 1930
Orange and White, May 1, 1930
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Figure 33: Total Cigarette Advertisements by Brand – 1930

Figure 34: Brands of Cigarettes – 1930s
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Figure 35: Creative Strategy by Year – 1930s

Figure 36: Creative Strategy by Percent – 1930s
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Figure 37: Advertising Tactics by Year – 1930s

Figure 38: Advertising Tactics by Percent – 1930s
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Figure 39: Camel 1931490

Figure 40: Camel 1931491

490
491

Orange and White, April 23, 1931
Orange and White, May 21, 1931
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Figure 41: Camel 1932492

Figure 42: Camel 1933493
492
493

Orange and White, April 21, 1932
Orange and White, January 20, 1933
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Figure 43: Camel 1934494

Figure 44: Camel 1935495

494
495

Orange and White, February 9, 1934
Orange and White, February 25, 1935
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Figure 45: Camel 1936496

Figure 46: Camel 1936497

496
497

Orange and White, February 15, 1936
Orange and White, February 15, 1936
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Figure 47: Camel 1937498

Figure 48: Chesterfield 1930499

498
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Orange and White, May 14, 1937
Orange and White, October 16, 1930
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Figure 49: Chesterfield 1931500

Figure 50: Chesterfield 1931501
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Orange and White, January 29, 1931
Orange and White, October 22, 1931
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Figure 51: Chesterfield 1932502

Figure 52: Chesterfield 1933503

502
503

Orange and White, February 19, 1932
Orange and White, January 3, 1933

243

Figure 53: Chesterfield 1934504

Figure 54: Chesterfield 1935505

504
505

Orange and White, April 29, 1934
Orange and White, May 17, 1935
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Figure 55: Chesterfield 1936506

Figure 56: Chesterfield 1937507

506
507

Orange and White, April 3, 1936
Orange and White, April 1, 1937
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Figure 57: Chesterfield 1937508

Figure 58: Chesterfield 1938509

508
509

Orange and White, December 3, 1937
Orange and White, October 19, 1938
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Figure 59: Chesterfield 1938510

Figure 60: Lucky Strike 1931 511
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Orange and White, January 18, 1939
Orange and White, October 29, 1931
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Figure 61: Lucky Strike 1931512

Figure 62: Lucky Strike 1932513

512
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Orange and White, October 29, 1931
Orange and White, November 4, 1932
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Figure 63: Lucky Strike 1934514

Figure 64: Lucky Strike 1934515
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Orange and White, January 26, 1934
Orange and White, October 5, 1934

249

Figure 65: Lucky Strike 1935516

Figure 66: Lucky Strike 1937517
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517

Orange and White, February 15, 1935
Orange and White, April 11, 1937
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Figure 67: Old Gold518

Figure 68: Old Gold 1934519
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Orange and White, October 13, 1932
Orange and White, October 5, 1934
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Figure 69: Frequency of Cigarette Advertising by Brand

Figure 70: Cigarette Advertisements by Brand - 1940s
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Figure 71: Graph
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Figure 71: Strategy by Brand 1940s

Figure 72: Strategy by Percent
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Figure 73: Advertising Tactics - 1940

Figure 74: Tactics by Percent
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Figure 75: Camel 1940520

Figure 76: Camel 1941521

520
521

The Orange and White, November 8, 1940
The Orange and White, February 14, 1941
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Figure 77: Camel 1941522

Figure 78: Camel 1942523

522
523

The Orange and White, November 21, 1941
The Orange and White, October 7, 1942
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Figure 79: Camel 1947524

Figure 80: Camel 1948525

524
525

The Orange and White, October 2, 1947
The Orange and White, October 8, 1948
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Figure 81: Chesterfield 1940526

Figure 82: Chesterfield 1941527

526
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The Orange and White, November 29, 1940
The Orange and White, March 21, 1941
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Figure 83: Chesterfield 1943528

Figure 84: Chesterfield 1944529

528
529

The Orange and White, April 18, 1943
The Orange and White, April 14, 1944
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Figure 85: Chesterfield 1946530

Figure 86: Chesterfield 1946531

530
531

The Orange and White, January 11, 1946
The Orange and White, January 11, 1946
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Figure 87: Chesterfield 1948532

Figure 88: Phillip Morris 1943533

532
533

The Orange and White, October 8, 1948
The Orange and White, October 23, 1943
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Figure 89: Old Gold 1947534

Figure 90: Raleigh 1947535

534
535

The Orange and White, March 12, 1947
The Orange and White, January 17, 1947
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Figure 91: Comparison of Advertising Across Three Classes of Cigarettes

Figure 92: Primary Unfiltered Cigarette Advertisers
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Figure 93: Frequency of Advertising for Unfiltered Brands – 1950s

Figure 94: Primary Advertisers for Filtered Cigarettes – 1950s
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Figure 95: Advertisers for Filtered Cigarette Brands – 1950s

Figure 96: Creative Strategy by Year – 1950s
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Figure 97: Creative Strategy by Percent - 1950s

Figure 98: Creative Tactics by Year – 1950s
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Figure 99: Creative Tactics by Percent

Figure 100: Lucky Strike 1952536

536

The Orange and White, October 2, 1952
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Figure 101: Lucky Strike 1954537

Figure 102: Lucky Strike 1954538

537
538

The Orange and White, April 15, 1954
The Orange and White, October 4, 1954
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Figure 103: Lucky Strike 1954539

Figure 104: Lucky Strike 1956540

539
540

The Orange and White, October 4, 1954
The Orange and White, November 2, 1956
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Figure 105: Camel 1951541

Figure 106: Camel 1952542

541
542

The Orange and White, March 30, 1951
The Orange and White, October 23, 1952
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Figure 107: Camel 1954543

Figure 108: Camel 1955544

543
544

The Orange and White, April 15, 1954
The Orange and White, October 14, 1955
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Figure 109: Camel 1956545

Figure 110: Camel 1958546
545
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The Orange and White, November 2, 1956
The Orange and White, November 7, 1958
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Figure 111: Chesterfield 1950547

Figure 112: Chesterfield 1951548

547
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The Orange and White, October 18, 1950
The Orange and White, October 17, 1951 and November 7, 1951
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Figure 113: Chesterfield 1952549

Figure 114: Chesterfield 1954550

549
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The Orange and White, October 16, 1952
The Orange and White, April 29, 1954
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Figure 115: Chesterfield 1954551

Figure 116: Chesterfield 1958552

551
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The Orange and White, May 6, 1954
The Orange and White, April 1958
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Figure 117: Phillip Morris 1951553

553

The Orange and White, April 20, 1951
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Figure 118: Phillip Morris 1952554

554

The Orange and White, April 14, 1952
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Figure 119: Phillip Morris 1956555

555

The Orange and White, 1956

278

Figure 120: Old Gold 1957 556

556

The Orange and White, January 11, 1957
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Figure 121: Pall Mall 1959557

Figure 122: Winston 1954558

557
558

The Orange and White, February 13, 1959
The Orange and White, May 13, 1954
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Figure 123: Winston 1956559

Figure 124: Winston 1958560
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The Orange and White, April 6, 1956
The Orange and White, April 4, 1958

281

Figure 125: L&M 1954561

Figure 126: L&M 1955562

561
562

The Orange and White, November 18, 1954
The Orange and White, October 14, 1955
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Figure 127: L&M 1958563

563

The Orange and White, April 4, 1958
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Figure 128: Viceroy 1956564

564

The Orange and White, May 11, 1956
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Figure 129: Viceroy 1958565

Figure 130: Tareyton 1955566

565
566

The Orange and White, March 28, 1958
The Orange and White, November 4, 1955
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Figure 131: Tareyton 1956567

Figure 132: Tareyton 1960568

567
568

The Orange and White, October 19, 1956
The Orange and White, April 8, 1960

286

Figure 133: Marlboro 1956569

569

The Orange and White, May 4, 1956
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Figure 134: Marlboro 1958570

570

The Orange and White, November 21, 1958
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Figure 135: Salem 1957571

Figure 136: Kool 1960572

571
572

The Orange and White, October 11, 1957
The Orange and White, May 27, 1960
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Figure 137: Comparison of Advertising Across Three Classes of Cigarettes

Figure 138: Unfiltered Cigarette Advertisements – 1960 to 1963
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Figure 139: Advertisements for Unfiltered Cigarettes – 1960 to 1963

Figure 140: Advertisements for Filtered Cigarettes – 1960 to 1963
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Figure 141: Advertisers for Filtered Cigarette Brands – 1960s

Figure 142: Creative Strategy by Year – 1960 to 1963
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Figure 143: Creative Strategy by Percent – 1960 to 1963

Figure 144: Creative Tactics by Year – 1960 to 1963
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Figure 145: Pie Chart
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Figure 145: Creative Tactics by Percent - 1960 to 1963

Figure 146: Camel 1961573

573

The Orange and White, October 27, 1961
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Figure 147: Camel 1961574

Figure 148: Chesterfield 1961575
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The Orange and White, October 27, 1961
The Orange and White, October 27, 1961
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Figure 149: Chesterfield 1962576

576

The Orange and White, October 2, 1962
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Figure 150: Lucky Strike 1960577

577

The Orange and White, November 18, 1960
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Figure 151: Lucky Strike 1961578

Figure 152: Lucky Strike 1962579

578
579

The Orange and White, November 2, 1961
The Orange and White, April 27, 1962
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Figure 153: Pall Mall 1962580

Figure 154: Pall Mall 1962581

580
581

The Orange and White, January 12, 1962
The Orange and White, October 2, 1962
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Figure 155: Tareyton 1960582

Figure 156: Tareyton 1961583

582
583

The Orange and White, September 20, 1960
The Orange and White, October 12, 1961
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Figure 157: Winston 1960584

Figure 158: L&M 1960585

584
585

The Orange and White, November 18, 1960
The Orange and White, April 1, 1960
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Figure 159: L&M 1962586

Figure 160: Viceroy 1961587

586
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The Orange and White, November 6, 1962
The Orange and White, November 10, 1961
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Figure 161: Viceroy 1962588

Figure 162: Marlboro 1962589

588
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The Orange and White, May 10, 1962
The Orange and White, December 7, 1962
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Figure 163: Marlboro 1962590

590

The Orange and White, September 12, 1962
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Figure 164: Kool 1960591

Figure 165: Salem 1962592

591
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The Orange and White, October 7, 1960
The Orange and White, October 9, 1962

305

Figure 166: Camel 1931 Career Advisors593

Figure 167: Chesterfield 1933 Career Advisors594

593
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Orange and White, April 2, 1931
Orange and White, January 17, 1933

306

Figure 168: Camel 1935 Career Advisors595

595

Orange and White, April 26, 1935
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Figure 169: Chesterfield 1943 Career Advisors596

Figure 170: Camel 1943 Career Advisors597
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The Orange and White, March 10, 1943
The Orange and White, May 12, 1943
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Figure 171: Camel 1954 Career Advisors598

Figure 172: Camel 1956 Career Advisors599

598
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The Orange and White, March 4, 1954
The Orange and White, October 5, 1956
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Figure 173: Chesterfield 1958 Career Advisors600

Figure 174: Chesterfield 1932 Matchmakers601

600
601

The Orange and White, November 21, 1958
Orange and White, November 18, 1932
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Figure 175: Lucky Strike 1935 Matchmakers602

602

Orange and White, March 29, 1935
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Figure 176: Winston 1955 Matchmakers603

603

The Orange and White, December 2, 1955
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Figure 177: Tareyton 1956 Matchmakers604

604

The Orange and White, February 10, 1956
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Figure 178: Camel 1956 Matchmakers605

605

The Orange and White, February 24, 1956
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Figure 179: Chesterfield 1955 Matchmakers606

606

The Orange and White, October 27, 1955
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Figure 180: Old Gold 1928 Campus Cigarette607
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Orange and White, April 12, 1928
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Figure 181: Lucky Strike 1954 Campus Cigarette608
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The Orange and White, January 14, 1954
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Figure 182: Chesterfield 1954 Campus Cigarette609

Figure 183: Lucky Strike 1957 Campus Cigarette610

609
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The Orange and White, January 14, 1954
The Orange and White, October 25, 1957
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Figure 184: Chesterfield/L&M/Oasis 1960 Campus Cigarette611

611

The Orange and White, October 21, 1960
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Figure 185: Viceroy 1961 Campus Cigarette612

612

The Orange and White, November 10, 1961
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Figure 186: Camel 1934 Study Buddies613

613

Orange and White, November 2, 1934
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Figure 187: Old Gold 1928 Smoking and Health614

Figure 188: Lucky Strike 1932 Smoking and Health615

614

Orange and White, November 15, 1928
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Figure 189: Lucky Strike 1937 Smoking and Health616

Figure 190: Camel 1937 Smoking and Health617

Orange and White, May 17, 1932
Orange and White, February 26, 1937
617 Orange and White, February 26, 1937
615
616
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Figure 191: Camel 1935 Smoking and Health618

618

Orange and White, October 11, 1935
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Figure 192: Camel 1936 Smoking and Health619

619

Orange and White, December 4, 1936
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Figure 193: Camel 1941 Smoking and Health620

Figure 194: Camel 1948 Smoking and Health621

620
621

The Orange and White, December 10, 1941
The Orange and White, October 22, 1948
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Figure 195: Old Gold 1947 Smoking and Health622

622

The Orange and White, March 12, 1947
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Figure 196: Chesterfield 1952 Smoking and Health623

Figure 197: Chesterfield 1953 Smoking and Health624

623
624

The Orange and White, November 6, 1952
The Orange and White, October 1, 1953
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Figure 198: L&M 1954 Smoking and Health625

Figure 199: Viceroy 1958 Smoking and Health626

625
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The Orange and White, November 18, 1954
The Orange and White, March 29, 1958
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Figure 200: Old Gold 1934 Advertorials/Cartoons627

627

Orange and White, November 2, 1934
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Figure 201: Old Gold 1930 Advertorials/Cartoons628

628

Orange and White, March 6, 1930
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Figure 202: Old Gold 1935 Advertorials/Cartoons629

Figure 203: Old Gold 1935 Advertorials/Cartoons630

629
630

Orange and White, February 15, 1935
Orange and White, March 29, 1935
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Figure 204: Camel 1933 Advertorials/Cartoons631

631

Orange and White, April 11, 1933
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Figure 205: Camel 1951 Advertorials/Cartoons632

632

The Orange and White, March 30, 1951
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Figure 206: Camel 1952 Advertorials/Cartoons633

Figure 207: Camel 1958 Advertorials/Cartoons634

633
634

The Orange and White, October 30, 1952
The Orange and White, November 14, 1958
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Figure 208: Winston 1958 Advertorials/Cartoons635

635

The Orange and White, November 14, 1958
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Figure 209: Pall Mall 1962 Advertorials/Cartoons636

636

The Orange and White, January 12, 1962
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Figure 210: Lucky Strike 1961 Advertorials/Comics637

637

The Orange and White, November 2, 1961
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Figure 211: Marlboro 1962 Advertorials/Cartoon638

638

The Orange and White, September 12, 1962
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Figure 212: Kool 1960 Advertorials/Cartoon639

639

The Orange and White, May 27, 1960
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Figure 213: Chesterfield 1932 Promotional Advertising640

640

Orange and White, February 19, 1932

341

Figure 214: Chesterfield 1932 Promotional Advertising641

Figure 215: Chesterfield 1937 Promotional Advertising642
641
642

Orange and White, April 29, 1932
Orange and White, May 7, 1937

342

Figure 216: Camel 1935 Promotional Advertising643

643

Orange and White, October 25, 1935

343

Figure 217: Camel 1937 Promotional Advertising644

644

Orange and White, January 15, 1937
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Figure 218: Phillip Morris 1947 Promotional Advertising645

Figure 219: Chesterfield 1948 Promotional Advertising646

645
646

The Orange and White, December 10, 1947
The Orange and White, November 19, 1948
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Figure 220: Phillip Morris 1952 Promotional Advertising647

647

The Orange and White, April 14, 1952
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Figure 221: Lucky Strike 1931 Legislation648

648

Orange and White, October 29, 1931
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Figure 222: Lucky Strike 1937 Legislation649

649

Orange and White, April 11, 1937
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